Leonid Batyuk

An Android Application Sandbox system for suspicious software detection

Smartphones are steadily gaining popularity, creating new application areas as their capabilities increase in terms of computational power, sensors and communication. Emerging new features of mobile devices give opportunity to new threats. Android is one of the newer operating systems targeting smartphones. While being based on a Linux kernel, Android has unique properties and specific limitations due to its mobile nature. This makes it harder to detect and react upon malware attacks if using conventional techniques. In this paper, we propose an Android Application Sandbox (AASandbox) which is able to perform both static and dynamic analysis on Android programs to automatically detect suspicious applications. Static analysis scans the software for malicious patterns without installing it. Dynamic analysis executes the application in a fully isolated environment, i.e. sandbox, which intervenes and logs low-level interactions with the system for further analysis. Both the sandbox and the detection algorithms can be deployed in the cloud, providing a fast and distributed detection of suspicious software in a mobile software store akin to Googles Android Market. Additionally, AASandbox might be used to improve the efficiency of classical anti-virus applications available for the Android operating system.

Smartphone malware evolution revisited: Android next target?

Smartphones started being targets for malware in June 2004 while malware count increased steadily until the introduction of a mandatory application signing mechanism for Symbian OS in 2006. From this point on, only few news could be read on this topic. Even despite of new emerging smartphone platforms, e.g. Android and iPhone, malware writers seemed to lose interest in writing malware for smartphones giving users an unappropriate feeling of safety. In this paper, we revisit smartphone malware evolution for completing the appearance list until end of 2008. For contributing to smartphone malware research, we continue this list by adding descriptions on possible techniques for creating the first malware(s) for Android platform1. Our approach involves usage of undocumented Android functions enabling us to execute native Linux application even on retail Android devices. This can be exploited to create malicious Linux applications and daemons using various methods to attack a device. In this manner, we also show that it is possible to bypass the Android permission system by using native Linux applications.

Developing and benchmarking native Linux applications on Android

Smartphones get increasingly popular where more and more smartphone platforms emerge. Special attention was gained by the open source platform Android which was presented by the Open Handset Alliance (OHA) hosting members like Google, Motorola, and HTC. Android uses a Linux kernel and a stripped-down userland with a custom Java VM set on top. The resulting system joins the advantages of both environments, while third-parties are intended to develop only Java applications at the moment.

Multi-device Key Management Using Visual Side Channels in Pervasive Computing Environments

In the modern connected world, pervasive computing has become reality. Thanks to the ubiquity of mobile computing devices and emerging cloud-based services, the users permanently stay connected to their data. This introduces a slew of new security challenges, including the problem of multi-device key management and single-sign-on architectures. One solution to this problem is the utilization of secure side-channels for authentication, including the visual channel as vicinity proof. However, existing approaches often assume confidentiality of the visual channel, or provide only insufficient means of mitigating a man-in-the-middle attack. In this work, we introduce \emph{QR-Auth}, a two-step, 2D barcode based authentication scheme for mobile devices which aims specifically at key management and key sharing across devices in a pervasive environment. It requires minimal user interaction and therefore provides better usability than most existing schemes, without compromising its security. We show how our approach fits in existing authorization delegation and one-time-password generation schemes, and that it is resilient to man-in-the-middle attacks.