Luzi Hail

The Importance of Reporting Incentives: Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms

A mounting arrangement for a plurality of electrical components is disclosed wherein these components may be included in cases which are stacked in sets on a level-by-level basis. These cases include resilient mounting tabs on each end thereof which cooperate with mounting plates and allow a plurality of cases to be stacked in each layer and subsequent additional layers stacked on top of the first layers.

Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions

This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm-level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into ‘label’ and ‘serious’ adopters using firm-level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital-market effects are different across ‘serious’ and ‘label’ firms. While on average liquidity and costs of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: ‘Serious’ adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas ‘label’ adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital-market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or broader changes in firms’ reporting strategies, and not just the standards.

Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions: adopting a label

This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm‐level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into “label” and “serious” adopters using firm‐level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital‐market effects are different across “serious” and “label” firms. While on average liquidity and cost of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: “Serious” adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas “label” adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital‐market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or in firms’ broader reporting strategies, and not just the standards.

Dividend Payouts and Information Shocks

We examine changes in firms’ dividend payouts following an exogenous shock to the information asymmetry problem between managers and investors. Agency theories predict a decrease in dividend payments to the extent that improved public information lowers managers’ need to convey their commitment to avoid overinvestment via costly dividend payouts. Conversely, dividends could increase if minority investors are in a better position to extract cash dividends. We test these predictions by analyzing the dividend payment behavior of a global sample of firms around the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of new insider trading laws. Both events serve as proxies for a general improvement of the information environment and, hence, the corporate governance structure in the economy. We find that, following the two events, firms are less likely to pay (increase) dividends, but more likely to cut (stop) such payments. The changes occur around the time of the informational shock, and only in countries and for firms subject to the regulatory change. They are more pronounced when the inherent agency issues or the informational shocks are stronger. We further find that the information content of dividends decreases after the events. The results highlight the importance of the agency costs of free cash flows (and changes therein) for shaping firms’ payout policies.

Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement

We examine the capital-market effects of changes in securities regulation in the European Union (EU) aimed at reducing market abuse and increasing transparency. To estimate causal effects for the population of EU firms, we exploit that for plausibly exogenous reasons, like national legislative procedures, EU countries adopted these directives at different times. We find significant increases in market liquidity, but the effects are stronger in countries with stricter implementation and traditionally more stringent securities regulation. The findings suggest that countries with initially weaker regulation do not catch up with stronger countries, and that countries diverge more upon harmonizing regulation.

Equity cross-listings in the U.S. and the price of debt

Using a large panel from 46 countries over 20 years, we find that non-U.S. firms issue corporate bonds more frequently and at lower offering yields following an equity cross-listing on a U.S. exchange. Firms issue more bonds through public offerings instead of private placements and in foreign markets rather than at home, in both cases at significantly lower yields. Moreover, the debt-related benefits are concentrated among firms domiciled in countries with less private benefits of control, efficient debt enforcement, and developed bond markets, suggesting that equity cross-listings cannot completely offset the impact of weak home country institutions. The results support the notion that the monitoring, transparency, and visibility benefits brought about by equity cross-listings on U.S. exchanges are valuable to bond investors.

Proper Inferences or a Market for Excuses? The Capital-Market Effects of Mandatory IFRS Adoption

Barth and Israeli (2013) raise five serious concerns regarding the research design and interpretation of Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2013). They claim: (i) the evidence stands in stark contrast to Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2008) and fails to replicate its prior findings; (ii) the research design using fixed effects leaves out main effects and two-way interactions which likely biases the estimated liquidity effects around IFRS adoption and changes in enforcement; (iii) the vast majority of sample observations do not contribute to the identification which is misleading in terms of the scope and the conclusions that can be drawn from the study; (iv) the timing of IFRS adoption and enforcement changes is measured imprecisely leading to low power tests; and (v) the evidence from Japan is irrelevant to the study. In this note, we show that all five claims are incorrect or misleading. Our discussion also more broadly describes how to properly interpret the fixed-effect specifications in Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2013). Since studies in accounting, finance, and economics make extensive use of fixed-effect models, a correct understanding of this research design is important to avoid interpretational mistakes. More generally, we discuss that proper empirical identification and inferences are important to international accounting and IFRS studies so that this area of research does not become a market for excuses.

A Tale of Two Regulators: Risk Disclosures, Liquidity, and Enforcement in the Banking Sector

This paper examines how a regulatory design with multiple supervisory agencies translates into firm-level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. We exploit the fact that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and banking regulation (Pillar 3 of the Basel II accord), but that different regulators start enforcing the rules at different points in time. We find that banks substantially increase their formal risk disclosures upon the adoption of Pillar 3 even if they already had to comply with the same requirements under IFRS 7. Regulators facing stronger institutional competition and with more supervisory powers and resources are stricter in imposing the written rules while, in turn, firms fearing regulatory scrutiny or market pressures are more forthcoming in following the rules. However, formal compliance with the disclosure requirements does not necessarily convert into more transparent reporting. Liquidity and returns-based tests show that the materiality of the enhanced risk disclosures for investors was concentrated around Pillar 3 adoption and associated with the content of certain disclosure items.

Corporate Scandals and Regulation

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent corporate misbehavior from occurring or quickly rectify transgressions. However, regulators are also self-interested and may be captured, uninformed, or ideological, and become less effective as a result. In this registered report, we develop a historical time series of corporate (accounting) scandals and (accounting) regulations for a panel of 26 countries from 1800 to 2015. An analysis of the lead-lag relations at both the global and individual country level yields the following insights: (i) Corporate scandals are an antecedent to regulation over long stretches of time, suggesting that regulators are typically less flexible and informed than firms. (ii) Regulation is positively related to the incidence of future scandals, suggesting that regulators are not fully effective, that explicit rules are required to identify scandalous corporate actions, or that new regulations have unintended consequences. (iii) There exist systematic differences in these ∗ The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania ∗∗ London Business School ∗∗∗ Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa

Do Risk Disclosures Matter When it Counts? Evidence from the Swiss Franc Shock

We examine the relation between disclosure quality and information asymmetry among market participants following an exogenous shock to macroeconomic risk. In 2015 the Swiss National Bank abruptly announced that it would abandon the longstanding minimum euro-Swiss franc exchange rate. We find evidence suggesting that firms with more transparent disclosures regarding their foreign exchange risk exposure ex ante exhibit significantly lower information asymmetry ex post. The information gap in bid-ask spreads appears within 30 minutes of the announcement and persists for two weeks, during which new information gradually substitutes for past disclosures. We validate the information dynamics of past risk disclosures with three field surveys: (1) Sell-side analysts emphasize the importance of existing (risk) disclosures in evaluating the translational and transactional effects of the currency shock. (2) Lending banks’ credit officers rely on past disclosures as the primary information source available for smaller (unlisted) firms in the immediate aftermath of the shock. (3) Investor-relations managers use existing financial filings as a key resource when communicating with external stakeholders. The results suggest that historical disclosures help investors attenuate information asymmetry in light of unexpected news.