Lori B. Andrews

My Body, My Property

Two recent cases raise the question: Should the body be considered a form of property? Patients generally do not share in the profits derived from the applications of research on their body parts and products. Nor is their consent for research required so long as the body part is unidentified and is removed in the course of treatment. A market in body parts and products would require consent to all categories of research and ensure that patients are protected from coercion and given the chance to be paid fairly for their contributions. Such a market might force us to rethink our policies prohibiting organ sales. Donors, recipients, and society will benefit from a market in body parts so long as owners--and no one else--retain control over their bodies.

Genes and patent policy: rethinking intellectual property rights

Concerns about human gene patents go beyond moral disquiet about creating a commodity from a part of the human body and also beyond legal questions about whether genes are unpatentable products of nature. New concerns are being raised about harm to public health and to research. In response to these concerns, various policy options, such as litigation, legislation, patent pools and compulsory licensing, are being explored to ensure that gene patents do not impede the practice of medicine and scientific progress.

Whose body is it anyway? Disputes over body tissue in a biotechnology age

In this changing context, developments in the removal, storage, and transformation of human tissue have created new opportunities for medical research and biotechnological applications that have increased demands for tissue. Body tissue has become a part of an international market. For example, a company has obtained American and European patents on the process of extracting stem cells from cord blood; and pharmaceutical companies are searching the world for disease genes and sometimes patenting them. As the market for human tissue has increased, so have disputes in which scientific and commercial ideas about the proper uses of tissue confront social and personal understandings about the body. Whereas scientists seek greater access to bodily materials, others defend their cultural values and individual rights. Scientists need to pay greater heed to such social claims, for they reflect legitimate interests and further other important social values and activities. Indeed, courts and other policymaking bodies are struggling to develop systems to accomodate productive use of bodily materials while respecting cultural associations and individual rights. And they are increasingly incorporating social meanings of the body into their decisons.

Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists

Surrogate motherhood presents an enormous challenge for feminists. During the course of the Baby M trial, the New Jersey chapter of the National Organization of Women met and could not reach consensus on the issue. “The feelings ranged the gamut,” the head of the chapter, Linda Bowker, told the New Yorb T i m . “We did feel that it should not be made illegal, because we don’t want to turn women into criminals. But other than that, what you may feel about the Baby M case may not be what you feel about another. “We do believe that women ought to control their own bodies, and we don’t want to play big brother or big sister and tell them what to do,” Ms. Bowker continued. “But on the other hand, we don’t want to see the day when women are turned into breeding machines.”’ Other feminist groups have likewise been split on the issue, but a vocal group of feminists came to the support of Mary Beth Whitehead with demonstrations* and an amicus brier; they are now seeking laws that would ban surrogate motherhood altogether. However, the rationales that they and others are using to justify this governmental intrusion into reproductive choice may come back to haunt feminists in other areas of procreative policy and family law. As science fiction has taught us, the types of technologies available shape the nature of a society. Equally important as the technologies-and having much farther-reaching implications-are the policies that a society devises and implements to deal with technology. In Margaret Atwood’s A Handmuid’s Tale, a book often cited as showing the dangers of the technology of surrogacy, it was actually policy changcs-the criminalization of abortion and the banning of women from the paid labor force-that created the preconditions for a dehumanizing and harmful version of surrogacy. The Feminist Legacy

The Aftermath of Baby M: Proposed State Laws on Surrogate Motherhood

New Jerseys Baby M case has thrust the issue of surrogate motherhood on state legislatures throughout the country. Like artificial insemination in the 1950s and 1960s, this new reproductive technology is evoking legislative responses ranging from horrified prohibition to cautious facilitation

Privacy Policies of Android Diabetes Apps and Sharing of Health Information

Privacy Policies of Android Diabetes Apps and Sharing of Health Information Mobile health apps can help individuals manage chronic health conditions.1 One-fifth of smartphone owners had health apps in 2012,2 and 7% of primary care physicians recommended a health app.3 The US Food and Drug Administration has approved the prescription of some apps.4 Health apps can transmit sensitive medical data, including disease status and medication compliance. Privacy risks and the relationship between privacy disclosures and practices of health apps are understudied.

Alternative Modes of Reproduction

The past decade has witnessed the birth of new reproductive technologies (such as in vitro fertilization) and the application of older technologies to new situations (such as the use of artificial insemination to facilitate surrogate motherhood). The new and old technologies1 have been the subject of a vast discussion in the legal and ethical literature, but little attention has been paid to the feminist perspective in the majority of books and articles.2 However, there is a growing separate literature addressing alternative reproduction written by feminists themselves.3

Human in vitro fertilization and the law

Physicians who intend to perform in vitro fertilization--or the newer alternative, in vivo fertilization and embryo transfer--should be aware of the plethora of laws that potentially cover their work. In perhaps no other area of medicine are there so many separate statutes and regulations that potentially apply. State fetal research laws, abortion statutes, human subject protection laws, and specific in vitro fertilization statutes can determine whether and how the procedure can be undertaken. When donor gametes or a surrogate carrier is used, additional laws governing artificial insemination, paternity, or adoption may come into play to determine the childs legal status and its relationship to the parties involved. This article is designed to guide physicians through the legal maze.

When Baby's Mother is also Grandma—and Sister

Andrews, an attorney, and Tiefel, a professor of religion, respond to the question of whether an in vitro fertilization program should accept a case in which the applicants adult daughter would donate an ovum to be fertilized by sperm from the applicants husband (the daughters step-father) and implanted in a surrogate for gestation. Andrews notes that the arrangement is consistent with societys reluctance to interfere with procreative decisions and is acceptable as long as its ramifications are discussed with all of the concerned parties. She urges that such cases be monitored as part of research on the effects of the new reproductive technologies. Tiefel identifies problems of contradictory values about genetic ties and confusion over claims and responsibilities regarding the child, maintains that physicians have no duty to facilitate reproduction, and concludes that the request is both foolish and immoral.

Legal Aspects of Assisted Reproduction

The differing perspectives of medicine and law become clear in any exploration of assisted reproduction. Medicine and law take much different approaches to solving problems. Medicine looks forward, while the law gazes backwards. Medical doctrine will readily embrace an innovative technology, such as extracorporeal fertilization. In contrast, the common law cannot assimilate a new technology unless it has legal precedents of analogous situations to draw upon. Yale Law professor Fred Rodell aptly pointed out the ramifications of this distinction: “If a British barrister of two hundred years ago were suddenly to come alive in an American court-room, he would feel intellectually at home. . . . Imagine, by contrast, a British surgeon of two hundred years ago plopped into a modern hospital operating room. He would literally understand less of what was going on than would any passer-by in from the street at random. ” I The legal problem with medically assisted reproduction is that there are few precedents to look back upon. The law does provide precedents for individual doctor-patient interactions such as the standards for informed consent. But where in the history of the common law do we turn for guidance about the legal issues raised by extracorporeal embryos? Or the legal issues created by the use of a donor or surrogate to provide the genetic or gestational component for reproduction? Because these are the issues that stretch the soul and conscience of the common law, these are the legal aspects of assisted reproduction that need the most attention.