Limor Golan

Gender Differences in Executive Compensation and Job Mobility

Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We find, controlling for executive rank and background, that women earn higher compensation than men, experience more income uncertainty, and are promoted more quickly. Among survivors, being female increases the chance of becoming chief executive officer. The unconditional gender pay gap and job-rank differences are primarily attributable to female executives exiting the occupation at higher rates than men.

Counteroffers and Efficiency in Labor Markets with Asymmetric Information

This article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker’s productivity than potential employers. Previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers, the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker’s qualifications. As a result, assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient. I find that when current employers can match outside offers, the equilibrium outcome may be efficient. I analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers, and find these investment levels to be first best.

Experimentation and Job Choice

In this article, we examine optimal job choices when jobs differ in the rate at which they reveal information about workers’ skills. We then analyze how the optimal level of experimentation changes over a worker’s career and characterize job transitions and wage growth over the life cycle. Using the Dictionary of Occupational Titles merged with the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, we then construct an index of how much information different occupations reveal about workers’ skills and document patterns of occupational choice and wage growth that are consistent with a trade-off between information and wages.

PROMOTION, TURNOVER, AND COMPENSATION IN THE EXECUTIVE LABOR MARKET

This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard, and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm‐size pay gap. We find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size, certainty‐equivalent pay decreases with firm size. In larger firms, and for more highly ranked executives, weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums. This risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm‐size gap in total compensation. Larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives. Finally, the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant, but their collective effect on firm‐size pay differentials nets out.

Wage Signaling: A Dynamic Model Of Intrafirm Bargaining And Asymmetric Learning

The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers. A failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss. Because the disagreement points depend upon the workers productivity, productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages. In existing models of asymmetric learning, wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics. This model, in contrast, generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics.

Competition, Managerial Slack, and Corporate Governance

We characterize how product market competition disciplines managers in a moral hazard setting. Competition has two effects on a firm. First, the expected revenue or the marginal benefit of effort declines, leading to weakly lower effort. Second, the cost of inducing high effort increases (decreases) if competition increases (decreases) the probability of failure at a firm. Both effects imply a change in the optimal level of effort as competition increases. The manager in our model enjoys slack if he supplies low effort in equilibrium. We show that, if competition increases the probability of failure, managerial slack increases with competition. The relationship between managerial slack and firm value is ambiguous: Exogenous changes in the private benefit of low effort can affect slack without changing firm value, and vice versa. As a result, empirical tests that identify changes in slack may not capture the effect of competition on the level of slack.We model the interaction between product market competition and internal governance at firms. Competition makes it more difficult to infer a manager’s action given the realized output, thus increasing the cost of inducing effort. An exogenous change in the incentive to shirk increases managerial slack. However, the effects on firm value are ambiguous; in particular, firm value can increase as slack increases. As a result, empirical tests that focus on changes in value may not capture changes in the level of slack. We also provide conditions under which increased competition leads all firms to switch from high to low effort.

Intergenerational Mobility and the Effects of Parental Education, Time Investment, and Income on Children’s Educational Attainment

This article analyzes the mechanisms through which parents? and children?s education are linked. It estimates the causal effect of parental education, parental time with children, and parental income during early childhood on the educational outcomes of children. Estimating the causal effects of time with children, income, and parental education is challenging because parental time with children is usually unavailable in many datasets and because of the problem of endogeneity of parental income, time with children, and education. The authors, therefore, use an instrumental variables approach to estimate the causal effects. They find that once they account for the parental time input with children, parental income during the first five years is no longer statistically significant. The parental time investments of both parents in early childhood are each statistically and quantitatively significant determinants of the educational outcomes of children.