Lisa J. Carlson

Traditional Decision Analysis and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making

The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making posits a two-stage process wherein the decision maker first employs a noncompensatory decision rule to eliminate politically unacceptable alternatives and then employs a (perhaps) traditional decision procedure to select from the remaining set of acceptable alternatives. Ageneral decision analysis is used to provide a structured account of the elimination process of the first stage of the poliheuristic theory by displaying a noncompensatory decision rule for eliminating unacceptable policy alternatives. The results show how general decision analysis can be used to specify when an alternative is unacceptable to a political decision maker who is sensitive to public opinion.

Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo

The model developed in this paper provides a formal prospect theory account of Challengers behavior in the traditional deterrence game played under sequential decision analysis. The model is used to analyze two basic claims commonly made in the international relations literature regarding the importation of prospect theory into the analysis of crisis games. These claims pertain to Challengers behavior when the valuation of the status quo is positive and Challengers behavior when the valuation of the status quo is negative. We model the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender as a one-sided incomplete information game where Challenger is uncertain about Defenders preference ordering. We examine the behavior of Challenger under the condition that the status quo is declining, using a von Neumann—Morgenstern decision rule as specified by expected utility theory, and a Kahneman—Tverksy decision rule as specified by prospect theory. The formal results show that these claims do not hold unconditionally and must be stated more precisely. Furthermore, there exist conditions under which the claims are false. We show that in addition to specifying the valuation of the status quo and the value of the probability of loss, as per the claims, a fuller understanding of Challengers behavior also requires a specification of Challengers valuation of the status quo vis-à-vis the valuations of other major payoffs in the game. In so doing, we capture many of the details relevant to a more complete analysis of Challengers behavior in the deterrence game.

Beyond zero-sum: game theory and national forest management

Abstract Following two decades of bitter struggle, the current debate over management of the U.S. national forests is characterized by animosity, controversy, and seemingly intractable gridlock. This view has led some to characterize the current management process a situation of pure conflict or a zero-sum game. In this article, we develop a game-theoretic model based on an argument that national forest policymaking is a game between the U.S. National Forest Service and Environmentalists and that this game is not zero-sum. The model is used to account for outcomes associated with contemporary management policy and to examine some recent changes to the games rules and how this may affect outcomes. The analysis shows that some changes will have little to no effect on outcomes, while others have a significant potential to do so.

Sequential Decision Analysis of the Traditional Deterrence Game

We examine the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender. We treat two variations of the game – the complete information game and the one-sided information game where the first mover, Challenger, is the uncertain player. We employ sequential decision theory to analyze the game of incomplete information. The analysis is basic in that we employ a simplifying assumption, specifically that Challenger’s valuation of the status quo is fixed at zero. We examine the behavior of Challenger using both a von-Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule and a Kahneman-Tversky decision rule. The formal results show that given the right combination of outcome valuations and probability values and weightings, Challenger can make choices under the von Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule that are reversed from those made under the Kahneman-Tversky decision rule. We then relate these reversals to the concept of misperception found in the International Relations and Peace Science literatures. Finally, we comment on extensions of the ensuing analysis.

The use of fear and anger to alter crisis initiation

This paper provides a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the use of fear and anger on the decision to initiate a crisis. The formalization employs the finding that fearful decision-makers are risk-averting across frames and make pessimistic risk assessments, and that angry decision-makers are risk-seeking across frames and make optimistic risk assessments. The work presented here employs a sequential decision analysis based on the two-sided incomplete information version of the Traditional Deterrence Game. The analysis shows when the use of the emotions of fear and anger is effective, ineffective, and counterproductive in altering the decision to initiate or not initiate a crisis.

International and Domestic Uncertainties in the Traditional Deterrence Game

We develop an extension of the Traditional Deterrence Game to examine the interaction between international and domestic sources of uncertainty as these sources influence the behavior of Challengers and Defenders. The extension involves incorporating a third and a fourth domestic player, named Assassin ♯1 and Assassin ♯2. Assassin ♯1 reacts to Challengers decision to capitulate to Defender, and Assassin ♯2 reacts to Defenders decision to capitulate to Challenger. From the perspective of Challenger and Defender, Assassin ♯1 and Assassin ♯2 are lotteries that involve a probability of being punished, and a complementary probability of not being punished, for the decisions to capitulate to the adversary, respectively, in the international game. We employ the two-sided incomplete information version of the game wherein Challenger is uncertain about Defenders type and the behavior of Assassin ♯1, and Defender is uncertain about Challengers type and the behavior of Assassin ♯2. The model provides an account of the trade-off between domestic and international conflicts generally, and specifies the conditions under which Challenger and/or Defender is advantaged in the international game with the presence of a domestic constraint in the form of Assassin ♯1 or Assassin ♯2. The model generates two striking results in particular. First, Assassin ♯1 can influence the behavior of some Challengers, whereas Assassin ♯2 can determine the behavior of some Defenders. Second, the Challengers who ultimately capitulate are more prone to initiate conflict, in the first place, than are the Challengers who will not capitulate.

Crisis escalation: An empirical test in the context of extended deterrence

The effort to explain escalation processes using formal and empirical models has yielded numerous insights. However, there have been relatively few attempts to integrate these two approaches such that the results from an empirical test of escalation behavior are interpreted within and based on a well specified theory of escalation. This paper bridges that gap by developing a formal theory of escalation processes to derive hypotheses that identify the conditions under which states escalate in conflict. A players decision to escalate or back down is based on an estimate of the opponents cost tolerance—the maximum costs a player will withstand to achieve a demand in the game. The hypotheses derived from the theory are general and applicable in many contexts that involve escalation processes. In this paper, the hypotheses are tested empirically in the context of extended deterrence crises. The test confirms the theorys expectations and reveals strong support for the hypotheses. The theory offered here, I argue, provides a better explanation for the patterns found in the data than do the theories used in previous studies of extended deterrence.

Aspects of Peace Economics

The Economics of Peace can be modeled as a basic multi-game system composed of economic games played between and among firms and consumers in each of two nations, domestic pressure games played by firms, consumers, and the government within each nation, and political games played between the governments of the two nations. The integrated study of the basic system is given in the account of two-level games (Putnam, 1988). The details of these games were sketched in Dacey (1994, 1996-a) and are updated here via the results obtained in the assassin models presented in Carlson and Dacey (2009, forthcoming). While the field has made numerous advances in the last sixteen years, the conclusion of Dacey (1994) still holds — Peace Economics, as initially characterized by Isard (1994) and Polachek (1994), consists in the resolution of conflicts arising in the multi-game system. Since the games are played rationally, the tools of Peace Economics are the tools of the general theory of rational choice.

Social norms and the traditional deterrence game

Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of “when, how, and to what degree” norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37:1–27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory for political scientists, 1994), the paradigmatic model of conflict initiation in International Relations. The deterrence game is modeled here as a sequential decision problem. As such, our analysis is an adaptation of Bicchieri’s game-theoretic formalization of norms to what we will call the norms account of the game. We find that the standard account of the traditional deterrence game is a special case of the norms account of the game. We also show that the adaptation of Bicchieri’s analysis of social norms yields new and interesting claims regarding when, how, and to what degree norms operate as a constraint on risk-related behavior in the traditional deterrence game. Moreover, we discuss how the results of the model provide testable propositions of relevance to the role of norms in international interactions.