Lital Ruderman

Adolescents’ risk-taking behavior is driven by tolerance to ambiguity

Adolescents engage in a wide range of risky behaviors that their older peers shun, and at an enormous cost. Despite being older, stronger, and healthier than children, adolescents face twice the risk of mortality and morbidity faced by their younger peers. Are adolescents really risk-seekers or does some richer underlying preference drive their love of the uncertain? To answer that question, we used standard experimental economic methods to assess the attitudes of 65 individuals ranging in age from 12 to 50 toward risk and ambiguity. Perhaps surprisingly, we found that adolescents were, if anything, more averse to clearly stated risks than their older peers. What distinguished adolescents was their willingness to accept ambiguous conditions—situations in which the likelihood of winning and losing is unknown. Though adults find ambiguous monetary lotteries undesirable, adolescents find them tolerable. This finding suggests that the higher level of risk-taking observed among adolescents may reflect a higher tolerance for the unknown. Biologically, such a tolerance may make sense, because it would allow young organisms to take better advantage of learning opportunities; it also suggests that policies that seek to inform adolescents of the risks, costs, and benefits of unexperienced dangerous behaviors may be effective and, when appropriate, could be used to complement policies that limit their experiences.

Like cognitive function, decision making across the life span shows profound age-related changes

Significance Although largely unstudied, behavioral changes in decision making across the life span have implications for problems associated with poor decision making at different life stages, such as careless driving in adolescents and disadvantageous medical or financial decision making in older adults. We examine age-based differences in individual decision-making characteristics—choice consistency, rationality, and preferences for known and unknown risks—in 12- to 90-y-olds. We found that even the healthiest of elders show profoundly compromised decision making, and that risk attitudes show systematic changes across the life span that have important policy implications. It has long been known that human cognitive function improves through young adulthood and then declines across the later life span. Here we examined how decision-making function changes across the life span by measuring risk and ambiguity attitudes in the gain and loss domains, as well as choice consistency, in an urban cohort ranging in age from 12 to 90 y. We identified several important age-related patterns in decision making under uncertainty: First, we found that healthy elders between the ages of 65 and 90 were strikingly inconsistent in their choices compared with younger subjects. Just as elders show profound declines in cognitive function, they also show profound declines in choice rationality compared with their younger peers. Second, we found that the widely documented phenomenon of ambiguity aversion is specific to the gain domain and does not occur in the loss domain, except for a slight effect in older adults. Finally, extending an earlier report by our group, we found that risk attitudes across the life span show an inverted U-shaped function; both elders and adolescents are more risk-averse than their midlife counterparts. Taken together, these characterizations of decision-making function across the life span in this urban cohort strengthen the conclusions of previous reports suggesting a profound impact of aging on cognitive function in this domain.

POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS SYMPTOMS AND AVERSION TO AMBIGUOUS LOSSES IN COMBAT VETERANS

Psychiatric symptoms typically cut across traditional diagnostic categories. In order to devise individually tailored treatments, there is a need to identify the basic mechanisms that underlie these symptoms. Behavioral economics provides a framework for studying these mechanisms at the behavioral level. Here, we utilized this framework to examine a widely ignored aspect of trauma‐related symptomatology—individual uncertainty attitudes—in combat veterans with and without posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Not sensitive, yet less biased: A signal detection theory perspective on mindfulness, attention, and recognition memory.

The practice of mindfulness has been argued to increase attention control and improve memory performance. However, it was recently suggested that the effect of mindfulness on memory may be due to a shift in response-bias, rather than to an increase in memory-sensitivity. The present study examined the mindfulness-attention-memory triad. Participants filled in the five-facets of mindfulness questionnaire, and completed two recognition blocks; in the first attention was full, whereas in the second attention was divided during the encoding of information. It was found that the facet of non-judging (NJ) moderated the impact of attention on memory, such that responses of high NJ participants were less biased and remained constant even when attention was divided. Facets of mindfulness were not associated with memory sensitivity. These findings suggest that mindfulness may affect memory through decision making processes, rather than through directing attentional resources to the encoding of information.

Value-based decision making under uncertainty in hoarding and obsessive- compulsive disorders

Difficulties in decision making are a core impairment in a range of disease states. For instance, both obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) and hoarding disorder (HD) are associated with indecisiveness, inefficient planning, and enhanced uncertainty intolerance, even in contexts unrelated to their core symptomology. We examined decision-making patterns in 19 individuals with OCD, 19 individuals with HD, 19 individuals with comorbid OCD and HD, and 57 individuals from the general population, using a well-validated choice task grounded in behavioral economic theory. Our results suggest that difficulties in decision making in individuals with OCD (with or without comorbid HD) are linked to reduced fidelity of value-based decision making (i.e. increase in inconsistent choices). In contrast, we find that performance of individuals with HD on our laboratory task is largely intact. Overall, these results support our hypothesis that decision-making impairments in OCD and HD, which can appear quite similar clinically, have importantly different underpinnings. Systematic investigation of different aspects of decision making, under varying conditions, may shed new light on commonalities between and distinctions among clinical syndromes.