Lise Mounier

Norms, status and the dynamics of advice networks: A case study

The issue of the influence of norms on behavior is as old as sociology itself. This paper explores the effect of normative homophily (i.e. “sharing the same normative choices”) on the evolution of the advice network among lay judges in a courthouse. (Blau, 1955) and (Blau, 1964) social exchange theory suggests that members select advisors based on the status of the advisor. Additional research shows that members of an organization use similarities with others in ascribed, achieved or inherited characteristics, as well as other kinds of ties, to mitigate the potentially negative effects of this strong status rule. We elaborate and test these theories using data on advisor choice in the Commercial Court of Paris. We use a jurisprudential case about unfair competition (material and “moral” damages), a case that we submitted to all the judges of this court, to test the effect of normative homophily on the selection of advisors, controlling for status effects. Normative homophily is measured by the extent to which two judges are equally “punitive” in awarding damages to plaintiffs. Statistical analyses combine longitudinal advice network data collected among the judges with their normative dispositions. Contrary to what could be expected from conventional sociological theories, we find no pure effect of normative homophily on the choice of advisors. In this case, therefore, sharing the same norms and values does not have, by itself, a mitigating effect and does not contribute to the evolution of the network. We argue that status effects, conformity and alignments on positions of opinion leaders in controversies still provide the best insights into the relationship between norms, structure and behavior.

Eliciting Personal Network Data in Web Surveys through Participant-generated Sociograms

The article presents a method to elicit personal network data in Internet surveys, exploiting the renowned appeal of network visualizations to reduce respondent burden and risk of dropout. It is a participant-generated computer-based sociogram, an interactive graphical interface enabling participants to draw their own personal networks with simple and intuitive tools. In a study of users of websites on eating disorders, we have embedded the sociogram within a two-step approach aiming to first elicit the broad ego network of an individual and then to extract subsets of issue-specific support ties. We find this to be a promising tool to facilitate survey experience and adaptable to a wider range of network studies.

Images De La Recherche Sociologique Actuelle

Images of Current Sociological Research. Three sociological associations participated in 1988 in the production of a directory of French-speaking sociologists: Sociologie française et francophone. This directory includes research topics - presented as text in an open question - and key words. After an initial compilation of the vocabulary (with Lexinet), 1460 entreis were the object of a statistical classification analysis (with Leximappe) in order to reveal the research problematics covered by the corpus. A statistical indicator of coherence and a more subjective evaluation of thematic coherence showed: research specialties which were both narrow and very homogeneous, more open specialties organized around a thematic core, and finally traditional specialties which persist. It is more the objects of study than the concepts employed which structure the domain. It is a picture of a rich and active sociology closely tied to social problems.

Interlocking judges : on joint exogenous and self-governance of markets

This study stresses the importance of considering a “joint” governance of interfirm relations as an alternative to external governance (by the State) and self-governance (by the business community) of these relations. We argue that a broadly-conceived structural and organizational approach to economic institutions provides insights into this joint governance because it shows how such a system spreads the costs of control among several kinds of stakeholders. We look at how transactions between any two firms are regulated through jurisdiction by “consular” judges (i.e. judges elected through the local Chamber of Commerce) who indirectly represent other firms and industries in that market, and are therefore considered to be at the same time third parties and potential levers of influence acting on behalf of corporate interests. We study an empirical case of such joint governance: The Tribunal of Commerce of Paris (TCP). Following previous work on lateral control and leverage, we hypothesize that industries and/or companies that have a strong stake in the conflict resolution process will be more represented among the judges of this court than other industries and/or companies, and that judges who are socially active in the court that enforces this joint governance will be sought out for advice more than other judges, and thus gain influence on their peers by suggesting specific outcomes. The analyses of the composition of the bench and of the advice network data collected in this court display an influence structure that confirms these hypotheses and that is likely to affect conflict resolution between businesses. It thus characterizes joint governance of markets as a complex set of social processes worthy of economic sociologists’ attention.

Interdependent entrepreneurs and the social discipline of their cooperation: a research programme for structural economic sociology in a society of organizations: Markets, Networks and Hierarchies

Economists have long focused on markets as exchange mechanisms, and many economic sociologists have also used the same approach. This focus emphasized the importance of price and that of the social embeddedness of economic transactions among actors, whether individuals or organizations. Focusing on the production side of economic activity, however, underlines the fact that society is a society of organizations (Presthus, 1962; White, 1981b; Stokman et al., 1985; Coleman, 1990; Perrow, 1991), with specific social mechanisms underlying collective action. From the latterOs perspective, saying that society is an organizational society is also equivalent to saying that its intrinsically multi-level dimension should frame Ð much more than it currently does Ð sociologistsO perspective on human, including economic, activity. In our view, this additional focus reframes analyses of both market exchange and social exchange (Blau, 1964) of resources as they are connected in production. This approach advocates new combinations of theories of individual action and theories of collective action. Within such a perspective, priority is given here to the study of social exchange and cooperation among interdependent entrepreneurs, at the intraorganizational and interorganizational levels. In short, this study is about the social discipline that helps interdependent entrepreneurs in their collective action. Entrepreneurs are not conceived as individuals acting on their own, but as individuals, and organizations, interacting with, and investing in, other entrepreneurs as peers or quasi-peers in order to make collective action possible. The sociology of organizations has been able to design an ideal-typical

Articulation of hierarchy and networks as an evolving social structure

This paper describes agent-based simulations designed to study emerging networks that are created thanks to different logics of communication. The model is inspired by sociological observations led in a courthouse, in Paris, and by assumptions on the motivations for individuals to interact in this context. Two ways to choose communication partner are here represented: by following a pre-existing hierarchy; by reproducing past interactions. Both logics are described as well as their effect on the evolution of networks, and their combination is analyzed. The work is in its first phase, and although we get inspiration from real world observation, we are not leading yet a complete comparison of artificial and real society but more an exploration on how the simulations could help us in the following interview research and potentially eliminate some of our hypothesis.

Norms, Advice Networks and Joint Economic Governance : The Case of Conflicts among Shareholders at the Commercial Court of Paris

Businesses are usually very keen to participate in the governance of their markets (Lazega and Mounier, 2002, 2003; Falconi et al., 2005). In this chapter, we combine a sociological perspective on joint governance of markets with an economic perspective, such as that of Dixit (2009) that deals with issues of social optimality of private or public governance and enforcement institutions. Institutional and neo-institutional economic theory often separate official governance institutions from private self-governance (Greif, 1996; Ellickson, 1991; Milgrom et al., 1990; Williamson, 1985). At the inter-organizational level, at least two different sociological traditions also deal with the issue of self and exogenous governance of markets, comparing the formal and often exogenous aspects with informal and endogenous ones (...).

Finance in Public Service: Discreet Joint Regulation as Institutional Capture at the Paris Commercial Court

Businesses of all kinds are usually very keen to participate in regulation of their own sector. One way of contributing to regulatory activity is to exercise influence in the State institutions set up to solve conflicts between businesses and discipline entrepreneurs. This can lead to institutional capture, which we redefine at the institutional (not individual) level as an extreme form of joint regulation. This chapter describes and illustrates one of the ways the financial industry effectively runs a State institution through analysis of the operations of a judicial institution, the Paris Commercial Court. This is France’s main first-level commercial court, and its judges are lay volunteer judges, that is, business people elected by their business community through their local chamber of commerce. The court functions as an institution of discreet joint regulation of markets, hearing commercial litigation and bankruptcy cases. It is a contested terrain, the object of broader conflicts played out outside the court buildings. We focus on how this court handles bankruptcy proceedings, observing the composition of chambers, the judges’networks, and the normative choices made by bankers when dealing with insolvency and recovery plans. The results illustrate the financial industry’s domination of this institution, and its epistemic, normative and regulatory influence. This exposure of the connections between discreet joint regulation, the dual role of finance, and institutional capture more generally shows it is time to re-examine the inner organizational, structural and normative workings of economic and legal institutions, from the perspective of protecting the public interest in regulation of capitalist economies where the private/public sector boundaries are increasingly blurred.