Lloyd J. Dumas

Human fallibility and weapons

Everything will work the way it is supposed to work.Nothing will happen until it is supposed to happen.

Do offsets mitigate or magnify the military burden

Introduction: Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne Part I: Theory and Policy 1. Do offsets mitigate or magnify the military burden? Lloyd J. Dumas 2. Using procurement offsets as an economic development strategy Travis Taylor 3. Mandatory defense offsets - conceptual foundations Stefan Markowski and Peter Hall 4. Economic aspects of arms trade offsets Jurgen Brauer 5. Arms trade as illiberal trade Ann Markusen 6. Defense offsets: policy versus pragmatism Ron Matthews Part II: Cases 7. Comparing British and German Offset Strategies Jocelyn Mawdsley and Michael Brzoska 8. Offsets and the Joint Strike Fighter in the UK and the Netherlands Keith Hartley 9. Nordic offset policies: changes and challeges Bjorn Hagelin 10. Evaluating defense offsets: the experience in Finland and Sweden Elisabeth Skons 11. Offsets in Belgium: between Scylla and Charybdis? Wally Struys 12. The defense industry in Poland: an offsets-based revival? Stefan Markowski and Peter Hall 13. Offsets and the development of the Brazilian arms industry Sam Perlo-Freeman 14. The Argentine defense industry: an evaluation Thomas Scheetz 15. The role of offsets in Indian defense procurement policy Angathevar Baskaran 16. Offset policies and trends in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan Michael W. Chinworth 17. Offsets and defense industrialization in Indonesia and Singapore Richard A. Bitzinger 18. Defense offsets in Australia and New Zealand Stefan Markowski and Peter Hall 19. Defense industrial participation: The South African experience J.Paul Dunne and Guy Lamb 20. Defense offsets and regional development in South Africa Richard J. HainesIn many ways Britain and Germany share similar profiles as arms producers. But their policy on both import and export offsets are quite different. This chapter argues that only by considering the historical and cultural backgrounds to their procurement and arms export policies can their offset policy choices be fully understood. While Britain reluctantly accepts the existence of offsets to counteract imperfect markets (but tries to seek waiver agreements, especially in Europe), Germany has been able to use offsets creatively not only to develop its own industry but also to become a significant exporter. The chapter suggests that British attachment to competitive procurement and its strong export promotion network explain its relative dislike of offsets, while the historical background of the German defense industry has given it certain qualities that enable it to cope far more successfully with offsets.

The Role of Demilitarization in Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Africa

In April 1994, the slaughter began. With guns, with knives, with clubs, the people of Rwanda butchered each other in an ethnic genocide carefully orchestrated by Rwanda’s government, while the rest of the world watched in horror — and did nothing.’ By the time it was over, 500,000 to 1,000,000 people had died and several million more had fled their homes in terror. Squalid conditions in refugee camps took the lives of thousands who sought sanctuary in neighboring Zaire (a nation soon to be violently transformed into the Democratic Republic of Congo). Malnutrition and maltreatment weakened them, and cholera spread like wildfire (Villalon, 1998).

Confronting corruption, building accountability: Lessons from the world of international development advising

Corruption, Accountability and Economic Progress Origins and Approach Structural Problems in International Economic Consulting Measures Across Organizations and Contexts Measures Within International Development Organizations Appendix A: Workshop on Building Accountability into International Development Advising (Pultusk, Poland: September 21-24, 2003)Appendix B: Host Governments and Multinational Corporations: Enron Comes to Nepal D.Gyawali Appendix C: Guidelines and Recommendations for Officials in Recipient Countries For Use in Contracting and Negotiating Consulting Services G.Rivas & B.Ejupovic Appendix D: Prototype Consultancy Contract I.Fawzy Appendix E: A Closer Look at the World Bank Process Appendix F: Recurrent Themes Among Recipient and Donor Representatives Appendix G: World Bank Guidelines Regarding Conflicts of Interest: An Analysis and Taxonomy

Disarmament and Economy in Advanced Industrialized Countries- The U.S. and the U.S.S.R:

for nonproductive purposes The use of productive resources (labor, materials, capital, fuel, etc.) for nonproductive purposes constitutes a drain on the vitality and prosperity of any economy. The issue of the use to which resources are put is so fundamental and so overriding in its impact on the ability of an economy to generate efficiently useful goods and services that economic systems as distinct as those of capitalism and communism experience similar structural problems when resources are diverted to nonproductive use. But what constitutes ’productive’ and ’nonproductive’ use? Productive resource use will be defined as

PARAMETRIC COSTING AND INSTITUTIONALIZED INEFFICIENCY.

Abstract The parametric costing methodology, developed by the RAND Corporation as a means for improving the capability for estimating project costs, is essentially a sophisticated form of historical costing in which the cost experience of past systems becomes a baseline for estimating the cost of future systems. This paper argues that such a procedure, interacting with the special characteristics of the environment in which it operates, tends to institutionalize the inefficiencies of previous production operations, reducing the critically important pressures for increased efficiency that are a central concern of the industrial engineering function. A simple model illustrating the tendency of parametric costing type techniques to exacerbate cost growth is presented. An alternative approach, more in line with traditional industrial engineering is suggested—one that is likely to not only improve cost estimates but enhance rather than degrade productive efficiency.

The Economics of Peacekeeping

By defining political economy and war in the broadest sense, this unique Handbook brings together a wide range of interdisciplinary scholars from economics, political science, sociology, and policy studies to address a multitude of important topics. These include an analysis of why wars begin, how wars are waged, what happens after war has ceased, and the various alternatives to war. Other sections explore civil war and revolution, the arms trade, economic and political systems, and post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. Policymakers as well as academics and students of political science, economics, public policy and sociology will find this volume to be an engaging and enlightening read.

Military Research and Development, and Economic Progress: Of Burdens and Opportunities

*Compiled from papers presented at the International Conference ’From Arms Race to Disarmament’ organized by Swedish Professionals Against Nuclear Arms and for Peace, at Stockholm, September 25-27, 1988, and of a chapter in Carlo Schaerf, Brian Holden and David Carlton (eds.), New Technologies and the Arms Race to be published in 1989 by the Macmillan Press, London. Permission to reproduce is gratefully acknowledged. **Lloyd J. Dumas is Professor of Political Economy and Economics at the University of Texas, Dallas (USA). 1. The lnyths and the myopia of the

Market Structure, Technological Development, and Productivity

Empirical investigations in the 1950s into the sources of productivity growth found that a significant part of that growth could be attributed to technological change (see, for example, Kendrick, 1956; Solow, 1957; Abromowitz, 1956; Denison, 1962). The proportion of growth accounted for by technology varies from one study to another, partly because of measurement problems and differences in data, but all agree that technology is an important factor. This spurred a series of investigations into the process of technological change. It began to be treated as an endogenous process; various factors within the firm were examined for their effect on technology.

Corruption, Accountability, and Economic Progress

W hen the financial crisis swept around the world in the late summer/early fall of 2008, there was a widespread fear that something very basic had gone wrong with the global market system. Market capitalism, hailed as triumphant less than two decades earlier as communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, suddenly seemed about to come unglued. Large and venerable financial institutions, long regarded by many as the bedrock of economic stability, teetered at the brink of disaster. Governments around the world, perhaps most spectacularly in the United States, felt compelled to rush forward with hundreds of billions of dollars to save the day, against the very principles that those financial institutions had long espoused. It seemed that, when they got themselves into deep enough trouble, the kind of massive government intervention the leaders of the private sector had so often inveighed against was all right after all.