Lucian W. Pye

The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation

It could be that no people have ever outdone the Chinese in ascribing moral virtues to the state or in deprecating the worth of the individual. First Confucianism and then the Chinese version of Leninism went all out in extolling the importance of rulers and society and in minimizing the rights of individuals. The gap between the moral worth and the recognized rights of state and citizen in China was and remains huge both because of the way the Chinese have consistently given paramountcy to the state and the ways in which they have subordinated the individual to the group. The extraordinary imbalance in the relations of the state and individuals provides both the structural and the cultural bases for the human rights practices which are now the most contentious issues between China and the west, especially the United States. What is outrageous to Americans can be for most Chinese normal expectations – although since Tiananmen a majority may feel that the state has gone too far.

On Chinese Pragmatism in the 1980s

The orthodoxy of the day is that Chinese politics is now pragmatic. The China that was once the ultimate in ideological politics in both the intensity of her passions and the follies of her principles has vanished as by the wave of a conjurers hand. The primacy of ideology, the hallmark of Chinese Communism under Chairman Mao Zedong, has been replaced by the no-nonsense philosophy of Deng Xiaoping who does not care about the “colour of the cat” so long as it catches “the mice.” With near unanimity scholars of contemporary China welcome the change. It promises not only liberation for the Chinese people from the heavy hand of doctrinal politics but also the prospect that analysis of Chinese developments can emerge from the realm of murky esoteric interpretation into the fresh air of reasoned policy evaluation.

An Overview of 50 Years of the People's Republic of China: Some Progress, but Big Problems Remain

In the very first sentence of the first article in the first issue of The China Quarterly , Howard L. Boorman, seeking to summarize the first decade of the PRC, wrote: “The man who faces his typewriter to set down a thousand words of coherent comment on the Communist revolution in China confronts not only a massive experiment in social engineering but also the fact that his interpretation of that experiment will expose as much of the author as it does of the revolution.” Except that now it is a computer and not a typewriter, little is different for anyone who would try to summarize what is now 50 years of the PRC. True, enough time has gone by for us now to have not just the initial standard interpretations as to what transpired in China but revisions and then further re-revisions of the story, so that even though we cannot be so bold as to say that we now have the full truth, we probably are a bit closer.

The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishu in Chinese Politics

Important and busy people in all societies rely upon aides, assistants, staff associates, factotums, lackeys and personal servants, and it is no different in China. What is distinctive is the diffuse and all-purpose character of the Chinese mishu , literally “secret book” but usually translated as “secretary.” A mishu , however, is actually someone with both far broader and more personally intimate responsibilities and powers than this term suggests. Any Chinese shouzhang (leader or head) of significance will have numerous mishus , personal and/or organizational, in his service. In Chinas political arena there are around one million people who claim the title of mishu , and who, in shielding, guiding and doing the bidding of their masters, give a distinctive character to the political process. Mishus operate with considerable authority not just at the pinnacles of power, as aides do in most countries, but from top to bottom of both the Party and state hierarchies. Therefore, to understand how political relationships operate, how communications flow and how authority is asserted in the ranks of Chinese officialdom it is necessary to appreciate the ubiquitous role of the mishu .

Reassessing the Cultural Revolution

Two decades after Mao Zedong ignited the Great Proletarian Revolution there is still no satisfactory accounting for the upheaval which Beijing now says caused millions of deaths and left some 100 million people scarred victims. Ordinary imagination cannot grasp what took place during those “10 bad years of great disaster” ( shinian haojie ) as the Chinese now call them. Since so much at that time defied conventional theories of politics, outsiders quickly put the phenomenon out of mind once the turmoil ceased. For the Chinese, however, it has not been so simple. Those who personally suffered have tended to summarize the story according to their individual tragedies. Chinese seeking a larger perspective are caught between the inexplicableness of its causes and the incalculability of its consequences.

The International Position of Hong Kong

Uncertainty about Hong Kongs future has been aggravated by lack of precedent. When before has there been an established date of termination of colonial rule set by treaty? Even more confounding is that the history of the Crown Colony provides so little guidance as to its future. The usual practice in facing uncertainty is to look to the past to chart trends, identify propensities and make projections. All of these standard methods are, however, to no avail with respect to the future of Hong Kong. We are left to the mercy of that purported ancient Chinese saying, “Prediction is exceedingly difficult, especially with respect to the future.”