Lori Markson

Intention and analogy in children's naming of pictorial representations.

What underlies childrens naming of representations, such as when they call a statue of a clothespin “a clothespin”? One possibility is that they focus exclusively on shape, extending the name “clothespin” only to entities that are shaped like typical clothespins. An alternative possibility is that they extend a word that refers to an object to any representation of that object, and that shape is relevant because it is a reliable indicator of representational intent. We explored these possibilities by asking 3- and 4-year-olds to describe pictures that represented objects through intention and analogy. The results suggest that it is childrens appreciation of representation that underlies their naming; sameness of shape is neither necessary nor sufficient. We conclude by considering whether this account might apply more generally to artifacts other than pictorial representations.

Capacities underlying word learning

Children are strikingly good at learning the meanings of words. Current controversy focuses on the relative importance of different capacities in this learning process including principles of association, low-level attentional mechanisms, special word learning constraints, syntactic cues and theory of mind. We argue that children succeed at word learning because they possess certain conceptual biases about the external world, the ability to infer the referential intentions of others and an appreciation of syntactic cues to word meaning. Support for this view comes from studies exploring the phenomena of fast mapping, the whole object bias, the acquisition of names for entities belonging to different ontological kinds and the effect of lexical contrast. Word learning is not the result of a general associative learning process, nor does it involve specialized constraints. The ability to learn the meanings of words depends on a number of capacities, some of which are specific to language and unique to humans, others of which are potentially shared with other species.

Similarity predicts liking in 3-year-old children.

Two studies examined the influence of similarity on 3-year-old childrens initial liking of their peers. Children were presented with pairs of childlike puppets who were either similar or dissimilar to them on a specified dimension and then were asked to choose one of the puppets to play with as a measure of liking. Children selected the puppet whose food preferences or physical appearance matched their own. Unpacking the physical appearance finding revealed that the stable similarity of hair color may influence liking more strongly than the transient similarity of shirt color. A second study showed that children also prefer to play with a peer who shares their toy preferences, yet importantly, show no bias toward a peer who is similar on an arbitrary dimension. The findings provide insight into the earliest development of peer relations in young children.

The shape of thought

When children learn the name of a novel object, they tend to extend that name to other objects similar in shape - a phenomenon referred to as the shape bias. Does the shape bias stem from learned associations between names and categories of objects, or does it derive from more general properties of childrens understanding of language and the world? We argue here for the second alternative, presenting evidence that the shape bias emerges early in development, is not limited to names, and is intimately related to how children make sense of categories.

The Child as Econometrician: A Rational Model of Preference Understanding in Children

Recent work has shown that young children can learn about preferences by observing the choices and emotional reactions of other people, but there is no unified account of how this learning occurs. We show that a rational model, built on ideas from economics and computer science, explains the behavior of children in several experiments, and offers new predictions as well. First, we demonstrate that when children use statistical information to learn about preferences, their inferences match the predictions of a simple econometric model. Next, we show that this same model can explain childrens ability to learn that other people have preferences similar to or different from their own and use that knowledge to reason about the desirability of hidden objects. Finally, we use the model to explain a developmental shift in preference understanding.

Orienting to third­party conversations

Children as young as two years of age are able to learn novel object labels through overhearing, even when distracted by an attractive toy (Akhtar, 2005). The present studies varied the information provided about novel objects and examined which elements (i.e. novel versus neutral information and labels versus facts) toddlers chose to monitor, and what type of information they were more likely to learn. In Study 1, participants learned only the novel label and the novel fact containing a novel label. In Study 2, only girls learned the novel label. Neither girls nor boys learned the novel fact. In both studies, analyses of childrens gaze patterns suggest that children who learned the new information strategically oriented to the third-party conversation.

Three-Year-Old Children Detect Social Exclusion in Third-Party Interactions

ABSTRACT Humans are motivated to connect with others and are sensitive to social exclusion—intentionally leaving out others. This ability to detect social exclusion is suggested to be evolutionarily adaptive, biologically hardwired, and an important feature of social-cognitive development. Yet it is unclear when children start to independently detect social exclusion. Previous developmental research on social exclusion has focused on children older than 4 years of age, but recent infancy research has suggested younger children may be able to process complex social interactions such as social exclusion. The present study is the first to examine whether 2- to 3-year-old children detect social exclusion and if they prefer to affiliate with individuals who have been excluded over individuals who exclude others. Across 2 experiments, 2- and 3-year-old children (N = 140) viewed exclusive group interactions, in which 2 agents unjustly excluded 1 agent, and children were asked to choose whether they preferred to play with an excluded agent or an exclusive agent. Three-year-old children consistently preferred to play with the excluded agent, whereas 2-year-old children showed no preference. Three-year-old children did not show a preference among agents engaged in inclusive interactions and did not prefer an agent who refused to engage with a group, showing that 3-year-old children distinguish unjust exclusion from other types of interactions. Together, these findings suggest 3-year-old children detect social exclusion and are motivated to affiliate with unjustly excluded agents over those who exclude others, whereas these capacities are still developing in 2-year-old children.