Lone Grønbæk Kronbak

Sharing Rules and Stability in Coalition Games with Externalities

This paper examines cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule that takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. We contribute to existing knowledge by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). As an illustrative example, we describe a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model of the major agents who exploit the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.

Bio-economic evaluation of implementing trawl fishing gear with different selectivity

The paper develops a biological-economic evaluation tool to analyse the consequences for trawl fishers of implementing more selective fishing technologies. This is done by merging a dynamic biological population model and an economic cost-benefit evaluation framework to describe the consequences for the fish stocks, fishermen and society. The bio-economic evaluation is applied to the case of the Danish trawl fishery in Kattegat and Skagerrak, which experiences a high level of discards and bycatches of several species. Four different kinds of selectivity scenarios are evaluated in comparison with a baseline. The results from the evaluation are indicators for the consequences on ecological and economic levels. The results show that implementation of different selective fishing gear in the Kattegat and Skagerrak mixed trawl fisheries generally implies a trade off over time between rebuilding the stocks and economic loss. Moreover, the analysis shows that implementation of more selective gear is not always beneficial.

On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

Game-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. It is, however, the case that these types of models do not capture many real world mixed fisheries, where species are bio-logical independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting biodiversity preservation by setting up a two species model with the aim of ensuring both species survive harvesting of exploiters adapting a non-cooperative behaviour. The model starts out as a multi-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to include also biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the limits on the number of players preserving both species including the conditions to be satisfied. For visual purposes we simulate a two species model with different kind of interrelationship.

On International Fisheries Agreements, Entry Deterrence and Ecological Uncertainty

A prerequisite for an international fisheries agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect the benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is true. The agreement, therefore, implicitly builds on an expectation of the ecological condition of the natural resource. Game theoretical models often assume that all parties have the same (often perfect) information about the resource and that the exploitation is an equilibrium use of the stock. As stated by experts in natural science, the fish ecology still has many open questions, for example how to predict population dynamics, migration patterns, food availability, etc. In some cases, parties disagree about the state, abundance, and migration of a stock, which can reduce the possibilities of reaching an agreement for exploitation of the stock. This paper develops a model and applies it to the North-East Atlantic mackerel fishery, in order to analyze an IFA under different ecological scenarios, and also combines the model with the economic theory of entry deterrence. The model is used empirically to determine whether the parties with original access to the resource have an advantage when forming an agreement with a new party in having the ability to fish the stock down to a smaller size and thereby prevent another party from entering into the fishery. With a basis in entry deterrence, combined with lack of information, the paper illustrates the obstacles that have made an agreement for the North-East Atlantic mackerel so difficult to achieve.

Recent Developments in Fisheries Economics Research

Fisheries economics stand on the cusp of potentially sizeable changes in orientation and policy focus, leading in turn to comparable changes in modeling and general analysis. Notably, fisheries are increasingly framed as part of the overall marine environment rather than considered as solely or largely a commercial fishing issue. Other changes further challenge this traditional conceptual foundation, including technological change, multiple externalities, asymmetric information, marine planning and strategic interactions among players that are especially pronounced in international settings. This paper contends there is a potential for re-development of fishery economic models related to fishery and marine economics in several directions also related to the economic foundation.

Allocation and sharing in international fisheries agreements

Abstract This paper provides an introduction to the allocation and sharing of benefits in international fisheries agreements. The reader is introduced to the concept of sharing the benefits from cooperative fisheries agreements and to several different sharing imputations. The paper summarises the lessons learned from the literature. In the literature review, several policy-relevant issues emerging from game theory and fisheries literature on the topic are identified.

Environmental cost-effectiveness analysis in intertemporal natural resource policy: Evaluation of selective fishing gear

In most decision-making involving natural resources, the achievements of a given policy (e.g., improved ecosystem or biodiversity) are rather difficult to measure in monetary units. To address this problem, the current paper develops an environmental cost-effectiveness analysis (ECEA) to include intangible benefits in intertemporal natural resource problems. This approach can assist managers in prioritizing management actions as least cost solutions to achieve quantitative policy targets. The ECEA framework is applied to a selective gear policy case in Danish mixed trawl fisheries in Kattegat and Skagerrak. The empirical analysis demonstrates how a policy with large negative net benefits might be justified if the intangible benefits are included.

The Two-sector Economic Problem Of Persistent Organic Pollution and Baltic Sea Salmon Fisheries

The paper describes the general nature of two-sector environmental and natural resource problems and highlights the issue of two sector models where one sector imposes a one-sided negative externality on the other sector, e.g. the polluting sector causes changes in the economic value of the fishery sector. The paper sets up a general social planner model and demonstrates it in simple functional form, using the problem of persistent organic pollution in the Baltic Sea and its effects on the regulation and economic value of the Baltic Salmon. The paper illustrates how a modified golden rule can be used to describe the optimal link between the two sectors. Lay-Person’s Abstract The problem of Persistent Organic Pollution (POPs) in the Baltic Sea has been widely studied by biologists and chemists, however the economic impacts of the pollution have not been sufficiently examined. This paper explores possibilities for sustainable development which accommodate both the fishery and industrial sectors. It focuses on the Baltic Sea salmon fishery and the effects on its value resulting from different pollution levels. The paper aims to find balance and an optimal link between sectors. Author’s Note Barbara Hutniczak is a student in the Masters Programme in