Luh Luh Lan

Agency Theory, Institutional Sensitivity, and Inductive Reasoning: Towards a Legal Perspective

Making agency theory institutionally sensitive is a reasonable suggestion, as far as normal science stands. However, we argue that such a move has already been taking place, that it cannot address important problems with agency theory, and that the time is ripe for a critical re-examination of this theory. We suggest that inductive studies can not only be more sensitive to institutional features than deductive studies, but they can also offer deeper understanding of governance practices in specific contexts, as well as the potential for analytical or moderatum generalizations. Drawing from legal theory, we offer an alternative conception of the principal, and of the role and status of the board of directors. We contend that this reformulated agency theory has a greater potential of being institutionally sensitive because it recognizes various stakeholders as team members, rather than just adding specific institutional features as variables to the dominant conception of agency theory.

Social Marketing Initiatives: National Kidney Foundation’s Organ Donation Programs in Singapore

The authors focus on the organ donation scene in Singapore and explore the range of marketing activities and responsibilities of the primary organ procurement agency in Singapore, the National Kidney Foundation. The authors examine Horton and Hortons (1991) model of willingness to become a potential organ donor and apply it with modifications to a sample of 368 multiracial Singapore residents. The authors find that, in addition to altruistic values and product knowledge, spiritual beliefs surrounding organ donation have an impact on a persons willingness to be a potential organ donor. The authors discuss implications for marketers and policymakers.

Why Women Say No to Corporate Boards and What Can Be Done “Ornamental Directors” in Asia

Research indicates many women prefer being self-employed and entrepreneurs, creating value based on their personal beliefs, rather than sitting on boards as “Ornamental Directors”. Furthermore, the road to corporate boards for women has been long, tortuous, and bumpy, but needlessly so. Several theoretical explanations have been suggested for this situation, often with overlap and similarities. However, we believe that in other barriers are due to poor ‘signaling’ of success for female directors and structural issues. The messaging comes in the form of networks and nomination process bias, role model and mentor shortages, work–family balance, legal ambiguity, policies, and cognitive behavior. This leads to what we call the “Ornamental Director” syndrome.

Force‐field analysis on policies affecting working women in Singapore

Examines the impact of public policies on the entry of women into the workforce in Singapore, using force‐field analysis to study the counteracting forces created by the mixed policies which can either drive or restrain women from entering the job market. Suggests that although there has been an increase in Singapore’s female workforce participation rate in the last few decades, more measures could be devised to encourage more women to participate in the workforce.

Why might females say no to corporate board positions? The Asia Pacific in comparison

Females have obtained more senior management positions and corporate board seats in many countries. However, this is less the case in much of Asia. In short, the road to boardrooms for females can turn out to be quite long, tortuous and full of dead-ends. Who is to blame for this – businesses or females themselves or even governments – is a moot question. Here we look at this in terms of: why have females on boards; the situation in Asia in global perspective; reasons for barriers and limits.

Does the Adoption of an Information-Connected Approach Reduce Insider Trading?

Many countries adopt either an information-connected approach or the person-connected approach to regulate insider trading. In this paper, we examine the impact of countries switching from a person-connected approach to an information-connected approach using 502 tender offer announcements in Singapore, Malaysia and Australia, over the period from 1986 to 2006. We find that illegal insider trading in Singapore decreases with the enactment of insider trading regulations. Insider trading in Malaysia, on the other hand, only decreases after the enforcement of insider trading regulations. For Australia, we observe that the enactment or enforcement of insider trading regulation has little impact on the market. Our findings show that market participants react to legislation change earlier if the regulator concerned has a strong reputation for enforcement. In other words, the timing at which the market can be expected to react to legislation changes is a function of a governments reputation for enforcement.