Lluis Oviedo

Explanatory Limits in the Cognitive Science of Religion: Theoretical Matrix and Evidence Levels

Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) has developed for almost 20 years naturalistic explanations on religious mind and behavior, opening that field to scientific scrutiny. Scholars used to study religion from a more humanistic tradition or a hermeneutic approach could feel surprised by the application of biological-evolutionary, cognitive and neurological means to better explain religion. Not too confident with the new approach, many traditional students of religion, like theologians, religion philosophers, phenomenologists, and even psychologists, were often dazzled by the exhibition of new terms, concepts and ways to understand religion, beyond the traditional frames. Time is ripe for an assessment on the plausibility that these new theories exhibit, taking into account their respective frameworks and the reported empirical evidence.

Recent Scientific Explanations of Religious Beliefs: A Systematic Account

The study of beliefs – both in a large sense and specifically religious – has had exponential development in the past number of years. The current research makes good use of cognitive and neuroscientific methods, allowing for a deeper insight into the structure of beliefs and believing as a complex process. Religious faith has received particular attention, giving rise to many studies. For clear access to its variety and value, a systematic review on the published material is presented in an Appendix, which includes – to date – 75 books and articles applying cognitive, evolutionary, and neurological approaches, and other new methods, in an attempt to better characterize religious experience and beliefs. As a result, a dynamic picture emerges and some development can be followed toward more complex and inclusive theories. A case is made for the utility that this research can offer for the study of broadly understood beliefs; the same can be stated regarding the application of research on general beliefs for a better knowledge on religious ones.

Supernatural belief is not modulated by intuitive thinking style or cognitive inhibition

According to the Intuitive Belief Hypothesis, supernatural belief relies heavily on intuitive thinking—and decreases when analytic thinking is engaged. After pointing out various limitations in prior attempts to support this Intuitive Belief Hypothesis, we test it across three new studies using a variety of paradigms, ranging from a pilgrimage field study to a neurostimulation experiment. In all three studies, we found no relationship between intuitive or analytical thinking and supernatural belief. We conclude that it is premature to explain belief in gods as ‘intuitive’, and that other factors, such as socio-cultural upbringing, are likely to play a greater role in the emergence and maintenance of supernatural belief than cognitive style.

Introduction: What We Do Not Know About Believing – Approaching a New Scientific Hot Spot

The human propensity to believe is one of the most fascinating phenomena of mankind. Since antiquity, philosophers have spent time and energy trying to understand how and why humans are touched and influenced by their beliefs. Nevertheless “belief” remains a strange phenomenon; it is both wanted and unwanted. Knowledge-based societies as well as either secular or strict religious worldviews can cast belief in a very negative light. Also, from a scientific point of view belief can be considered overly complex and heavily interwoven with religion. This chapter argues against the underestimation of the relevance of belief. It highlights the predominant use of the noun “belief” as one of the basic problems in both everyday speech and scientific research. But an understanding of belief that reduces it to only a noun is not sufficient. Beliefs are expressions and results of activities. This means that believing does not exist only as a noun, but also as a verb. We are active when we do what we call “to believe.” The chapter explains that we are at the crossroads of a change in perspective from examining “belief” to examining “believing”. This change will foster our understanding of the more fundamental “process of believing” and enable us to analyze the process of how believing works in the human mind. Thus, the chapter provides an overview of the book, which starts with two introductory chapters and clusters the following chapters according to scientific disciplines (“neuroscience,” “philosophy,” “theology, religious studies, and anthropology,” “social sciences,” and “natural and computer sciences”) though many of them reflect an interdisciplinary approach.

Does Religious Behavior Render Humans Special

Developments in the new scientific study of religion provide abundant analysis and material to determine how human-specific are religious beliefs and behaviors. Some explanations clearly try to observe links between religious attitudes and those of other animal species. Three research lines are explored. The first looks for the presence of ‘religious precursors’ in other species, especially in great apes. The second identifies some behavioral isomorphism between human religious behavior and general animal behavior. This is the case of submissive-like behaviors rendering oneself lower or smaller or more vulnerable before a more powerful and aggressive subject (Jay Feierman) seen in the non-verbal aspect of petitioning prayer in all religions. The third approach looks at the cognitive level to identify which forms can be shared with other animals and which ones could be identified as human-specific, since some aspects of current religious beliefs require ‘higher’ faculties and conditions. The answer to the title question should be nuanced, since – to some extent – affinities and isomorphism with other animals can be identified, while other aspects of religion, like those which are more symbolic and cultural, qualify religion as a ‘special’ human feature.