Leszek Buszynski

Maritime Claims and Energy Cooperation in the South China Sea

The unresolved maritime claims to all, or parts, of the South China Sea involve Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, and China, and have hindered the development of the hydrocarbon resources there. Rising oil prices and Chinas voracious appetite for energy have stimulated greater interest in the exploitation of the areas oil reserves. Despite the uncertainty, ASEAN countries have involved energy companies in exploration and drilling in their respective claims. Cooperation arrangements between national oil companies including Chinese have been negotiated which hold out the prospect of greater security, even in the absence of a settlement of the maritime claims. Energy cooperation may stabilize the South China Sea providing a secure operating environment for oil exploitation. In time, the way could be prepared for further steps which would involve the claimants in negotiations over a resolution of the maritime claims.

Oil and territory in Putin's relations with China and Japan

Abstract Russias President Vladimir Putin has centralized decision making in Moscow and has reduced the role of domestic actors. He has demonstrated his own personal management of foreign policy in relation to China and Japan. He has used negotiations over oil and territory to place Russia in a more favourable position between them. In relation to oil, he has overruled the oil company Yukos and others within his own government and decided in favour of the Japanese pipeline route, which includes a branch line to China. Putin decided on the Japanese route because it promised access to wider markets in the Asia Pacific, besides China. It also entailed deeper Japanese involvement in Russias development and reduced Russian dependence upon China. In terms of territory, Putin undermined the power of local opposition and offered territorial settlements to both China and Japan, to remove sources of future tension. With China he compromised over the river islands which had been left outstanding since the main border agreement was signed in 1991. To Japan he again offered a compromise over the disputed islands based on the 1956 agreement to improve relations. Russians may hope that energy dependence would induce the Japanese to become more willing to compromise over the territorial issue. The Japanese, however, expect that Russias need for funding for the pipeline would allow them to resist that pressure and to demand a return of all disputed islands. If Russia emerges as an energy supplier to both China and Japan its influence and its regional role would be enhanced. Much depends upon the prospects for the oil pipeline and its branch line, whose feasibility has been questioned.

Thailand's Foreign Policy: Management of a Regional Vision

Thailands foreign policy has been transformed since the days of the Cambodian conflict when the Vietnamese threat was the major preoccupation and the national security imperative dominated decision-making, creating rigidities and distorting relations with the region. The emphasis upon national security as the overriding priority in foreign policy was facilitated by the role of the military in Thai politics, which pursued its own corporate interests and identified them with those of the Thai state. Since the termination of the Cambodian conflict, however, Thai foreign policy has moved in new directions, a process assisted by the decline of the militarys domestic role. It has become economics-driven, reflecting internal economic expansion in the absence of external threat. Foreign policy toward the region has been directed by a wider vision that places Thailand in the role of economic transformer for mainland Southeast Asia, a vision which was expressed by Chatichai Chunhawan during his administration (1988-91) but which has roots in contemporary Thai history. It has been similarly raised by subsequent Thai leaders as a measure of Thailands status as an economic power and its sense of economic achievement. There is the view in official circles that the country is no longer just an ordinary Southeast Asian country but one whose economic transformation has elevated its status into that of a regional power. This article examines the development of Thailands regional vision as a basis for foreign policy and assesses the consequences for Thailands relations with the external environment.

Sino-Japanese Relations: Interdependence, Rivalry and Regional Security

Rivalry within interdependence is possible. Trade and investment ties alone are not sufficient to bring peace and security to a relationship, the responsiveness of the political leadership to economic interdependence is critical. Responsiveness can be influenced by a history of conflict in a relationship, national ambitions or by a military which espouses expansionist plans. Britain and Germany before 1914 demonstrated that interdependence and rivalry can coexist and may degenerate into war. This can happen when one side under the influence of a dominant military falsely assumes that the other would be constrained by interdependence from responding to its military action. Both Japan and China have become bound by a tight economic interdependence despite their historical animosities. These animosities could be exacerbated by military modernization and China’s plans to develop a naval capability to protect its sealanes. Japan would be prompted to respond to the development of Chinese naval power which would aggravate existing rivalry with Beijing. To reduce the impact of this rivalry both ASEAN and the United States should clearly signal to Beijing that military action over Taiwan or naval expansion without transparency would be unacceptable. Otherwise false assumptions would arise in Beijing that interdependence would constrain responses to China’s risk taking.

Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a successful example of regionalism for a number of reasons, but the most important has been its ability to affirm a commitment to regional order based upon the territorial status quo. This commitment was enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concluded during the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976. The devastation wrought by Indonesias konfrontasi campaign against Malaysia (1963-66) exposed the dangers of territorial revisionism and the need for common affirmation of the postcolonial frontiers. Moreover, fear of communist insurgency throughout the late 1960s and 1970s prompted Southeast Asian leaders to develop bilateral or border security cooperation and to coordinate political responses against communism in general. I Vietnams occupation of Cambodia (December 1978-September 1989) was the test of ASEANs commitment to regional order, and its success in terms of focusing the international communitys attention upon a territorial revision by force of arms endowed ASEAN with a unique sense of status. Vietnams withdrawal from Cambodia was an indication that Vietnam recognized that the principle of the territorial status quo, which had governed relations between the ASEAN countries, extended to Indochina as well. The extension of this principle to a communist-dominated part of the region, which previously had been a source of instability, was indeed a crowning achievement. But where does ASEAN go from here?

Russia and Northeast Asia: aspirations and reality

This article examines Russian Government policy towards Northeast Asia as an interplay between aspirations, which have been expressed by government leaders, parliamentary figures and prominent academics and journalists and actual results. The article uses three levels, global, regional and bilateral, as a basis for the analysis. In terms of global interests the Russian leadership has sought diplomatic balance against the US, in terms of regional interests the leadership has pursued the aim of economic and security integration while at the bilateral level Russian leadership has sought specific benefits from particular relations with China, Japan and South Korea. The article notes that Russia has obtained certain diplomatic benefits from the relationship with China which serve its interests at the global level. At the regional level policy aspirations have been frustrated by Russias dire economic condition and the tendency to be treated as an ‘outsider’. Russia has benefited from an improvement of bilateral relations with China, Japan and South Korea but these gains do not translate into an improved position at the regional level yet. while the Russian leadership has been nurturing the development of bilateral relationships problems particular to those relationships hinder its wider regional acceptance.

Thailand and Myanmar: The perils of ‘constructive engagement’

Abstract Thailand has pursued a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards Myanmar since Chatichai Chunawans government, which was in office from August 1988 until February 1991. While the international community has condemned Myanmars military leadership for human rights violations Thailand has promoted closer relations with the ruling regime in Myanmar, or the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) utilizing the idea of ‘constructive engagement’ as a justification. Chatichai gave expression to this policy of closer relations with Myanmar when he outlined a vision of Thailand as an economic centre on mainland Southeast Asia, which would embrace neighbours Laos and Cambodia as well as Myanmar. The term ‘constructive engagement’ was used subsequently to characterize this policy when it came under international criticism. According to successive Thai governments the benefits of ‘constructive engagement’ included enhanced border security and increased trade since, as it was argued, Thailand could...

Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue

Introduction 1. Bargaining and Negotiation Theory 2. Strategies and Bargaining Positions of the Players 3. The Formation of the Six Party Talks 4. South Korea and China and the September 2005 Agreement 5. The Nuclear Test and the February 2007 Agreement 6. From the February Agreement to the End of the Six Party Talks 7. Efforts to Revive the Six Party Talks Conclusion

Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign Policy

TRADITIONALLY, Thailand has accommodated itself to superior power, bargaining compliance for protection and obligating the dominant state in the region to come to its defense. Thailand accepted Japanese occupation during World War II and even declared war on the allied powers, but manipulated an obliging helplessness that subsequently evoked U.S. protection against British demands for retribution. Indeed, this disarming quality of the Thais has proved particularly captivating as far as the Americans are concerned and somewhat frustrating for their Southeast Asian neighbors, whose anxieties can be aroused by what they regard as audacious inconstancy. Thailand allied itself firmly with the United States in the expectation of establishing a bond that could be directed against Vietnam, for many decades considered the traditional enemy. U.S. revision of priorities in Southeast Asia, however, prompted a crisis in Thai foreign policy as it was realized that Thailand would be compelled to protect itself from the undesirable consequences of Vietnamese reunification without the support of a clearly dominant regional power. The idea of diversified relations with the great powers was obviously an attempt to come to terms with post-Vietnam war realities in a situation in which no one actual or potential protector could claim undisputed regional primacy. Thailands flexibility in foreign policy largely derived from its experience of dealing with powers that were able to maintain only a temporary presence in the region. The European colonial powers, the Japanese during World War II, and the United States during the Vietnam war introduced eras into the regions history that were relatively transient. Flexibility in foreign policy was of necessity a protective reaction to the

Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia: Prospects for the Gorbachev Era

Mikhail Gorbachevs statements on Soviet Asian policy indicate predictable continuity with the past without, as yet, any hint that his proclaimed and long overdue focus upon the deteriorating state of the Soviet economy would demand adjustment or contraction. Gorbachev has not and cannot be expected to act like Khrushchev who, upon consolidating power by the time of the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, was able to introduce sweeping and startling innovations in foreign policy. Even if the present General Secretary were as impulsive and bombastic as the fustian Khrushchev, he would have learned from the latters fate that policies in the Soviet Union require a firm base in a party consensus for their implementation. The effort to cultivate and maintain a consensus imposes an institutional constraint upon the General Secretary that severely circumscribes his ability to innovate or otherwise deviate from the established pattern. The General Secretary may move to redefine or influence the party consensus by placing his appointees into key positions, but this takes time in a system where the rules governing the transfer of power are at best inchoate and ill-formed. The major personnel changes which have taken place since Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 that will affect foreign policy decision making relate more to superpower relations and Soviet policy toward Europe than to Third World policy. Gromykos elevation to the presidency on July 2 was in essence a victory for the party apparatchiks within the central committee secretariat as against the professionals within the Foreign