Linda R. Cohen

How to vote, whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls

This paper develops and tests a theory of voting and abstaining on Congressional roll calls. The theoretical model assumes that the voting behavior of legislators is oriented toward reelection, and that constituents vote retrospectively. Among the predictions of the theory are that supporters of a program are more likely to abstain than opponents, that conflicted legislators are more likely to vote on the losing side (but will abstain when the vote is very close), and that indifferent legislators will abstain when votes are not close but trade their votes when the outcome is uncertain. The empirical test is based on a series of votes on appropriations for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor from 1975 to 1982. We estimate a nested logit model of, first, the probability of voting for Clinch River, and second, the probability of abstaining from the vote, conditional on preferences regarding the program. All of the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and most are statistically significant by conventional standards. The implication is that the abstention decision, as well as yes or no votes, can be purposive, and that the pattern of abstentions is not random among supporters and opponents.

Term Limits and Representation

Legislative term limits have now been instituted in over a dozen states. Proponents have seized the opportunity to extend them more generally, and have introduced ballot propositions in another half-dozen states; victory seems likely in at least some of them. Meanwhile, opponents have taken their fight to the courts. In the 94–95 term, the Supreme Court will hear an appeal of the term limits provision in Arkansas. The issue has generated an enormous literature, both popular and academic. This paper is concerned with one facet of the debate: how term limits affect the incentives of legislators to represent the wishes of their constituents.1

Deregulation, Restructuring and Changing R&D Paradigms in the US Electric Utility Industry

This paper studies the impact of electricity deregulation and restructuring on research and development (R&D) expenditures of investor owned utilities. The differing pace of deregulation in the fifty states provides heterogeneity in institutional structure and competitive forces, and showcases the response of R&D funding to changing institutional environments. Based on a panel of all major investor-owned utilities from 1989-1997, this paper analyzes various political constraints, institutional change, and firm-specific financial and structural factors that have contributed to the decline of R&D expenditure in the U.S. electric utility industry. R&D is modeled as a two-stage process where firms first decide whether to invest in research depending on their critical mass and state characteristics, and then conditional on a positive decision, decide on the level of expenditure. A variation of the Heckman model is estimated in a panel data setting, allowing for separate effects of selection and intensity. The primary findings are: First, greater deregulation and competition has a positive effect on R&D whereas a higher probability of deregulation adversely affects research spending. The start date for retail competition and level and policies for stranded cost recovery do affect spending. Second, the response of R&D to financial and other firm attributes varies with the state of deregulation and provides insights into firm behavior in a regulated context. Third, the institutional and competitive factors interact in a way that suggest that full deregulation, coupled with effective retail competition may mitigate the problem of declining electricity R&D by the utilities.

R&D Choice in Restructured Industries: In-house v/s Collaborative Research in the US Electricity Industry

This paper studies the impact of market restructuring on the character of research and development (R&D) expenditures. Using a political economy approach, we consider the likely differences in internal and collaborative R&D activities under regulatory and market regimes, and test the predictions on R&D investments by a panel of investor owned electric utilities between 1989 and 1997. We find that spending on internal projects declines with the uncertainty associated with restructuring, but recuperates for companies in states that transition to relative competitive market regimes. Alternatively, external R&D expenditures (outsourced or consortium activities) are initially higher for firms subject to the uncertainty of the policy transition but subsequently decline in restructuring states. Our analysis yields insights into the incentives for firms to perform research internally or to outsource it, and suggests some new guidelines for effective public technology programs.