Liyang Hou

Excessive Prices within EU Competition Law

Due to the different views in economics the prohibition of excessive prices is among the most controversial subjects within EU competition law. This article aims to shed some light on this concept. In the following, it first identifies the exceptional circumstances that may justify antitrust actions against excessive pricing. Subsequently, an empirical research is undertaken on the two-step analytical framework established by United Brands: first, analysing whether the profit margin is excessive; if affirmative, then assessing whether the price is unfair in itself or compared with others. In particular, it focuses on the three uncertainties within that framework: (i) determining an excessive profit margin, (ii) examining whether a price is abusive in itself, and (iii) demonstrating an abusive price based on benchmarks.

The Assessment of Single SMP: Lessons Learned from the First Round Market Review

The concept of significant market power (SMP) is enshrined by the European regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services to the extent to which national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in most circumstances can only regulate undertakings with SMP. According to this regulatory framework, both the definition and the methods for the assessment of SMP are equivalent to those of dominance under Article 82 EC Treaty. Although theories already suggest that the assessment of SMP should be different from dominance to some extent, empirical research has not been fully explored. This paper aims to sheds some light on the empirical differences between the assessment of single SMP and single dominance based on the decisions of the European Commission under Article 7 of Framework Directive in the first round of market review. After examining these decisions, this paper first finds that when using a very high/low market share as evidence of market power the regulatory regime takes a higher threshold than the antitrust regime. Subsequently, on a closer level it looks at the appraisal of other criteria for the assessment of SMP by NRAs and furthermore categorizes them into three groups due to their different values: direct criteria, collaborating criteria and not very important criteria.

SME cluster vs. multinational companies: similarities and differences for tax and competition lawmakers

The aim of the article is to analyse to what extent some traditional tools developed in the area of tax and competition law for big companies can be applied to SME clusters in order to promote their development. The focus of the research, in particular, will be on group taxation and the EU competition provisions in the fields of abuse of dominant positions and mergers, as well as anti-competitive agreements. Based on the examples coming from some European countries, in particular Italy and on an accurate review on literature and legislation, it will be shown that the extension of group taxation and the non-expansion of competition tools to SME clusters are efficient ways to promote their growth and development.

Collective Dominance within the Context of EU Electronic Communications Regulation

The Regulatory Framework concerning electronic communications networks and services in the European Union transposes the concept of collective dominance under Article 82 of the EC Treaty into electronic communications regulation as collective significant market power. However, it is of academic and also practical interest to see how the regulatory authorities to apply this concept under the regulatory regime, given a fact that collective dominance is still developing in the area of competition law. This article empirically examines the application of collective dominance by the national regulatory authorities based on the European Commission decisions according to Article 7 of the Framework Directive, with an aim to interpret the four economic factors to assess collective dominance, i.e. (1) oligopolistic market characteristics conductive to coordinate, (2) incentives to coordinate, (3) abilities to retaliate, and (4) abilities to resist market constraints, by concrete legal examples.

The Assessment of Collective SMP: Lessons Learned from the First Round of Market Review

The legal uncertainty in the application of collective dominance by competition authorities under EU competition law raises an interesting question on how its equivalent concept, collective significant market power, should be employed by the national regulatory authorities in the context of the EU 2003 Regulatory Framework in the electronic communications sector. This article aims to shed some light on the implementation of collective significant market power from an empirical point of view. It will first examine the decisions of the European Commission that involve the assessment of collective significant market power under Article 7 of the Framework Directive in the first round of market review, and then provide a general overview of the application of collective significant market power based on these decisions, following a four-step analysis: (1) conduciveness to tactic coordination, (2) ability and incentives to detect deviation, (3) ability and incentive to retaliate, and (4) an SMP position.