Lewis Davis

Do All Countries Follow the Same Growth Process

We estimate a finite mixture model in which countries are sorted into groups based on the similarity of the conditional distributions of their growth rates. We strongly reject the hypothesis that all countries follow a common growth process in favor of a model in which there are two classes of countries, each with its own distinct growth process. Group membership does not conform to the usual categories used to control for parameter heterogeneity such as region or income. However, we find strong evidence that one country characteristic that helps to sort countries into different regimes is the quality of institutions, specifically, the degree of law and order. Once institutional features of the economy are controlled for, we find no evidence that geographic characteristics play a role in determining the country groupings.

Language, Culture and Institutions: Evidence from a New Linguistic Dataset

Kashima and Kashimas (1998) linguistic dataset has played a prominent role in the economics of culture, providing the instrumental variables used in two seminal works to identify the causal effect of culture on institutional quality. However, for economists, this dataset has a number of weaknesses, including poor overlap with a key cultural dataset and reliance on sources of linguistic information of uneven quality. We address these issues by constructing a new linguistic dataset based on an authoritative source of linguistic information, the World Atlas of Language Structures. The resulting dataset has greater overlap with key sources of cultural information, is arguably less subject to selection bias, and provides more refined information regarding key dimensions of linguistic variation. We show that the variables in this dataset are significantly correlated with commonly used measures of individualism and egalitarianism. In addition, we reexamine the key results from the literature on culture and institutions, showing the causal relationship between culture and institutions is robust to the use of the new linguistic instruments.

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holders product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.

Individual Responsibility and Economic Development: Evidence from Rainfall Data*

This paper estimates the effect of individual responsibility on economic development using an instrument derived from rainfall data. I argue that a taste for collective responsibility was adaptive in preindustrial societies that were exposed to high levels of agricultural risk, and that these attitude continue to influence contemporary social norms. The link between agricultural risk and collective responsibility is formalized in a model of informal risk sharing arrangements that incorporates optimal parental socialization decisions. Empirically, I find a robust negative correlation between rainfall variation, a measure of exogenous agricultural risk, and measures of individual responsibility. Finally, using rainfall variation as an instrument, I find that individual responsibility has a large positive effect on economic development. The empirical relationships between rainfall variation, individual responsibility and economic development are robust to the use of alternative measures of individualism and rainfall variation and to the inclusion of controls for contemporary and historical agricultural outcomes, soil and climate quality, early institutional quality, and dimensions of climate and geography associated with institutional development.

The Institutional Foundations of Inequality and Growth

After a decade of research, the effect of inequality on long-run economic growth remains unresolved, in part because researchers have treated omitted variable bias as an estimation problem rather than a deeper question of causality. In this article we argue that the key omitted variable is the quality of economic institutions. Using both cross-country and panel data specifications, we find no direct effect of inequality on growth in the long-run. Rather, the protection of property rights simultaneously raises growth rates and reduces income inequality. We interpret these findings as evidence that insecure property rights disproportionately disadvantage the poor.

Individual Responsibility and Economic Development: Evidence from Rainfall Data*: Individual Responsibility and Economic Development

This paper estimates the effect of individual responsibility on economic development using an instrument derived from rainfall data. I argue that a taste for collective responsibility was adaptive in preindustrial societies that were exposed to high levels of agricultural risk, and that these attitudes continue to influence contemporary social norms and economic outcomes. The link between agricultural risk and collective responsibility is formalized in a model of optimal parental socialization effort. Empirically, I find a robust negative correlation between rainfall variation, a measure of exogenous agricultural risk, and a measure of individual responsibility. Using rainfall variation as an instrument, I find that individual responsibility has a large positive effect on economic development. The relationships between rainfall variation, individual responsibility and economic development are robust to the inclusion of variables related to climate and agricultural and institutional development.

Culture and the Regulation of Entry

Does culture affect the manner in which a society regulates the entry of new firms? Our results suggest it does. We find more individualistic countries regulate entry more lightly. We investigate how culture matters presenting evidence of significant interactions between individualism and formal legal and political institutions. Individualism has a greater impact on entry regulation in societies with democratic political institutions or a common law tradition. This outcome is consistent with the idea that culture influences social preference for regulation, and political and legal institutions determine the degree to which those preferences are expressed as policy outcomes.

Toward a Unified Transaction Cost Theory of Economic Organization

This paper develops a general equilibrium model endogenizing labor specialization, firm size, firm specialization, interfirm trade, and economic fragmentation. In contrast to the standard neoinstitutionalist understanding of firms and markets as substitutes in organizing production, firms and markets are shown to be complements in reaping economies to the division of labor. As a result, firm size varies directly, rather than inversely, with the extent of interfirm trade. Growth is facilitated by increases in the complexity of economic organization, involving increases in the division of labor, the size and specialization of firms, market size, and the complexity of interfirm trade.

Federal policies, state responses, and community college outcomes: Testing an augmented Bennett hypothesis

We estimate the impact of increases in Federal student aid and higher education funding, such as the recently proposed American Graduation Initiative (AGI), on the outcomes of community colleges, including enrollments, list and average tuitions, and educational quality. We develop a reduced form model of state-level education policy in which state policy makers, who have objectives that differ from those of Federal policy makers, respond to changes in Federal policies. Our empirical specification treats state and institutional variables as endogenous; we interpret the coefficients as measuring the responses of state and institution officials to changes in Federal policies. We simulate the effects of AGI and find little evidence that states recapture Federal education resources. AGI would have a significant effect on educational quality but a limited effect on enrollments. An equivalent increase in Federal student aid would have greater impact on access and enrollments, but decrease educational quality.

Social Comparisons and Life Satisfaction Across Racial and Ethnic Groups: The Effects of Status, Information and Solidarity

This paper explores the role of within group social comparisons on the life satisfaction of different racial and ethnic groups in the US. For Whites, we find that higher group income levels are associated with lower levels of life satisfaction, a result that is consistent with a preference for within group status. In contrast, life satisfaction is increasing in group income for Blacks. This result is consistent with the existence of social norms that emphasize Black solidarity. It is also consistent with an information effect in which Blacks rely on peer income levels to form expectations regarding their future prospects. We introduce a theoretical framework to help to distinguish between solidarity and information effects. Our empirical results provide strong support for the hypothesis that solidarity rather than information accounts for the positive relationship between average Black income and the subjective wellbeing of US Blacks. Finally, we consider two theories of social solidarity and find support for social salience but not social density in determining the strength of solidarity effects.