Liesbet De Kock

Hermann von Helmholtz's Empirico-Transcendentalism Reconsidered: Construction and Constitution in Helmholtz's Psychology of the Object

This paper aims at contributing to the ongoing efforts to get a firmer grasp of the systematic significance of the entanglement of idealism and empiricism in Helmholtzs work. Contrary to existing analyses, however, the focal point of the present exposition is Helmholtzs attempt to articulate a psychological account of objectification. Helmholtzs motive, as well as his solution to the problem of the object are outlined, and interpreted against the background of his scientific practice on the one hand, and that of empiricist and (transcendental) idealist analyses of experience on the other. The specifically psychological angle taken, not only prompts us to consider figures who have hitherto been treated as having only minor import for Helmholtz interpretation (most importantly J.S. Mill and J.G. Fichte), it furthermore sheds new light on some central tenets of the latters psychological stance that have hitherto remained underappreciated. For one thing, this analysis reveals an explicit voluntarist tendency in Helmholtzs psychological theory. In conclusion, it is argued that the systematic significance of Helmholtzs empirico-transcendentalism with respect to questions of the mind is best understood as an attempt to found his empirical theory of perception in a second order, normative account of epistemic subjectivity.

Voluntarism in early psychology: the case of Hermann von Helmholtz.

The failure to recognize the programmatic similarity between (post-)Kantian German philosophy and early psychology has impoverished psychologys historical self-understanding to a great extent. This article aims to contribute to recent efforts to overcome the gaps in the historiography of contemporary psychology, which are the result of an empiricist bias. To this end, we present an analysis of the way in which Hermann von Helmholtzs theory of perception resonates with Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Ego-doctrine. It will be argued that this indebtedness is particularly clear when focusing on the foundation of the differential awareness of subject and object in perception. In doing so, the widespread reception of Helmholtzs work as proto-positivist or strictly empiricist is challenged, in favor of the claim that important elements of his theorizing can only be understood properly against the background of Fichtes Ego-doctrine.

Helmholtz's Kant revisited (Once more). The all-pervasive nature of Helmholtz's struggle with Kant's Anschauung

In this analysis, the classical problem of Hermann von Helmholtzs (1821-1894) Kantianism is explored from a particular vantage point, that to my knowledge, has not received the attention it deserves notwithstanding its possible key role in disentangling Helmholtzs relation to Kants critical project. More particularly, we will focus on Helmholtzs critical engagement with Kants concept of intuition [Anschauung] and (the related issue of) his dissatisfaction with Kants doctrinal dualism. In doing so, it soon becomes clear that both (i) crucially mediated Helmholtzs idiosyncratic appropriation and criticism of (certain aspects of) Kants critical project, and (ii) can be considered as a common denominator in a variety of issues that are usually addressed separately under the general header of (the problem of) Helmholtzs Kantianism. The perspective offered in this analysis can not only shed interesting new light on some interpretive issues that have become commonplace in discussions on Helmholtzs Kantianism, but also offers a particular way of connecting seemingly unrelated dimensions of Helmholtzs engagement with Kants critical project (e.g. Helmholtzs views on causality and space). Furthermore, it amounts to the rather surprising conclusion that Helmholtzs most drastic revision of Kants project pertains to his assumption of free will as a formal condition of experience and knowledge.