Lucia Mannetti

The Energetics of Motivated Cognition: A Force-Field Analysis

A force-field theory of motivated cognition is presented and applied to a broad variety of phenomena in social judgment and self-regulation. Purposeful cognitive activity is assumed to be propelled by a driving force and opposed by a restraining force. Potential driving force represents the maximal amount of energy an individual is prepared to invest in a cognitive activity. Effective driving force corresponds to the amount of energy he or she actually invests in attempt to match the restraining force. Magnitude of the potential driving force derives from a combination of goal importance and the pool of available mental resources, whereas magnitude of the restraining force derives from an individuals inclination to conserve resources, current task demands, and competing goals. The present analysis has implications for choice of means to achieve ones cognitive goals as well as for successful goal attainment under specific force-field constellations. Empirical evidence for these effects is considered, and the underlying theorys integrative potential is highlighted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Psychological theory testing versus psychometric nay-saying : Comment on Neuberg et al.'s (1997) critique of the Need for Closure Scale

S. L. Neuberg, T. N. Judice, and S. G. West (1997) faulted our work with the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) on grounds that the NFCS lacks discriminant validity relative to S. L. Neubergs and J. T. Newsoms (1993) Personal Need for Structure (PNS) Scale and is multidimensional, which, so they claim, renders the use of its total score inadmissible. By contrast, the present authors show that neither of the above assertions is incompatible with the underlying need for closure theory. Relations between NFCS and the PNS are to be expected, as these were designed to operationalize the very same construct (of need for closure). Furthermore, no unidimensionality of the NFCS has been claimed, and none is required to use its total score for testing various theoretically derived predictions. An instruments ultimate utility hinges on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence rather than on questionable psychometric dogma unrelated to the substantive matters at hand.

Says Who?: Epistemic Authority Effects in Social Judgment

Publisher Summary This chapter features the concept of ascribed epistemic authority offered as a unique perspective on source effects in social judgment. It assumes that both the self and external sources may be assigned different degrees of epistemic authority in different domains and that this determines the ways in which individuals process information, make decisions, and undertake actions. The present framework traces the socio-developmental aspects of epistemic authority assignments and considers individual differences in the distribution of authority assignments across sources. The chapter conceives of epistemic authority ascriptions as meta-cognitive beliefs about a source of information. It introduces a perspective on source effects framed from the subjective standpoint of the informations recipient. This perspective highlights the developmental, individual differences, self-related, and applied aspects of source phenomena. The treatment of source effects in several major models of persuasion is reviewed. A final discussion highlights the unique properties of the epistemic authority and considers its implications for the place of source effects in notions of information processing and human judgment.

Construct validity and generalizability of the Carver–White behavioural inhibition system/behavioural activation system scales

The factorial structure and invariance of the BIS/BAS scales of Carver and White were assessed across three samples from the USA, UK, and Italy. Previous validation studies of the BIS/BAS scales relied on individual samples drawn from English‐speaking populations only and failed to formally assess generalizability. The current study shows that the four‐factor structure proposed by Carver and White—i.e. one BIS and three BAS facets—achieved satisfactory psychometric properties in all three samples and that measurement invariance was obtained across countries. Latent mean differences due to gender and country were also investigated. Theoretical issues concerning the validity of the BIS/BAS scales are addressed. Copyright

A cross-cultural study of the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale: comparing its structure in Croatia, Italy, USA and The Netherlands.

This study was designed to compare the factor structure of Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) as it emerges from three European samples (Croatia, Italy and The Netherlands) to the structure emerging from a USA sample, and to test the invariance of the structure of the scale both across three European contexts and across European and US samples. This comparison was conducted to examine the generalizability of results obtained with the NFCS across cultures. The sample sizes employed in this study range from 201 (Croatia) to 418 (Italy) participants. First- and second-order confirmatory factor analysis and multiple-group measurement invariance tests were performed using the LISREL-8 program (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). The analyses revealed that the factor structure of the scale was invariant across all samples, and that the best fitting model was one with two latent second-order factors, thus confirming results of previous studies (Kruglanski et al., 1997; Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997).

Effects of need for closure on creativity in small group interactions

Three experiments investigated the consequences of the epistemic motivation toward closure on the emergence of creative interactions in small groups. In the first study, need for closure was manipulated via time pressure. Results showed that in groups under high need for closure (i.e. under time pressure) the percentage of creative acts during group discussion was reduced. The second study replicated this result using an individual differences operationalization of the need for closure. In the third study, groups composed of individuals high (versus low) in need for closure performed less creatively, and exhibited less ideational fluidity during group interaction. Moreover, it was demonstrated that conformity pressure mediates the negative relationship between dispositional need for closure and group creativity. Copyright

Autocracy Bias in Informal Groups Under Need for Closure

Two experiments investigated the tendency of groups with members under high (vs. low) need for cognitive closure to develop an autocratic leadership structure in which some members dominate the discussion, constitute the “hubs” of communication, and influence the group more than other members. The first experiment found that high (vs. low) need for closure groups, as assessed via dispositional measure of the need for closure, manifested greater asymmetry of conversational floor control, such that members with autocratic interactional style were more conversationally dominant and influential than less autocratic members. The second experiment manipulated the need for closure via time pressure and utilized a social network analysis. Consistent with expectation, groups under time pressure (vs. no pressure) showed a greater asymmetry of participation, of centrality, and of prestige among the group members, such that the more focal members were perceived to exert the greater influence over the groups’ decisions.

On Parametric Continuities in the World of Binary Either Ors

This article presents conceptual arguments and empirical evidence consistent with a unified conception of human judgment. It identifies several continuous parameters which intersections at specific values determine the judgmental impact of the information given. The unimodel serves as an overarching framework subsuming a plethora of theoretical notions and empirical findings related to binary distinctions between associative versus rule based, automatic versus deliberative, intuitive versus rational, heuristic versus systematic, and central versus peripheral modes of judgment. This perspective simplifies the depiction of human judgment processes and highlights its critical determinants.

Relevance override: on the reduced impact of "cues" under high-motivation conditions of persuasion studies.

This research addressed the reduced impact of cues under high processing motivation of persuasion experiments. The results of 3 studies suggested that such reduced impact is due to a relevance override whereby any more subjectively relevant information swamps the effects of any less subjectively relevant information, given the recipients sufficient motivation to process both. Because, in much persuasion research, cues may have been perceived as less relevant to the attitudinal judgments than message arguments, the relevance override hypothesis provides a general explanation of the reduced cue effect.

Motivated Closed-Mindedness and Creativity in Small Groups

An experiment was conducted to investigate whether the need for cognitive closure affects the degree of creativity in small groups. Participants in groups of four performed a task in which they had to create advertising slogans for a given product. Some of the groups were composed of individuals with high dispositional need for closure, whereas other groups were composed of individuals with low need for closure. Results showed that ideational fluency, degree of elaboration, and creativity, as rated by independent judges, was lower in high (vs. low) need-for-closure groups. These results suggest that the tendencies to restrict the number of hypotheses generated and to produce conventional ideas, consequences of the need for closure, lower the degree of creativity in interacting groups.