Louis Raes

Estimating the preferences of central bankers : an analysis of four voting records

This paper analyzes the voting records of four central banks (Sweden, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) with spatial models of voting. We infer the policy preferences of the monetary policy committee members and use these to analyze the evolution in preferences over time and the differences in preferences between member types and the position of the Governor in different monetary policy committees.

Hawks and Doves at the FOMC

In this paper we estimate ideal points of Bank Presidents and Board Governors at the FOMC. We use stated preferences from FOMC transcripts and estimate a hierarchical spatial voting model. We find a clear difference between the average Board Governor and Bank President. We find little evidence for difference in ideal points according to the appointing president in case of Bank Governors. Similarly career background has no clear effect on the ideal points. We find that the median ideal point at the FOMC has been fairly stable over our sample period (1989-2007) emphasizing the lack of a political appointment channel. We also show that there was considerable variation in the median ideal point of Bank Presidents and Board Governors, but that these seem to cancel each other out. Also the dispersion of opinions (the spread between the lowest and highest ideal point) varies over time, suggestion variation in agreement at the FOMC.

Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points

While not obvious at first sight, in many modern economies, the position of a monetary authority is similar to the position of the highest-level court (Goodhart (2002)). For example, both bodies are expected to operate independently even though there are crosscountry differences in what independence entails. In the United Kingdom, the highest court is the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (in short: Law Lords). There is a consensus among legal scholars that the powers of Law Lords with respect to the legislature are less wide ranging in the United Kingdom than the United States’ counterpart, the supreme court (Goodhart and Meade (2004), p.11). In economic jargon one says that the Supreme Court has goal independence whereas the Law Lords have instrument independence.

Exposure to Bankers: Networks and Stock Market Participation

In this paper we investigate the importance of acquaintance networks for financial decisions by households. We construct a variable capturing the expected proximity or social closeness to a subpopulation of financially savvy people using an overdispersed Poisson model. This measure captures the exposure to people with financial knowledge in an investors acquaintance network. We find that investors with a higher exposure to financial savvy people are more likely to invest in stocks. This holds after controlling for a wide range of known stock market participation determinants. Moreover when restricting to households with elevated levels of trust or wealth the impact of exposure to financial savvy people increases. Our main findings continue to hold in several analyses to uncover an exogenous effect from proximity on stock market participation. Furthermore we show that the importance of acquaintance networks extends to other financial decisions as well.