Linda A. W. Brakel

The primary process and the unconscious : Experimental evidence supporting two psychoanalytic presuppositions

The authors report on two experiments designed to test an important feature of the primary process: unconscious categorisation by attributes rather than by relations. These experiments were designed to provide support, independently of the clinical situation, for the presupposition of a psychological unconscious and for the presupposition that unconscious mentation is organised along primary-process lines. Their results were encouraging. They found that (1) unconscious similarity judgements could be made; and (2) these judgements were based on attributes (a primary-process mechanism) rather than relationships (a secondary-process mechanism). This independent evidence, obtained in controlled experimental studies supporting two fundamental psychoanalytic presuppositions, should be welcome news to psychoanalysts, given the continuing criticism from many quarters that basic psychoanalytic ideas lack independent validation. This paper begins with an overview of the primary processes with a special focus on the role of categorisation by attribute, the particular aspect of primary process explored in this study. Next a brief history of previous empirical investigations of primary process is given, following which the current experiments are presented.

Characterization of event related potentials using information theoretic distance measures

Analysis of event-related potentials (ERPs) using signal processing tools has become extremely widespread in recent years. Nonstationary signal processing tools such as wavelets and time-frequency distributions have proven to be especially effective in characterizing the transient phenomena encountered in event-related potentials. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of event-related potentials collected during a psychological experiment where two groups of subjects, spider phobics and snake phobics, are shown the same set of stimulus: A blank stimulus, a neutral stimulus and a spider stimulus. We introduce a new approach, based on time-frequency distributions, for analyzing the ERPs. The difference in brain activity before and after a stimulus is presented is quantified using distance measures as adapted to the time-frequency plane. Three different distance measures, including a new information theoretic distance measure, are applied on the time-frequency plane to discriminate between the responses of the two groups of subjects. The results illustrate the effectiveness of using distance measures combined with time-frequency distributions in differentiating between the two classes of subjects and the different regions of the brain.

The priority of primary process categorizing: Experimental evidence supporting a psychoanalytic developmental hypothesis

Earlier work has provided experimental evidence for the existence of the primary and secondary process mental organization posited by Freud and has demonstrated that primary process effects are the more active unconsciously (Brakel et al. 2000). Primary and secondary processes were assessed by a categorization test in which qualitatively different principles could be used. In new experiments using the same stimuli, another significant implication of Freuds model was tested: that primary process mental organization has developmental priority. In these experiments, which studied 559 participants ranging in age from 3 to 80, it was found (1) that primary process mentation predominates in preschoolers; (2) that it is not until around age 7 that primary process organization is supplanted by secondary process organization; and (3) that after age 7 the predominance of secondary process organization remains remarkably stable throughout the life span.

The psychoanalytic assumption of the primary process: extrapsychoanalytic evidence and findings.

No evidence for an assumption of a theory can be gained by data derived from methods dependent on that theory. Three experiments, using methods independent of psychoanalysis, test the psychoanalytic posit that primary process exists as a formal mental mode distinct from secondary process. The three experiments, using a nonpsychoanalytic index for primary process, test for a preponderance of primary process organization in three areas in which Freud observed primary process: (1) in unconscious mental states and during implicit tasks; (2) in the mental productions of preschool children; and (3) in anxiety states, as these are typically associated with unconscious conflict. All three experiments show significant results in favor of the primary process. Further, the three experiments taken together, because they account for seemingly disparate data, lend further credence to the original assumption. These positive results suggest that primary process may be more important than even Freud suspected. Perhaps it is the basic mental organization in many nonhuman mammals and some birds. Primary process organization may also underlie aspects of such basic psychological operations as generalizations in conditioning and assessments-in-action, as opposed to judgments proper, about how one would act. Finally, primary process may play a key role in drive activity. Three types of experiments are proposed to test these far-reaching applications of the primary process concept.

Freud's dual process theory and the place of the a-rational

In this commentary on Stanovich & West (S&W) we call attention to two points: (1) Freuds original dual process theory, which antedates others by some seventy-five years, deserves inclusion in any consideration of dual process theories. His concepts of primary and secondary processes (Systems 1 and 2, respectively) anticipate significant aspects of current dual process theories and provide an explanation for many of their characteristics. (2) System 1 is neither rational nor irrational, but instead a-rational. Nevertheless, both the a-rational System 1 and the rational System 2 can each have different roles in enhancing evolutionary fitness. Lastly, System 1 operations are incorrectly deemed “rational” whenever they increase evolutionary fitness.

Anxiety, attributional thinking, and the primary process

In earlier publications, experimental evidence was provided for the existence of the primary vs. secondary process mental organization posited by Freud. A well‐established cognitive categorization test based on attributional and relational similarity was found to map on to primary and secondary principles of mental organization respectively, thus offering the opportunity to test hypotheses drawn from psychoanalytic theory independent of the clinical situation. In prior work, primary process shifts occurred under three different conditions‐all predicted by psychoanalytic theory: (1) when stimuli were (subliminal) unconscious; (2) when participants were 3‐5 years of age; and (3) when tasks were implicit. In the current study, a fourth condition is examined dealing with the relationship of conscious anxiety to primary and secondary processes. In a naturalistic study, 120 patients waiting in medical center waiting rooms rated how anxious they felt on a 10‐point scale and then completed a version of the categorization test alluded to above. Those who reported any anxiety at all showed a signifi cant shift toward primary process categorization over those participants who rated themselves as calm. The implications of this fourth fi nding are discussed with respect to signal anxiety and symptom formation.

Phantasies, Neurotic-Beliefs, and Beliefs-Proper

This paper presents a philosophical analysis of three cognitive states familiar and important to psychoanalysts—phantasy, neurotic-belief, and belief-proper. It explores the differences among these three propositional attitudes and finds that the development of secondary process capacities of reality testing and truth directness out of earlier primary process operations (themselves prior to considerations of truth or falsity) plays a crucial role. Difficulties in the proper typing of cognitive states are discussed, as are the consequences of such confounds. This use of a philosophical method serves to sharpen the familiar psychoanalytic clinical concepts of phantasy and neurotic-belief. In addition, these same clinical concepts, once properly specified, have much to offer the philosophy of mind, where current understanding of representational cognitive states is restricted to those that are largely conscious and rational. When psychoanalytic concepts such as phantasy and neurotic-belief can be better integrated within the discipline of philosophy of mind, both philosophers and psychoanalysts will have a more complete and adequate theory of mind.

Testing Freud’s Hypothesis That Word Forms and Word Meaning Are Functionally Distinct: Subliminal Primary-Process Cognition and Its Link to Personality

One of Freud’s seminal hypotheses first appearing in his monograph On Aphasia (1891) posited that word meaning and word presentation (e.g., phonemic and graphemic properties) needed to be distinguished if aphasic symptoms were to be accurately understood. In his later psychoanalytic writing, this supposition was generalized to refer to the primary-process uses of language in dreams, symptom formation, and unconscious processes (1900, 1915). To test Freud’s hypothesis that word meaning and word presentation are functionally distinct when processed unconsciously (Freud, 1891, 1915), 50 participants were tested with a priming paradigm in which a “palindrome” prime, presented either subliminally or supraliminally, was followed by two target alternatives. In the forward condition, the prime (e.g. DOG) was followed with a semantic associate (e.g. CANINE) and a distractor. In the “palindrome” condition, the prime was followed with a semantic associate of the reversed word (e.g. ANGEL) and a distractor. The participants’ task was to choose the word they preferred. The supraliminal results confirm classical semantic priming, but only in the forward condition. Subliminally, however, while no main results emerged, there were interaction effects with self-rated personality factors and stimulus detectability. High trait anxiety induced priming facilitation, while in low anxiety there was inhibition, for both forward and palindrome conditions. On the other hand, high scores on the Hysteroid–Obsessoid Questionnaire, a measure of repressiveness, lead to inhibition of the priming effect while facilitation was observed with low scores—but only for forward priming. Consistently, these interaction effects were even stronger when stimulus detectability was low than at higher levels of detectability, ruling out any skeptical account that the measured effects might be due to residual conscious perception. Taken together, these findings support Freud’s hypothesis that the perceptual object dimension of a word, being functionally distinct from its meaning, can give rise to novel sequential processing, an effect that is more likely to occur unconsciously (i.e., d′ ≤ 0) and under conditions of anxiety.

Shall Drawing Become Part of Free Association?: Proposal for a Modification in Psychoanalytic Technique

Three psychoanalytic case vignettes are presented where drawing is used beneficially as part of the free-associative process. The history of the psychoanalytic use of drawing is briefly reviewed, together with a new technical proposal regarding the role of drawing in free association, Justification for testing this modification leads to a consideration of methodological issues and the nature of free association. Possible advantages of this modification, including enhanced clinical understanding through integration of pictorial and verbal modes, and greater potential for access to the period of life where experience is more visually dominated, are considered and also discussed in relation to dual hemispheric mental organization.

Understanding negative hallucination: toward a developmental classification of disturbances in reality awareness.

Negative hallucinations are explored from a psychodynamic viewpoint in four cases of neurosis. Next, shifting to the level of clinical theory, negative hallucinations are contrasted with five better-studied disturbances in reality awareness. It is noted that all six function as screen phenomena, and all occur in everyday contexts. These and other phenomenological issues lead to an assertion that negative hallucinations are regressive perceptual phenomena, similar inform to both preconscious perceptions and infantile amnesia. Finally, developmental considerations are used to derive a coherent hierarchy of disturbances in reality awareness.