Luo Yunfeng

An Analysis of Manufacturers' R&D Decision-Making in Defense Procurement with Incomplete Information

This paper is intended to research the manufacturers’ decision-making for R&D investment in defense procurement with incomplete information. On the basis of constructing the model of R&D investment scale adjustment of defense procurement, it explores the equilibrium of manufacturers’ R&D investment decision-making in defense procurement on condition that the monopolistic contract valuation of manufacturers is incomplete information. It comes to the conclusion that: under certain conditions, manufacturers’ investment equilibrium of R&D projects is identical to the government expectation. However, if the monopolistic contract valuation of manufacturers is incomplete information, the investment equilibrium may deviate from the government expectation. And it’s even possible that manufacturers would retreat form the contest, which will severely influence the performance of government’s reimbursement policy. Therefore, in the practice of defense procurement R&D, the government must ensure that predicting the future demand accurately and adopting a definite objective of procurement in order to keep manufacturers’ anticipation about the monopolistic contact being consistent with it desired.

An Analysis on Defense Procurement Entry Right Allocation Mechanism

The paper studies the allocation of defense procurement entry right and designs a allocation mechanism of defense procurement entry right. The result shows that the allocation mechanism satisfies strong incentive compatibility, a condition stronger than incentive compatibility. So the allocation mechanism can always get the allocation the military desires, no matter whether the manufacturers’ technology levels are complete information between manufacturers or not. Next work is to design an implementation mechanism to implement the allocation mechanism.

Decision analysis for purchase risks of the purchaser in the four trading markets under the electricity market framework

This paper mainly illustrates that electricity purchasers face the decision of electricity purchase and the issues of risk managements in the four trading markets under the framework of the electricity markets. The restrictions and non-restriction purchase/sale of two purchasing electricity models are set up by means of Variance measuring risk under the framework of the electricity market. Meanwhile, in the paper, it also proposes several feasible algorithms to minimize risks for the electricity purchaser by guaranteeing their return.

Investment in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent usually has to investment to improve the service quality. The incumbentpsilas incentives to invest in a network technology that increases consumerspsila willingness to pay for services is investigated in a model of a vertically integrated monopolist network provider who faces rival operators in the retail market. We find that different from the conclusion obtained before the spillovers have positive effect and regulation has negative effect on investment level.

A comparative analysis of English Auction and First-price Sealed-bid Auction with Shill Biding

Aimed at the disadvantage of current research of shill bidding with different online auctions types, in this paper, applying decision analysis method and game theory, firstly, we research the bidderpsilas optimal biding strategy on english auction and first-price sealed-bid auction with shill biding. secondly, we discuss the relations between the sellerpsilas revenue and probability of shill biding and commission rate under two important auctions types. finally, we use honest bidderpsilas expected gain and honest sellerpsilas revenue as a basis to compare these two important auctions types, and interpret some bidding behavior in practice and give some suggestion.