Linda Gonçalves Veiga

Economics and elections in Western Europe : 1960-1997

This paper analyzes macroeconomic conditions and parliamentary election outcomes in 13 European countries over the 1960-1997 period. The analysis focuses on two themes. The first is that different macroeconomic theories imply that different economic indicators should be important for voters. The second is that political responsibility should condition voters’ responses to economic performance. We estimate a model in which indicators of economic performance and political responsibility interactively determine election outcomes. Performance measures suggested by alternative theories are included in empirical specifications. Results suggest that changes in inflation, especially when measured relative to the European average, have an impact on incumbents’ vote shares. The analysis fails to isolate political responsibility variables that condition the impact of economic performance on the vote, however.

The Impact of Local and National Economic Conditions on Legislative Election Results

Using data for 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities, we estimate the impact of national and local economic conditions on legislative electoral outcomes over the period from the reestablishment of democracy in 1974 to the present. Empirical results indicate that the performance of the national economy is important but that the municipal situation also conditions electoral outcomes.

Voting functions in the EU-15

This paper examines whether the European integration process, by transferring policy instruments to supra-national authorities, has affected voters’ evaluations of governments’ economic performance at elections. The analysis is implemented on a panel of 15 EU countries, from 1970 to 2011. Results suggest that before the Maastricht Treaty, citizens held incumbents responsible for GDP growth and for the evolution of inflation, particularly when measured relative to the EU average. After the Maastricht Treaty, there was a significant reduction in the impact of economic variables, especially inflation, on electoral outcomes. During the current economic crisis the capacity to control the budget deficit appears to be the main determinant of incumbents’ vote shares.

Elections, Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Illusion

This paper tests the joint hypotheses that policymakers engage in fiscal policy opportunism and that voters respond by rewarding that opportunism with higher vote margins. Furthermore, it investigates the impact of fiscal illusion on the previous two dimensions. Empirical results, obtained with a sample of 68 countries from 1960 to 2006, reveal that opportunistic measures of expenditures and revenues generate larger winning margins for the incumbent and that the opportunistic manipulation of fiscal policy instruments is larger when the current government is less likely to be reelected. Furthermore, fiscal illusion contributes to the entrenchment of incumbent policymakers in office and promotes opportunistic behaviour.

Economic Determinants of Citizens’ Support for the European Union

We investigate the determinants of public support for EU membership using a panel of fifteen countries over the 1974 - 2008 period. The results indicate that increases in inflation and unemployment rate generate a decrease in support for EU membership, while growth of GDP growth increases support. There is evidence of erosion in citizens’ support as time in the Union accumulates and when the country is under the excessive deficit procedure. Splitting the sample into different periods reveals that real economic variables were more influential in shaping citizens’ support for the EU than nominal variables during the first years of the Community, but inflation became the most relevant variable after implementation of the Treaty of the European Union.

Popularity Functions for the Portuguese Prime Minister, Government, Parliament and President

The purpose of this paper is to estimate popularity functions for the Portuguese Prime Minister, Government, Parliament and President using the ordinary least squares (OLS) and seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) methods. The results indicate that: (1) popularity polls for the Prime Minister and Government are better explained by economic conditions than are similar polls for the Parliament and President; (2) unemployment is a significant variable determining popularity while inflation is not; (3) honeymoon effects are significant; (4) popularity deteriorates over consecutive terms.

Digital Government and Administrative Burden Reduction

Administrative burden represents the costs to businesses, citizens and the administration itself of complying with government regulations and procedures. The burden tends to increase with new forms of public governance that rely less on direct decisions and actions undertaken by traditional government bureaucracies, and more on government creating and regulating the environment for other, non-state actors to jointly address public needs. Based on the reviews of research and policy literature, this paper explores administrative burden as a policy problem, presents how Digital Government (DG) could be applied to address this problem, and identifies societal adoption, organizational readiness and other conditions under which DG can be an effective tool for Administrative Burden Reduction (ABR). Finally, the paper tracks ABR to the latest Contextualization stage in the DG evolution, and discusses possible development approaches and technological potential of pursuing ABR through DG.

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Questions of Accountability and Autonomy

This chapter addresses issues related to the financing of public services in a multilevel system of government, focusing on water, soil, and waste resources management. Because subnational governments play a key role in this sector, capacity building on public finance topics that influence their performance is crucial for the nexus approach to environmental resources. The chapter discusses optimal arrangements for decentralized frameworks as well as the impact of decentralization on policy outcomes and government accountability. It also analyses recent trends in service delivery, namely larger participation of the private sector and of local communities, and recent financing models aimed at improving service delivery.

e-Government and the Shadow Economy: Evidence from Across the Globe

The shadow economy can be defined as economic activities that escape detection in the official estimates of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A larger size of the informal sector poses a significant challenge for policymaking as it reduces the reliability of official estimators and increases the likelihood of adopting ineffective policies. Furthermore, the shadow economy may also influence the allocation of resources. The phenomenon is particularly important in the developing world. This paper aims to investigate a possible contribution of e-Government (eGov) to mitigate the problem of the shadow economy. We argue that the implementation of eGov will allow the government to reduce the administrative burden costs, reduce tax evasion, and allow citizens to act as whistle-blowers, all of which may eventually lower the size of the shadow activities. Since the implementation of eGov corresponds to the stage of infrastructure development in the Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs), the diffusion of eGov also requires particular threshold points by which the impact can only be seen. We investigate the data of 147 countries during the period 2003–2013, where the data on estimated shadow economy (based on [1]) and eGov index (based on [2]) are both available. We found that increasing the eGov index significantly reduces the size of the shadow economy. Moreover, the marginal impact is greater in the developed and higher income countries. This sheds a light on the importance to achieve a sufficient level of critical mass in eGov infrastructure before countries are able to reap the benefits of the initiatives.

Against the Shadow: the Role of e-Government

The shadow economy is defined as economic activities which escape from detection in the official estimates of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). They erode the tax bases and reduce tax revenue, forcing the government to find other sources to finance their spending. The size of shadow economies is associated with a higher inflation rate, public debt, and unemployment, hence becoming a crucial problem to mitigate, especially in the developing countries. This paper aims to see a possible contribution of e-Government (eGov) implementation to reduce the shadow economy. If institutional and regulatory problems are addressed by introducing eGov, we can avoid predatory and obstructive regulations. This will lower compliance costs and the administrative burdens which have been addressed as among major factors affecting the shadow economy. We investigate this phenomenon on a panel of 128 countries during the period 2003-2013, where the data on shadow economy [1] and the eGov index [2] are both available. The analysis shows that the increasing eGov index significantly reduces the size of the shadow economy. We also found that shadow economy is a latent phenomenon and that the impact of eGov will be greatly conditioned by the severity of the historical phenomenon of the shadow economy.