Liangliang Jiang

Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans

This paper analyzes whether the political connections of listed firms in the United States affect the cost and terms of loan contracts. Using a hand-collected data set of the political connections of S&P 500 companies over the 2003-2008 time period, we find that the cost of bank loans is significantly lower for companies that have board members with political ties. We consider two possible explanations for these findings: a Borrower Channel in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize that connections enhance the borrowers credit worthiness and a Bank Channel in which banks assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own relationships with key politicians. After employing a series of tests to distinguish between these two channels, we find strong support for the Borrower Channel but no direct evidence supporting the Bank Channel. Finally, we demonstrate that political connections reduce the likelihood of a capital expenditure restriction or liquidity requirement commanded by banks at the origination of the loan. Taken together, our results suggest that political connections increase the value of U.S. companies and reduce monitoring costs and credit risk faced by banks, which, in turn, reduces the borrowers cost of debt.

Incentives for cost shifting and misreporting : US rural universal service subsidies, 1991-2002

The US high cost loop support (HCLS) program, formerly referred to as the Universal Service Fund (USF), has been a key component of the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) program to promote telephone access in rural, high cost areas. This study uses data from 1136 rural telecom firms in 50 states between 1991 and 2002 to test the impact of the HCLS subsidy system on reported costs. Our findings suggest that firms in higher reimbursement threshold tend to report higher costs to the FCC in order to qualify for higher support payments. We also find that the capping of total available subsidy funds increased the incentive to overstate or misclassify costs. Overall, our results suggest that this billion-dollar program deserves closer scrutiny than it receives at present.

Does Competition Affect Bank Risk

Although policymakers often discuss tradeoffs between bank competition and stability, past research provides differing theoretical perspectives and empirical results on the impact of competition on risk. In this paper, we employ a new approach for identifying exogenous changes in the competitive pressures facing individual banks and discover that an intensification of competition materially boosts bank risk. With respect to the mechanisms, we find that competition reduces bank profits, charter values, and relationship lending and increases banks’ provision of nontraditional banking services.