Ma Sussex

The impotence of being earnest? Avoiding the pitfalls of ‘creative middle power diplomacy’

This article critically evaluates Australias ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, encapsulated in the three pillars of the Labor governments foreign policy platform. It notes that each pillar has been accorded specific roles in the implementation of Australian foreign policy and makes particular reference to the governments preference for multilateral engagement. The article subsequently demonstrates that such an agenda actually impedes a creative approach to key issues such as trade, climate change and non-proliferation challenges, as well as Australias participation in Asia-Pacific order-building. It then offers some suggestions for a more flexible posture that is not inconsistent with past Labor approaches, but which also better appreciates regional and global complexities.

Conflict in the former USSR

1. Introduction: understanding conflict in the former USSR Matthew Sussex 2. The return of imperial Russia Roger E. Kanet 3. The shape of the security order in the former USSR Matthew Sussex 4. Great powers and small wars in the Caucasus Richard Sakwa 5. The Russo-Georgian war: identity, intervention and norm adaptation Beat Kernen and Matthew Sussex 6. Why not more conflict in the former USSR? Russia and Central Asia as a zone of relative peace Neil Robinson 7. Transnational crime, corruption and conflict in Russia and the former USSR Leslie Holmes 8. The transformation of war? New and old conflicts in the former USSR Matt Killingsworth 9. Conclusions: the future of conflict in the former USSR Matthew Sussex.

The roots of Russian conduct

This article examines the reasons behind Russias decision to go to war with Georgia in August 2008. It evaluates the key potential drivers of Russian policy relating to structural, domestic and perceptual factors. We find that initial responses to the war, which focused on Russia as the aggressor and raised the specter of a new ‘Cold War’, are overly simplistic. The wider Eurasian region is of critical strategic importance to decision-makers in Moscow, something we find has been overlooked or underestimated in many assessments of the war. By the same token, the idea of a new Cold War conflates the structural condition of bipolarity with the much more complex and fluid contemporary regional security order. We demonstrate that it is necessary to gain a more comprehensive and objective understanding of the roots of Russian foreign policy in order to better construct more durable and cooperative relations between Russia and the West. Here we argue that existing multilateral security institutions do not provide an effective mechanism to achieve this objective. We then offer suggestions for a new security framework for Eurasia, which would prevent a repeat of the Russia–Georgia war and the resulting deterioration in Russias relations with the West.

Introduction: Russia, Eurasia and the New Geopolitics of Energy

Little more than two decades ago, as the USSR dissolved to be replaced by 15 new sovereign states, most of which had never before existed, hopes were high for healing of the divisions that had characterized Europe for most of the prior century. Former Soviet President Gorbachev had called for a ‘common European home’ (Gorbachev, 1989); US President George H.W. Bush spoke of a ‘new world order’ in which disagreements among states would be resolved through negotiation, not warfare (Bush, 1991); Russian President Boris Yeltsin told the US Congress that Russia wished to join the world community (Yeltsin, cited in Donaldson & Nogee, 2002, p. 219). Those hopes have been dashed over the course of the intervening years and Europe, and the broader Eurasia, today finds itself enmeshed in a struggle for power and influence between the West, including especially the United States and the European Union, and the Russian Federation. The collaboration that was expected by many to emerge in the wake of the Cold War has turned into confrontation, as Russia and the West compete for what Richard Sakwa terms two different versions of a European future — a Wider Europe of the European Union and the West modelled after Western democratic institutions with a decidedly Atlanticist tilt and a Broader Europe, advocated by Russia, in which existing political and cultural differences would remain, but barriers to collaboration would be reduced.

Power, politics and confrontation in Eurasia: Foreign policy in a contested region

The editors wish to thank the authors of the chapters that comprise this volume for their central role in the project, for the quality of their analyses, and their positive responses to suggestions for revision and updating to strengthen the quality of their contributions. The idea for this volume and a companion volume to be entitled Russia, Eurasia and the New Geopolitics of Energy: Confrontation and Consolidation, emerged along with preparations for an ISA- (International Studies Association) supported daylong workshop entitled ‘Actors, Processes and Architecture in the Contemporary Eurasian Order: Political, Economic and Security Challenges’, organized by Matthew Sussex and held immediately prior to the annual ISA meetings in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, on Tuesday, 25 March 2014. Most of the contributors to this and the companion volume were able to share their views and comment on one another’s papers at that workshop, thereby helping to sharpen the focus of the chapters and the collection. They wish to express their special appreciation to the International Studies Association for the funding that made this workshop a reality.

From Retrenchment to Revanchism … and Back Again? Russian Grand Strategy in the Eurasian ‘Heartland’

Anyone studying ‘conventional’ power politics today tends to be treated with suspicion by those who view the unreconstructed realist as an academic Neanderthal in a globalized world. And yet both the gradual and more rapid return to prominence of various actors in international politics highlight the ongoing significance of traditional factors linked to material considerations, especially territoriality. The same type of sanctimonious cant — that the 21st century is somehow ‘different’ — was evident in Nick Clegg’s reference to Vladimir Putin as possessing ‘a KGB mentality rooted in the Cold War’ (Watt et al., 2014). But the trend is broader than Russia’s latest adventures in Ukraine. The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the subsequent US ‘rebalance’ to counter it, persistent tensions over the Korean Peninsula, and contestation over energy resources in Central Asia are all symptomatic of the continued importance of power politics in states’ strategic calculations. While the language of both practitioners and scholars now revolves much more around norms, laws and ethics, states’ actual motivations — and the outcomes they seek to engender — appear to have changed little since the end of Cold War bipolarity and the supposed triumph of liberal pluralist ideas that accompanied it.

Strategy, Security and Russian Resource Diplomacy

This chapter critically assesses Russian resource diplomacy as a core facet of its strategic policy. Whilst many excellent analyses of Russia’s position as a producer nation exist in the burgeoning literature on energy security (Ebel and Menon, 2000; Nygren, 2007), the emphasis in current scholarship has focused significantly on security of supply. This is unsurprising given the current global power distribution, which sees a United States hegemon, a rising China and powerful European Union (EU) states in a potentially vulnerable position as client states of resource-rich nations. But dwelling on consumers in discussions on energy security overlooks important questions in relation to energy suppliers, especially those that seek to leverage their resources for maximum gain. Consequently in this chapter I ask whether Russia’s choices in using its natural resources coercively, with particular attention to oil and gas, represents a sensible policy choice that advances Russian interests and helps it to achieve its strategic policy objectives.

Twenty years after the fall: continuity and change in Russian foreign and security policy

This article critically engages with recent scholarship that casts Russian foreign policy either in terms of a gradual evolution towards neo-imperialism, or alternatively as an episodic series of shifts on issues such as terrorism, energy, relations with great powers, and Russias geostrategic position in contemporary international politics. It argues that since the end of the Cold War what has been striking about Russian foreign policy has been its continuity. To do this it examines several key policy arenas, including Russias attempts to construct regional architecture to embed its hegemonic position; its recent preference for resource diplomacy, and its use of military force. It finds that while Russia has struggled to maintain hegemony in the former Soviet space due to the ongoing problem of weak material capabilities, the ‘assertive’ form of realism that characterizes its foreign policy has not altered significantly since shortly after the collapse of the USSR.

Globalization, 'New Wars' and the War in Chechnya

In May 2004, at a ceremony in Grozny commemorating victory over Nazi Germany, an explosion ripped through the main stands, killing Akhmad Kadyrov, the Moscow loyalist Chechen President. One could argue that this meticulously planned assassination was part of a conflict very different in its roots, reasons, rationale, and even results from the war whose end was being observed that day. World War Two was a ‘modern’ war pitting state against state with territory and power as the key factors. Conversely, the war in Chechnya that began in 1994 – half a century after Germanys defeat – has been identified as a postmodern or ‘new’ war, in an era of globalization in which traditional notions of power, space and conflict seem not to apply. But are wars changing so radically? In this chapter we deal with two central concepts: ‘globalization’ and ‘new wars’. The first has become a cliche and suffers from multiple and unworkable (indeed, sometimes contradictory) definitions. The second is more recent. Its adherents claim that ‘new wars’ differ from earlier low-intensity conflicts and guerrilla warfare. We deal with these concepts together because those that have developed ideas on new wars explain them with reference to processes of globalization. A variety of theories assert that we have entered a new era, one in which modernist notions of violent conflict between political communities are moribund.

Beslan's lessons: is pre-emption better than cure?

The brutal ending to the school siege in the North Ossetian town of Beslan serves as a tragic reminder that seemingly irrational violence remains a central feature of contemporary international politics. In an attempt to understand how Beslan could have occurred, questions about the nature of the Chechen war and the specific response of the Russian security services have been posed to a Putin administration elected - and subsequently returned to power - on a platform that prioritised order ahead of Russias ailing democratisation project. Some of these questions, such as Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bots insinuation that Russian commandos were to blame for the bloodbath, were misguided. Russian forces, mindful of past criticism of heavy-handedness during the October 2002 siege of a Moscow theatre in which over 100 hostages died, adopted a more patient approach at Beslan. Once a mine detonated inside the school, and terrorists began gunning down those who took the opportunity to flee amid the confusion, on-site commanders had little option but to order a full-scale assault. More thoughtful questions pertain to Russias conduct in the war against Chechnya, and whether Putin has deliberately sidestepped political solutions in his quest to preserve Russias territorial integrity. Ultimately, in order to better identify avenues for conflict resolution we also need to determine to what extent the crisis should be interpreted as part of a global war on terror (GWOT) and what the implications are for Russian security policy-making.