Lewis Evans

Incentive Regulation of Prices when Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment uncertain future demand and capital prices and a regulator who sets the firms output price at discrete intervals. Using this model we derive a closed-form solution for the firms output price which ensures that whenever the regulator resets the price the present value of the firms future net revenue stream equals the present value of the investment expenditure incurred by a hypothetical efficient firm which replaced the regulated firm. We calculate the rate of return which shareholders should receive to compensate them for the exposure to demand risk and capital price risk induced by modern incentive regulation. In contrast to rate of return regulation we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently increases the risk faced by the firms owners and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital. We show that the market value of the regulated firm will generally exceed the replacement cost of its existing assets by an amount that we interpret as the value of the firms excess capacity. The higher valuation is required in order for the firm to prospectively manage fixed costs that are implied by irreversibility. We suggest it is indicative of the efficient treatment of investment in advance. This contrasts with much of the existing literature which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of its existing assets.

An alternative approach to simulating var models

Abstract This paper proposes a simple approach to the problem of handling contemporaneous correlation of the error terms when simulating VAR models. The approach is illustrated with an example using an estimated VAR model of the New Zealand economy.

Shareholder Liability Regimes, Principal-Agent Relationships and Banking Industry Performance

We develop an interpretation of the economics of alternative shareholder liability regimes that challenges the view that limited liability always represents the most efficient form of corporate organization. Unlimited liability will prevail when creditors are willing to compensate shareholders for bearing all of the costs of monitoring management and the risk associated with the activities of the firm. When the information about the financial position of the firm that is required to facilitate increased risk-bearing by creditors can be provided at costs lower than those associated with unlimited liability, firms will incorporate. Scottish banking in the nineteenth century provides unique data on the operation of a market in which firms with limited and unlimited liability competed, on the risk premium associated with unlimited liability shares, and on the innovations in information provision that facilitated the move from unlimited to multiple liability.

Price-Cap Regulation and the Scale and Timing of Investment

This paper shows how scale economies affect welfare-maximizing regulation and regulated firms’ investment behavior. Price-regulated firms take less advantage of scale economies than social planners, with greater investment distortions for greater economies of scale. Price caps should be below the caps implied by planners’ investment programs for moderate economies of scale, and above them otherwise. Despite quantity regulation raising the average cost of building capacity, price caps should be lower when quantity is regulated. Immediately after firms make their initial investment, regulators want to transfer surplus from customers to shareholders by raising the price cap in order to fund service improvements.

Assessing the Integration of Electricity Markets Using Principal Component Analysis: Network and Market Structure Effects

The major difficulties in assessing market power in electricity wholesale spot markets mean that great weight should be placed upon assessing market outcomes against the fundamental determinants of supply demand and competition. In this spirit we study whether the New Zealand market has been a national market or a set of local markets since its inception in 1996. Electricity markets generally have loop flows that require simultaneous assessment of prices at all nodes thereby limiting the informativeness of pair-wise nodal comparisons. We introduce principal component analysis to this application and show that it is a natural tool for the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the presence of local markets. We find that increased competition induced some separation into local markets that was eliminated by transmission enhancement and the introduction of generation downstream from the constrained circuits. For most of the period New Zealand has had one national market.

How Options Provided by Storage Affect Electricity Prices

Generators supplying electricity markets are subject to volatile input and output prices and uncertain fuel availability. We show that a price-taking generator will generate only when the output price exceeds its operational marginal cost by the value of the option to delay the use of stored fuel. This option value, which is an increasing function of spot price volatility and the uncertainty about fuel availability, must be considered when evaluating whether market power is present in electricity markets. We calibrate our model to the California electricity market and show the implications of Hurricane Katrina for generators’ offers. The standard approach for simulating electricity supply curves for use in market power evaluations just uses operational marginal cost. Our work demonstrates that operational marginal cost is a lower bound for total short-run marginal cost and may considerably underestimate actual short-run marginal cost even in the complete absence of market power.

The performance of Internet service provider (ISP) markets of Australia and New Zealand

Shows that ISP final prices are lower, Internet usage is higher, and the number of ISPs per head of population is lower in New Zealand relative to Australia. Goes on to argue that ISPs pose competitive threats for telecommunications companies and that New Zealand’s open competition regime, relative to Australia’s access regulations, has invited more efficient facilities competition.

Discrimination in Bank Lending Policies: A Test Using Data from the Bank of Nova Scotia 1900-37

The authors use data on 460 loans made to individual firms by the Bank of Nova Scotia, together with information on the location, capital size, and activity type of each of these firms, to test for the existence of discriminatory lending policies. Their analysis indicates that there were marked differences in the amounts that firms of different types and in different locations actually borrowed. However, none of the results provides clear-cut support for the discrimination hypotheses in the secondary literature, including the suggestion that Canadian banks discriminated against manufacturing firms.

The Role of Storage in a Competitive Electricity Market and the Effects of Climate Change

This paper uses a new model of a competitive electricity market to investigate the role of storage in markets dominated by hydro generation. Competition among generators leads to an endogenous shadow price of stored water, which facilitates the efficient intra-day and inter-season substitution of fuel. Overall welfare depends on storage capacity, the cost structure of non-hydro generators, and the characteristics of water inflows. If climate change reduces the long-run average level of inflows or leads to the introduction of a carbon tax then overall welfare will fall and the profitability of generators will rise. The welfare benefits from additional storage capacity will increase if climate change makes long-term inflows less predictable or leads to the introduction of a carbon tax. They will decrease if average inflows fall or the predictable seasonal cycle in inflows becomes less pronounced.

The efficiency test under competition law and regulation in the small distant open economy that is New Zealand

This paper considers the application of competition law and price regulation in the very small and isolated economy that is New Zealand. It argues that the total surplus (efficiency) criterion should be applied in tests of practices and actions where the competition threshold is not met or doubtful. Further, it argues that this criterion is admitted, if not required, under New Zealand statutes. The differential treatment of affected parties, including foreign investors, in measuring the surplus is considered.