Lucas D. Introna

Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines Matters

This article argues that search engines raise not merely technical issues but also political ones. Our study of search engines suggests that they systematically exclude (in some cases by design and in some, accidentally) certain sites and certain types of sites in favor of others, systematically giving prominence to some at the expense of others. We argue that such biases, which would lead to a narrowing of the Webs functioning in society, run counter to the basic architecture of the Web as well as to the values and ideals that have fueled widespread support for its growth and development. We consider ways of addressing the politics of search engines, raising doubts whether, in particular, the market mechanism could serve as an acceptable corrective.This article argues that search engines raise not merely technical issues but also political ones. Our study of search engines suggests that they systematically exclude (in some cases by design and in some, accidentally) certain sites and certain types of sites in favor of others, systematically giving prominence to some at the expense of others. We argue that such biases, which would lead to a narrowing of the Webs functioning in society, run counter to the basic architecture of the Web as well as to the values and ideals that have fueled widespread support for its growth and development. We consider ways of addressing the politics of search engines, raising doubts whether, in particular, the market mechanism could serve as an acceptable corrective.

Privacy and the Computer: Why We Need Privacy in the Information Society

For more than thirty years an extensive and significant philosophical debate about the notion of privacy has been going on. Therefore it seems puzzling that most current authors on information technology and privacy assume that all individuals intuitively know why privacy is important. This assumption allows privacy to be seen as a liberal nice to have value: something that can easily be discarded in the face of other really important matters like national security, the doing of justice and the effective administration of the state and the corporation. In this paper I want to argue that there is something fundamental in the notion of privacy and that due to the profoundness of the notion it merits extraordinary measures of protection and overt support. I will also argue that the notion of transparency (as advocated by Wasserstrom) is a useless concept without privacy and that accountability and transparency can only be meaningful if encapsulated in the concept of privacy. From philosophical and legal literature I will discuss and argue the value of privacy as the essential context and foundation of human autonomy in social relationships. In the conclusion of the paper I will discuss implications of this notion of privacy for the information society in general, and for the discipline of information systems in particular.

Privacy in the information age: Stakeholders, interests and values

Privacy is a relational and relative concept that has been defined in a variety of ways. In this paper we offer a systematic discussion of potentially different notions of privacy. We conclude that privacy as the freedom or immunity from the judgement of others is an extremely useful concept to develop ways in which to understand privacy claims and associated risks. To this end, we develop a framework of principles that explores the interrelations of interests and values for various stakeholders where privacy concerns have risen or are expected to rise. We argue that conflicts between the interests and values of different stakeholders may result in legitimate claims of privacy/transparency being ignored or underrepresented. Central to this analysis is the notion of a stakeholder. We argue that stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests, of intrinsic value, in the procedural and/or substantive aspects of the privacy/transparency claim and subsequent judgements on that basis. Using the principles of access, representation, and power, which flow from our framework of analysis, we show how they can facilitate the identification of potential privacy/transparency risks using examples from the British National Health Service.

Defining the Web: the politics of search engines

Although the Web itself might truthfully claim a sovereign disinterested and unbiased attitude toward the people who use it, the authors claim that search engines, the tools that navigate the astronomical number of pages (800 million and counting), favor popular, wealthy, and powerful sites at the expense of others. Some researchers have estimated that, taken individually, none of the Web search engines studied indexes more than 16 percent of the total indexable Web. Combined, the results from all search engines they studied covered only about 42 percent of the Web. But what about those portions of the Web that remain hidden from view? The article looks at how search engine developers, designers, and producers grapple with the technical limits that restrict what their engines can find. The authors also examine influences that may determine systematic inclusion and exclusion of certain sites, and the wide-ranging factors that dictate systematic prominence for some sites while relegating others to systematic invisibility.

Against method‐ism

Provides a critique of method‐ism ‐ the view that methodology is necessary and sufficient for information systems’ development success; method‐ism presupposes also that systems developers understand the value of methodology and will prefer to work with it rather than without it. Argues, against method‐ism, that method flows from understanding, and not the reverse. Hence method cannot be a substitute for understanding. Discusses the way in which humans tend to interact with the world by means of ready‐to‐hand tools, using the ideas of Heidegger and Ihde. Shows that tools are used only if available (ready‐to‐hand) in the world of doing. If a methodology is not ready‐to‐hand, it will break down and be ignored in the pragmatics of getting the job done. Presents a number of arguments why methodologies by design will tend to break down (not be ready‐to‐hand) and hence be discarded.

The ends of information systems research: a pragmatic framework

In this paper, we argue that any effort to understand the state of the Information Systems field has to view IS research as a series of normative choices and value judgments about the ends of research. To assist a systematic questioning of the various ends of IS research, we propose a pragmatic framework that explores the choices IS researchers make around theories and methodologies, ethical methods of conduct, desirable outcomes, and the long-term impact of the research beyond a single site and topic area. We illustrate our framework by considering and questioning the explicit and implicit choices of topics, design and execution, and the representation of knowledge in experimental research--research often considered to be largely beyond value judgments and power relations. We conclude with the implications of our pragmatic framework by proposing practical questions for all IS researchers to consider in making choices about relevant topics, design and execution, and representation of findings in their research.

Maintaining the reversibility of foldings: Making the ethics (politics) of information technology visible

This paper will address the question of the morality of technology. I believe this is an important question for our contemporary society in which technology, especially information technology, is increasingly becoming the default mode of social ordering. I want to suggest that the conventional manner of conceptualising the morality of technology is inadequate – even dangerous. The conventional view of technology is that technology represents technical means to achieve social ends. Thus, the moral problem of technology, from this perspective, is the way in which the given technical means are applied to particular (good or bad) social ends. In opposition to this I want to suggest that the assumed separation, of this approach, between technical means and social ends are inappropriate. It only serves to hide the most important political and ethical dimensions of technology. I want to suggest that the morality of technology is much more embedded and implicit than such a view would suggest. In order to critique this approach I will draw on phenomenology and the more recent work of Bruno Latour. With these intellectual resources in mind I will propose disclosive ethics as a way to make the morality of technology visible. I will give a brief account of this approach and show how it might guide our␣understanding of the ethics and politics of technology by considering two examples of contemporary information technology: search engines and plagiarism detection systems.

On sociomaterial imbrications: What plagiarism detection systems reveal and why it matters

In the context of an increasingly mobile student population, and Greek students specifically, this paper opens up and reveals the manner in which a specific culturally situated human actor (the Greek student) and a specific culturally situated non-human actor (the plagiarism detection system) encounter, interpret and constitute each other within the situated context of the UK higher education system. Methodologically, we base our paper on a longitudinal in-depth case study that focussed on the teaching, learning and assessment practices in Greek public sector universities. Based on our Greek case example we specifically focus on how the delegation of plagiarism detection to a technical actor produces a particular set of agencies and intentionalities (a politics one might say) which unintentionally and unexpectedly conspires to constitute some students as plagiarists (who are not) and others as not (who are). We suggest that this is best explored by looking exactly at what is rendered visible and invisible in such imbrications. This has important implications for the design, implementation and use of IS in situated contexts.

Disciplining information systems: truth and its regimes

This paper provides a critical discussion of the ongoing concern of Information Systems (IS) academics on the status of IS as an academic discipline. The focal claim of the argument is that the status of IS as an ‘academic discipline’ is not an ontological or an epistemological question but rather a political one. In defending this claim the paper will draw on the work of Foucault, in particular his discussion on the relation between power and knowledge. The paper will conclude that the advice given by Paul (2002) and others may be appropriate but for very different reasons. It will claim that it is equally important, if not more so, to know the reasons why claims to legitimacy may succeed or not, for such claims to be effective as a political programme.

The Phenomenology of Information Systems Evaluation: Overcoming the Subject/Object Dualism

In this paper, we argue that the path to better IS evaluation in organizations is to get beyond the dualisms of subject/object, mind/body, and cognition/action that limit our analysis, understanding, and practice of evaluation in the flow of organizational life. We present a discussion of the unity of cognition and action using the work of phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Henry. We argue that the subject/object dualism as described in the evaluation literature only seems to exist because we accept and depend on another dualism, namely the assumed split between cognition and action. We propose that managers do not apply methods, propose alternatives, argue costs and benefits, and attempt to subvert these, in order to judge or decide. Rather the applying, proposing, arguing and subverting—the discourse—is exactly already the judging and the deciding. We proceed to present a set of principles that take the unity of cognition and action seriously. We believe these point to a way of making IS evaluation more skillful while taking into account both the rational and the political dimensions that now seem to stand as irreconcilable opposites.