Lilian Bermejo-Luque

Toulmin's Model of Argument and the Question of Relativism

In The Uses of Argument, Toulmin proposed a distinction between fielddependent and field-invariant standards for argument appraisal that gave rise to a relativistic understanding of his theory. The main goal of this paper is to show that epistemological relativism is not a necessary consequence of Toulmin’s model of argument. To this end, I will analyze the role that fields are to play within this model, given a proposed conception of one of its key elements: the warrant of an argument. 1. TOULMIN’S MODEL OF ARGUMENT In Human Understanding, S. E. Toulmin criticised not only dogmatism, but also relativism, as the counterpart of the same misconception of rationality, namely, rationality as adherence to a deductivist ideal of knowledge. In 1958, Toulmin had already developed an alternative to deductivism in The Uses of Argument. In this work, Toulmin proposed a new conception of logic based on the distinction between field-dependent and field-invariant criteria for argument evaluation. Despite Toulmin’s aim, the idea of field-dependent criteria gave rise to a relativistic reading of his theory of argument. The main goal of this paper is to show that epistemological relativism is not a necessary consequence of the model of argument that Toulmin proposed in 1958. I wish to show that, rather, it is a good way to fight it. According to Toulmin, every argument is composed of a claim, the reason for that claim and the warrant that licenses the step from this reason to that claim. In principle, this is the simplest form of argument. But Toulmin observes that in everyday arguments, we can also distinguish three more elements: backings, rebuttals and modal qualifiers. Backings are defined as “other assurances” that stand “behind our

The Uses of Analogies

This paper analyzes different types of similarity judgments, including a distinction between quantitative and qualitative analogies. Then, a survey of the most frequent uses of both types of analogical judgments. The main goal of this paper is to highlight the variety of criteria that we should employ in determining the value of a similarity judgment, depending on its function. This is particularly relevant for the appraisal of analogical argumentation. In particular, we argue for the importance of distinguishing between analogical argumentation and classificatory argumentation.

Why Do We Need a New Theory of Argumentation

This chapter is devoted to some meta-theoretical questions aimed to show why do we need a new theory of argumentation.

Argumentation and Its Study

This chapter has two sections: the first one is devoted to a characterization of argumentation as an everyday activity, inextricably linked to the specifics of linguistic communication. In addition, it is meant to show in which ways the activity of arguing is particularly akin to humans as rational and social beings: on the one hand, it is a tool to make our beliefs and claims rational, that is, a justificatory device; on the other, it is a means of interaction among individuals, that is, a persuasive device. The relationship between argumentation’s justificatory and persuasive powers will be central throughout this work.

The Rhetorical Dimension of Argumentation

This chapter deals with the rhetorical dimension of argumentation and the role that Rhetoric is to play for developing normative models shaping the concept of argumentative value.

The Logical Dimension of Argumentation

Given my defense, in Chapter 2, of the idea that the regulative conditions for argumentation have to be specified in terms of its constitutive conditions, it follows that, if argumentation is a complex of logical, dialectical and rhetorical properties, as contended in Chapter 3, then good argumentation will be argumentation satisfying logical, dialectical and rhetorical conditions.

Acts of Arguing

Following Chapter 2’s thesis that the only way to overcome the justification problem of Argumentation Theory’s normative models is to deal with the concept of argumentative value as the constitutive goal of the activity of arguing, I propose a characterization of argumentation as a communicative activity aimed at showing a target claim to be correct. My contention throughout this work is that this characterization makes it possible to integrate the logical, dialectical and rhetorical dimensions of argumentation, regarding both its interpretation and its evaluation.

The Dialectical Dimension of Argumentation

As explained in Chapter 4 regarding the logical normativity of argumentation, in dealing with the dialectical dimension of argumentation, I will also have to fulfill two tasks: on the one hand, showing that any type of argumentation, whether dialogical or monological, involves such a dialectical dimension; but on the other hand, showing that dialectical normativity cannot be reduced to argumentative normativity tout court.