Lukas Heydrich

Multisensory Mechanisms in Temporo-Parietal Cortex Support Self-Location and First-Person Perspective

Self-consciousness has mostly been approached by philosophical enquiry and not by empirical neuroscientific study, leading to an overabundance of diverging theories and an absence of data-driven theories. Using robotic technology, we achieved specific bodily conflicts and induced predictable changes in a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness by altering where healthy subjects experienced themselves to be (self-location). Functional magnetic resonance imaging revealed that temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) activity reflected experimental changes in self-location that also depended on the first-person perspective due to visuo-tactile and visuo-vestibular conflicts. Moreover, in a large lesion analysis study of neurological patients with a well-defined state of abnormal self-location, brain damage was also localized at TPJ, providing causal evidence that TPJ encodes self-location. Our findings reveal that multisensory integration at the TPJ reflects one of the most fundamental subjective feelings of humans: the feeling of being an entity localized at a position in space and perceiving the world from this position and perspective.

Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies – Evidence from two different virtual reality techniques

In neurology and psychiatry the detailed study of illusory own body perceptions has suggested close links between bodily processing and self-consciousness. One such illusory own body perception is heautoscopy where patients have the sensation of being reduplicated and to exist at two or even more locations. In previous experiments, using a video head-mounted display, self-location and self-identification were manipulated by applying conflicting visuo-tactile information. Yet the experienced singularity of the self was not affected, i.e., participants did not experience having multiple bodies or selves. In two experiments presented in this paper, we investigated self-location and self-identification while participants saw two virtual bodies (video-generated in study 1 and 3D computer generated in study 2) that were stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own body. In both experiments, we report that self-identification with two virtual bodies was stronger during synchronous stroking. Furthermore, in the video generated setup with synchronous stroking participants reported a greater feeling of having multiple bodies than in the control conditions. In study 1, but not in study 2, we report that self-location – measured by anterior posterior drift – was significantly shifted towards the two bodies in the synchronous condition only. Self-identification with two bodies, the sensation of having multiple bodies, and the changes in self-location show that the experienced singularity of the self can be studied experimentally. We discuss our data with respect to ownership for supernumerary hands and heautoscopy. We finally compare the effects of the video and 3D computer generated head-mounted display technology and discuss the possible benefits of using either technology to induce changes in illusory self-identification with a virtual body.

Turning Body and Self Inside Out Visualized Heartbeats Alter Bodily Self-Consciousness and Tactile Perception

Prominent theories highlight the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness, but it is currently not known whether bodily perception is based on interoceptive or exteroceptive signals or on integrated signals from these anatomically distinct systems. In the research reported here, we combined both types of signals by surreptitiously providing participants with visual exteroceptive information about their heartbeat: A real-time video image of a periodically illuminated silhouette outlined participants’ (projected, “virtual”) bodies and flashed in synchrony with their heartbeats. We investigated whether these “cardio-visual” signals could modulate bodily self-consciousness and tactile perception. We report two main findings. First, synchronous cardio-visual signals increased self-identification with and self-location toward the virtual body, and second, they altered the perception of tactile stimuli applied to participants’ backs so that touch was mislocalized toward the virtual body. We argue that the integration of signals from the inside and the outside of the human body is a fundamental neurobiological process underlying self-consciousness.

Distinct illusory own-body perceptions caused by damage to posterior insula and extrastriate cortex

Recent research in cognitive neuroscience using virtual reality, robotic technology and brain imaging has linked self-consciousness to the processing and integration of multisensory bodily signals. This work on bodily self-consciousness has implicated the temporo-parietal, premotor and extrastriate cortex and partly originated in work on neurological patients with different disorders of bodily self-consciousness. One class of such disorders is autoscopic phenomena, which are defined as illusory own-body perceptions, during which patients experience the visual illusory reduplication of their own body in extrapersonal space. Three main forms of autoscopic phenomena have been defined. During autoscopic hallucinations, a second own body is seen without any changes in bodily self-consciousness. During out-of-body experiences, the second own body is seen from an elevated perspective and location associated with disembodiment. During heautoscopy, subjects report strong self-identification with the second own body, often associated with the experience of existing at and perceiving the world from two places at the same time. Although it has been proposed that each autoscopic phenomenon is associated with different impairments of bodily self-consciousness, past research on neurological patients and the development of experimental paradigms for the study of bodily self-consciousness has focused on out-of-body experiences and the association with temporo-parietal cortex. Here, we performed quantitative lesion analysis in the-to date-largest group of patients with autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy and compared the location of brain damage with those of control patients suffering from complex visual hallucinations. We found that heautoscopy was associated with lesions to the left posterior insula, and that autoscopic hallucinations were associated with damage to the right occipital cortex. Autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy were further associated with distinct symptoms and deficits. The present data suggest that the autoscopic hallucination is a visuo-somatosensory deficit implicating extrastriate cortex and is, despite the visual hallucination of the own body, not associated with major deficits in bodily self-consciousness. Based on the symptoms and deficits in patients with heautoscopy and the implication of the left posterior insula, we suggest that abnormal bodily self-consciousness during heautoscopy is caused by a breakdown of self-other discrimination regarding affective somatosensory experience due to a disintegration of visuo-somatosensory signals with emotional (and/or interoceptive) bodily signals. These brain mechanisms are distinct from those described for out-of-body experiences. The present data extend previous models of autoscopic phenomena and provide clinical evidence for the importance of emotional and interoceptive signal processing in the posterior insula in relation to bodily self-consciousness.

Illusory own body perceptions: case reports and relevance for bodily self-consciousness

Neurological disorders of body representation have for a long time suggested the importance of multisensory processing of bodily signals for self-consciousness. One such group of disorders--illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body--has been proposed to be especially relevant in this respect, based on neurological data as well as philosophical considerations. This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: self-location, first-person perspective, and self-identification [corrected], is crucial for bodily self-consciousness. Here we present clinical and neuroanatomical data of two neurological patients with paroxysmal disorders of full body representation in whom only one of these aspects, self-identification, was abnormal. We distinguish such disorders of global body representation from related but distinct disorders and discuss their relevance for the neurobiology of bodily self-consciousness.

Partial and full own-body illusions of epileptic origin in a child with right temporoparietal epilepsy

Partial and full own-body illusions of neurological origin have been claimed crucial to understand the contribution of bodily experience and perception to self-consciousness. Whereas partial body illusions are relatively common and well defined, much less is known about full own-body illusions, and even less is known about these illusions in children. Here we describe a 10-year-old patient with the association of partial and full own-body illusions (somatoparaphrenia and out-of-body experience) that occurred sequentially during an epileptic seizure caused by right temporoparietal epilepsy. This report shows that partial and full own-body illusions share functional and neuroanatomical properties and highlights the importance of the right temporoparietal junction for bodily self-consciousness. This is the first report of out-of-body experiences in a child with focal epilepsy.

Suppression of the auditory N1-component for heartbeat-related sounds reflects interoceptive predictive coding

Although many studies have elucidated the neurocognitive mechanisms supporting the processing of externally generated sensory signals, less is known about the processing of interoceptive signals related to the viscera. Drawing a parallel with research on agency and the perception of self-generated action effects, in the present EEG study we report a reduced auditory N1 component when participants listened to heartbeat-related sounds compared to externally generated sounds. The auditory suppression for heartbeat sounds was robust and persisted after controlling for ECG-related artifacts, the number of trials involved and the phase of the cardiac cycle. In addition, the auditory N1 suppression for heartbeat-related sounds had a comparable scalp distribution as the N1 suppression observed for actively generated sounds. This finding indicates that the brain automatically differentiates between heartbeat-related and externally generated sounds through a process of sensory suppression, suggesting that a comparable predictive mechanism may underlie the processing of heartbeat and action-related information. Extending recent behavioral data about cardio-visual integration, the present cardio-auditory EEG data reveal that the processing of sounds in auditory cortex is systematically modulated by an interoceptive cardiac signal. The findings are discussed with respect to theories of interoceptive awareness, emotion, predictive coding, and their relevance to bodily self-consciousness.

Illusory hand ownership in a patient with personal neglect for the upper limb, but no somatoparaphenia

The symptoms of patients with left personal neglect are characterized by inattention towards contralesional (left) body parts while at the same time explicitly ascertaining ownership for the neglected hemibody. It is currently unknown if personal neglect is associated with more subtle or implicit disturbances of own body perception and body ownership as measured with the rubber hand illusion. In this study, we report data from a patient with a right hemispheric lesion and personal neglect, without associated somatosensory deficits. We administered to the patient (and to 12 age-matched controls) the rubber hand illusion paradigm to the right and left hands, to elicit illusory ownership for a fake hand, before and after recovery from personal neglect for the left arm. In a first session, run when the patient showed personal neglect affecting the left arm, he experienced a significantly enhanced subjective illusion of embodiment for the left fake hand as compared to the right hand (as assessed through a standard questionnaire). After recovery from personal neglect for the left arm (second session), the results of the left and right rubber hand illusion experiments were comparable, with no modulation of hand ownership. We argue that personal neglect may consist not only in an inattentional disorder, but also in a deficit of multisensory body representation characterized by a high sensitivity to experimental manipulations of subjective aspects of body ownership.

Lateralising value of experiential hallucinations in temporal lobe epilepsy

Objectives Ever since John Hughlings Jackson first described the so-called ‘dreamy state’ during temporal lobe epilepsy, that is, the sense of an abnormal familiarity (déjà vu) or vivid memory-like hallucinations from the past (experiential hallucinations), these phenomena have been studied and repeatedly linked to mesial temporal lobe structures. However, little is known about the lateralising value of either déjà vu or experiential hallucinations. Methods We analysed a sample of 28 patients with intractable focal epilepsy suffering from either déjà vu or experiential hallucinations. All the patients underwent thorough presurgical examination, including MRI, positron emission tomography, single-photon emission CT, EEG and neuropsychological examination. Results While déjà vu was due to right or left mesial temporal lobe epilepsy, experiential hallucinations were strongly lateralised to the left mesial temporal lobe. Moreover, there was a significant effect for interictal language deficits being more frequent in patients suffering from experiential hallucinations. Conclusions These results suggest a lateralising value for experiential hallucinations to the left temporal lobe.

Crossed somatoparaphrenia: an unusual new case and a review of the literature

AbstractSomatoparaphrenia is a delusional misidentification and confabulation of body parts, usually arm or hand, opposite to a cerebral lesion, generally of the “minor” right hemisphere. There is some controversy concerning lesion site (fronto-parietal; parieto-temporal; posterior insula, additional subcortical nuclei) or necessary associated symptoms (hemiparesis/plegia, anosognosia, neglect, position sense deficit). We here present a patient who is unusual in many respects, that is: (1) he is a right-hander with somatoparaphrenia after a “dominant” left-hemisphere lesion associated with aphasia and ideo-motor apraxia, but also with right hemineglect. He thus has “crossed” somatoparaphrenia; (2) his delusional misidentification concerned the right leg and not the arm or hand; (3) he has no anosognosia; (4) his proprioception is disturbed for the leg only; and (5) the lesion site is very posterior, a left occipito-parietal haemorrhage without involvement of the frontal lobe or the posterior insula. We present this case together with the seven other cases of “crossed somatoparaphrenia” with and without aphasia we found since 1935 in the literature and discuss their relevance in relation to the above controversies.