Louise Wallenberg

What can bodies do? Reading Spinoza for an affective ethics of organizational life

Recent attempts to develop an embodied understanding of ethics in organizations have tended to mobilize a Levinasian and ‘im/possible’ ethics of recognition, which separates ethics and embodiment from politics and organization. We argue that this separation is unrealistic, unsustainable, and an unhelpful starting point for an embodied ethics of organizations. Instead of rescuing and modifying the ethics of recognition, we propose an embodied ethics of organizational life through Spinoza’s affective ethics. Neither a moral rule system nor an infinite duty to recognize the other, Spinoza offers a theory of the good, powerful and joyful life by asking what bodies can do. Rather than an unrestrained, irresponsible and individualistic quest for power and freedom, this suggests that we enhance our capacities to affect and be affected by relating to a variety of different bodies. We first scrutinize recent attempts to develop an ethics of recognition and embodiment in organization studies. We then explore key concepts and central arguments of Spinozian ethics. Finally, we discuss what a Spinozian ethics means for the theory and practice of embodied ethics in organizational life.

Just doing gender? Transvestism and the power of underdoing gender in everyday life and work

While previous research in organization studies has utilized transgender to show how gender is done, overdone and undone, this literature lacks empirical grounding, and the theoretical arguments dominating it tend to idealize the transgressive power of transgender while reducing transgender to hyperbolic drag and stereotypical passing. To further advance the understanding of transgender within and around organizations, this article presents a qualitative study from a Northern European country to investigate how male-to-female transvestites do and undo gender in everyday life and work. In contrast to extant research, we found that participants did transgender and undid gender by underdoing gender, that is, by combining feminine, masculine and ungendered practices and attributes in ways that made passing and drag insignificant. As transvestites simultaneously expressed masculine and feminine forms of embodiment, we argue that they may more obviously challenge, though not dismantle, dominant forms of gender and identity than suggested by previous accounts. We conclude by discussing broader implications for the understanding of gender, identity, power and resistance in organizations.

Buggering Freud and Deleuze: towards a queer theory of masochism

Both Freuds and Deleuzes understandings of masochism limit the transgressive and subversive forces of masochism by taking sexual difference for granted. Drawing on Newtons fashion photography for Wolford and on feminist interrogations of Freud, Deleuze, and masochism, this paper therefore seeks to develop an alternative, queer theory of masochism as sexual indifference. Viewing masochism as sexual indifference opens up movements of desire beyond the heterosexual matrix of male masochists and female mistresses. This is therefore an exercise in buggery. In the first half of the paper we bugger Freuds understanding of masochism with Deleuzes diverging understanding of masochism. In the second half we bugger Deleuzes understanding of masochism with other parts of his own work, with feminist critique, and with Newtons photography.

What’s Wrong with Queer? Between Queer Dialogue and Separatist Safe Spaces

In this short piece we take issue with the current separatist tendencies that are being expressed in certain parts of the queer community. We illustrate how this compares with central ideas in proto-queer thought and queer theory, and how it risks undermining the possibility of a queer dialogue and queer politics.