Luigino Bruni

Moral canals: trust and social capital in the work of Hume, Smith and Genovesi

It is a truism that a market economy cannot function without trust. We must be able to rely on other people to respect our property rights, and on our trading partners to keep their promises. The theory of economics is incomplete unless it can explain why economic agents often trust one another, and why that trust is often repaid. There is a long history of work in economics and philosophy which tries to explain the kinds of reasoning that people use when they engage in practices of trust: this work develops theories of trust. A related tradition in economics, sociology and political science investigates the kinds of social institution that reproduce whatever habits, dispositions or modes of reasoning are involved in acts of trust: this work develops theories of social capital. A recurring question in these literatures is whether a society which organizes its economic life through markets is capable of reproducing the trust on which those markets depend. In this paper, we look at these themes in relation to the writings of three eighteenth-century philosopher-economists: David Hume, Adam Smith, and Antonio Genovesi.

Income Aspirations, Television and Happiness: Evidence from the World Values Survey

This paper argues that television viewing produces higher material aspirations, by enhancing both adaptation and positional effects, thus lowering the effect of income on life satisfaction. Using individual data from the World Values Survey we present evidence indicating that the effect of income on both life and financial satisfaction is significantly smaller for heavy television viewers, relative to occasional viewers. This finding is robust to a number of specification checks and alternative interpretations. Overall, the results can be interpreted as providing an additional explanation for the income-happiness paradox: the pervasive and increasing role of television viewing in people’s life, by raising material aspirations, reduces the effect of income on individual happiness.

The “Technology of Happiness” and the Tradition of Economic Science

This book is a welcome consolidation and extension of the recent expanding debates on happiness and economics. Happiness and economics, as a new field for research, is now of pivotal interest particularly to welfare economists and psychologists. This Handbook provides an unprecedented forum for discussion of the economic issues relating to happiness. It reviews the more recent literature and offers the interested reader an insight into the vast scope of the field in terms of the theory, its applications and also experimental design. The Handbook also gives substantial indications as to the future direction of research in the field, with particular regard to policy applications and developing an economics of interpersonal relations which includes reciprocity and social interaction theory.

The happiness of sociality. Economics and eudaimonia: A necessary encounter

The paper discusses some issues of the debate on happiness in economics. In particular it deals with the relationship between happiness and sociality. In fact, in contemporary ‘economics and happiness’ literature there is a new interest in interpersonal relationships thanks to the huge empirical evidence that genuine sociality is one of the heaviest components of self-reported happiness. At the same time, mainstream economics is badly equipped for studying genuine sociality, because it treats interpersonal interactions as elements to be taken into account in terms of externalities. The intuition originating the paper is the conviction that if research on happiness aims at taking into account non-instrumental interpersonal relations, i.e. ‘relational goods’, scholars will profit by a reconsideration or retrieving of the Aristotelian tradition of happiness as eudaimonia.

Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise

Original contributions from key international experts acknowledge and illustrate that markets and firms can be civilizing forces when and if they are understood as expressions of cooperation and civil virtues. They provide an illuminating discourse on a wide range of topics including reciprocity, gifts and the civil economy, which are especially relevant in times of crisis for financial capitalism. The Handbook questions the current phase of the market economy that arises from a state of anthropological pessimism. Such anthropological cynicism is one of the foundations of the contemporary economic system that is challenged by the contributors.

The Effect of Motivations on Social Indirect Reciprocity: an Experimental Analysis

This article investigates the effect of motivations on the perceived kindness of an action within the context of social indirect reciprocity (if A helps B, then C helps A). We test experimentally the hypothesis that, for a given distributional outcome, an action is perceived by a third party to be less kind if it can be strategically motivated. As a consequence, intention-based reciprocity should be stronger in the absence of strategic motivations. The results do not support this hypothesis: social indirect reciprocity is found to be less strong when strategic motivations can be ruled out.

The Value of Vocation. The Crucial Role of Intrinsically Motivated People in Values-based Organizations

Abstract The aim of the paper is to analyze the dynamics that arise in Values-based Organizations when ideal quality deteriorates. On the basis of Hirschmans “exit and voice” model, we analyze the mechanism that encourage the best subjects, the ones intrinsically motivated who care most about the mission and ideal quality of the organization, to leave the organization if their voice is ignored. By combining Hirschmans and a “critical mass” model, we show the possible cumulative effects caused by the “exit” of the intrinsically motivated members, which can bring the organization into a deterioration process.

The Economy of Communion

The Economy of Communion (EoC), the model of the Focolare Movement, may provide a solution to integrating spirituality and the economy. In the EoC, entrepreneurs are inspired by principles rooted in a culture different than what prevails in conventional practice and theory of economics. We can define this “culture” as a “culture of giving,” which is the antithesis of a “culture of having.” Since the inception of the concept almost two decades ago, it has been developed from an idea to a proven practice: it is a project involving hundreds of companies spanning five continents and numerous industries and countries, and it has attracted the interest of scholars and economists alike.

Ego Facing Alter: How Economists have Depicted Human Interactions

The paper analyses, in a historical perspective, how economists approached human interactions. In particular it is aimed at: (a) showing that in the beginning of economic science some economists, Genovesi and Smith in particular, analysed many dimensions of human interactions, and their account of rational economic behaviour was complex and not only instrumental; (b) analysing, through the works of Pareto and Wicksteed, the main turning point in the history of economics which reduced interactions to the sole instrumental one; (c) highlight some methodological questions and doubts on how contemporary economics approaches interactions.

Beyond Carrots and Sticks: How Cooperation and Its Rewards Evolve Together

This paper is based on the intuition of Dragonetti, an old Neapolitan economist, which argues that a society experiences economic and civic development if agents promote values and virtues, more than solely rely on punishments stated by law. We thus study the evolution of cooperative behaviors using a mechanism of endogenous social rewards for cooperation (SRC). These additional (material) rewards depend on the recognition that the society—each agent in the society—gives to cooperative strategies. We formalize it with a cultural evolution model in which the payoff matrix and the population shares coevolve. We find that this endogenous mechanism can produce a large variety of long-run situations (victory of cooperators, of non-cooperators or, finally, their coexistence) depending on the social features. Moreover, we analyze the differences between SRC and exogenous punishment, changes in cooperation costs or changes in repetition of interactions and we disentangle their respective contributions.