M. Govinda Rao

Federalism in India: Political Economy and Reforms

The objective of this paper is to examine the nature of India’s federal system, the reforms that have occurred over the last ten years, and what remains to be done. We begin by briefly describing the key federal institutions in India, focusing particularly on the mechanisms for center-state transfers. These transfers are quite large, and are the major explicit method for dealing with inequalities across constituent units of the federation. We then examine the evidence on how India’s political economy has affected the practical workings of the transfer mechanisms. We next describe recent and potential reforms of the center-state transfer system, in the context of evidence of widening interstate economic disparities. This is followed by a consideration of broader actual and possible reforms in India’s federal institutions, including tax assignments and local government reform. We conclude by relating our discussion to other dimensions of economic reform in India.

Accommodating public expenditure policies: the case of fast growing Asian economies

Abstract It is widely believed that the exceptional economic performances of the East Asian economies are attributable as much to the visible hand of the state as to the invisible hand of the market. This paper analyzes the experiences of Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan in implementing a key instrument of state intervention, namely, public expenditure policy. The analysis shows that these economies could achieve high standards of physical and social infrastructure even with relatively low spending. The key features of complementary spending policy include: emphasis on macroeconomic stability, cost-effective spending, involvement of private sector in providing quasi-public goods, minimum distortions in the labor markets and human resource development to achieve a broad-based development.

Asymmetric federalism in India

The focus of this paper is unequal arrangements and special treatment for some units within Indian federalism, namely. We first explore the conceptual issues – the causes and consequences of asymmetric federalism. Next, we trace the evolution of Indian federalism and analyze the factors contributing to the asymmetric arrangements in political, administrative and fiscal relations. We bring out asymmetric arrangements arising from constitutional arrangements or conventions evolved over the years. Recent political developments and asymmetric treatment due to administrative and political exigencies are also analyzed.

Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation in a Transitional Economy: The Case of Viet Nam

Intergovernmental fiscal arrangements may play an important role in ameliorating poverty in many countries. Successful poverty alleviation generally requires both ‘capacity improving’ and ‘safety net’ policies, and both types of policies may, to some extent, be implemented through, or affected by, intergovernmental transfers. From this perspective, we analyse the efficacy of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in poverty alleviation in a transitional economy, Viet Nam. We argue that both general and specific transfers are needed for this purpose: the former to enable all provinces to provide a given basket of public services at a given tax-price by offsetting their revenue and cost disabilities and the latter to ensure that minimum levels of those public services provided by lower levels of government are targeted to the poor throughout the country.

Urban Governance and Finance in India

Over 330 million people live in Indias cities; 35 cities have a population of over a million and three (Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata) of the 10 largest metropolises in the world are in India. Indias cities are large, economically important, and growing. However, neither urban infrastructure nor the level of urban public services is adequate for current needs, let alone to meet growing demands. Dealing with this problem is a formidable challenge. Not only must adequate finance for the provision of services be found but it is critical to ensure that the money spent results in desired outputs and outcomes. To do so, local governance structures also need to be reformed and strengthened. This paper attempts to point the way towards some possible solutions by analysing urban governance and finance in India in the context of lessons drawn from fiscal federalism theory and experiences of governance institutions and financing systems both in India and around the world. No one system of urban governance is likely to work equally well for all urban local bodies. However, the paper identifies some key reforms required to realise both the constitutional intent to encourage citizen participation in urban governance and the economic and politically desirable goal of ensuring greater accountability of urban governments. For example, the paper draws attention to existing ambiguities in the assignment system and underlines the need to undertake activity mapping to ensure clarity as well as to make independent agencies significantly accountable to elected governments in urban areas. The paper also discusses a variety of ways of augmenting the resources of the municipal bodies in the country including essential reforms in the property tax system and adequate exploitation of user charges and fees for various services delivered as well as ways of strengthening and improving Central and State transfers to urban local governments. With respect to financing urban infrastructure, development charges should be used more effectively. More should also be done to utilise public lands more effectively. In addition, to a considerable extent capital expenditure requirements will have to be financed through borrowing so further development of the municipal bond market is important, as is more and more effective use of public private partnerships in some areas.

Multilateral adjustment lending to states in India: Hastening fiscal correction or softening the budget constraint?

Abstract The widening fiscal deficit of sub-national governments has made the task of macroeconomic stabilisation much more difficult and complex. In many countries, including India, multilateral lending institutions provide assistance for sub-national fiscal reforms through structural adjustment loans (henceforth SAL) with conditionalities heavily loaded with fiscal correction measures. This paper examines the fiscal impact of SAL in Indian states by analysing the quantitative and qualitative aspects of SAL-induced fiscal reforms. Econometric investigation of fiscal impact reveals that state specific effect of SAL in terms of fiscal consolidation has been mixed. There is evidence of softening of the budget constraints in some states, but there is also evidence of greater reduction in fiscal imbalances of SAL states than non-SAL states. It is also seen that much of the fiscal gains have occurred through improved revenue productivity of the tax system and not through expenditure restructuring. It is also seen that the poorer states have preferred to reduce their developmental expenditures to deal with fiscal stress and to comply with fiscal correction targets. This, in turn, has had adverse growth implications. The paper concludes that the benefits and the acceptability of SAL at the sub-national level in India would critically depend on factors such as the qualitative change in government expenditure in meeting deficient delivery of public services at state level, and the removal of state level social and infrastructural bottlenecks for promotion of growth by releasing government resources through expenditure restructuring and reform.

The Political Economy of India’s Federal System and its Reform

This article examines the nature of Indias federal system, and recent and potential reforms in its structure and working. We summarize key federal institutions in India, focusing particularly on the mechanisms for Center-state transfers. These transfers are large, and are the major explicit method for dealing with inequalities across constituent units of the federation. We examine the evidence on how Indias political economy has affected the practical workings of the transfer mechanisms. This is followed by a consideration of actual and possible reforms in Indias federal institutions, including tax assignments and local government, and a discussion of how they might be implemented in a politically feasible manner.

The making of miracles in Indian states : Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Gujarat

Growth miracles typically have been studied at the country level. The Making of Miracles in Indian States breaks from that tradition and studies three growth miracles in India at the level of the state: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Gujarat. These are three of the largest and most diverse states in India. Andhra Pradesh is situated in the south of India, Bihar in the east, and Gujarat in the west. Bihar is the poorest among all states in India, Gujarat the third richest among the largest eighteen states, and Andhra Pradesh in the middle. Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat have long coastal lines while Bihar is landlocked. Yet, all of these states have grown at rates exceeding 8% for an entire decade in the 21st century. Despite many differences in the initial conditions, several common threads tie the high-growth experiences of the three states. First, accelerated growth has permitted acceleration in the growth of development expenditures in all three states, which has helped improve connectivity to markets. Alongside this growth, poverty has seen accelerated decline. Second, the composition of growth matters. Growth in high-value commodities such as fruits and vegetables, commercial crops, dairy, and animal husbandry in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat has led to accelerated reduction in rural poverty. However, the failure of labor-intensive industry has stunted the migration of workers out of agriculture into industry. Third, the quality of leadership that brings improved governance with it is central to improved outcomes in the states. Visionary leaders---Chandrababu Naidu in Andhra Pradesh, Nitish Kumar in Bihar, and Narendra Modi in Gujarat---played critical roles in the making of all three miracles. Fourth, the three studies also bring out the importance of pro-market reforms and the adoption of technology in development. Finally, the studies show that good economics is also good politics: voters reward the chief ministers who bring about significant improvement to the peoples lives. Available in OSO: Contributors to this volume - Rahul Ahluwalia, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Archana Dholakia, Gujarat Institute of Development Research, Ahmedabad, Gujarat Ravindra Dholakia, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, Gujarat. Mudit Kapoor, Indian School of Business, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. Arnab Mukherji, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, Karnataka. Anjan Mukherji, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. Arvind Panagariya, Columbia University, New York, New York. M. Govinda Rao, Member, Fourteenth Finance Commission, New Delhi.