Maciej Korczynski
Delft University of Technology
Network
Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.
Publication
Featured researches published by Maciej Korczynski.
network operations and management symposium | 2016
Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob; Maciej Korczynski; Arman Noroozian; Carlos Gañán; Michel van Eeten
Hosting services are associated with various security threats, yet the market has barely been studied empirically. Most security research has relied on routing data and equates providers with Autonomous Systems, ignoring the complexity and heterogeneity of the market. To overcome these limitations, we combined passive DNS data with WHOIS data to identify providers and some of their properties. We found 45,434 hosting providers, spread around a median address space size of 1,517 IP addresses. There is surprisingly little consolidation in the market, even though its services seem amenable to economies of scale. We applied cluster analysis on several measurable characteristics of providers. This uncovered a diverse set of business profiles and an indication of what fraction of the market fits each profile. The profiles are associated with significant differences in security performance, as measured by the uptime of phishing sites. This suggests the approach provides an effective way for security researchers to take the heterogeneity of the market into account.
recent advances in intrusion detection | 2016
Arman Noroozian; Maciej Korczynski; Carlos Gañán; Daisuke Makita; Katsunari Yoshioka; Michel van Eeten
A lot of research has been devoted to understanding the technical properties of amplification DDoS attacks and the emergence of the DDoS-as-a-service economy, especially the so-called booters. Much less is known about the consequences for victimization patterns. We profile victims via data from amplification DDoS honeypots. We develop victimization rates and present explanatory models capturing key determinants of these rates. Our analysis demonstrates that the bulk of the attacks are directed at users in access networks, not at hosting, and even less at enterprise networks. We find that victimization in broadband ISPs is highly proportional to the number of ISP subscribers and that certain countries have significantly higher or lower victim rates which are only partially explained by institutional factors such as ICT development. We also find that victimization rate in hosting networks is proportional to the number of hosted domains and number of routed IP addresses and that content popularity has a minor impact on victimization rates. Finally, we reflect on the implications of these findings for the wider trend of commoditization in cybercrime.
internet measurement conference | 2016
Maciej Korczynski; Michał Król; Michel van Eeten
This paper illuminates the problem of non-secure DNS dynamic updates, which allow a miscreant to manipulate DNS entries in the zone files of authoritative name servers. We refer to this type of attack as to zone poisoning. This paper presents the first measurement study of the vulnerability. We analyze a random sample of 2.9 million domains and the Alexa top 1 million domains and find that at least 1,877 (0.065%) and 587 (0.062%) of domains are vulnerable, respectively. Among the vulnerable domains are governments, health care providers and banks, demonstrating that the threat impacts important services. Via this study and subsequent notifications to affected parties, we aim to improve the security of the DNS ecosystem.
IEEE Communications Magazine | 2016
Maciej Korczynski; Ali Hamieh; Jun Ho Huh; Henrik Holm; S. Raj Rajagopalan; Nina H. Fefferman
Social insect colonies have survived over evolutionary time in part due to the success of their collaborative methods: using local information and distributed decision making algorithms to detect and exploit critical resources in their environment. These methods have the unusual and useful ability to detect anomalies rapidly, with very little memory, and using only very local information. Our research investigates the potential for a self-organizing anomaly detection system inspired by those observed naturally in colonies of honey bees. We provide a summary of findings from a recently presented algorithm for a nonparametric, fully distributed coordination framework that translates the biological success of these methods into analogous operations for use in cyber defense and discuss the features that inspired this translation. We explore the impacts on detection performance of the defined range of distributed communication for each node and of involving only a small percentage of total nodes in the network in the distributed detection communication. We evaluate our algorithm using a software-based testing implementation, and demonstrate up to 20 percent improvement in detection capability over parallel isolated anomaly detectors.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology | 2018
Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob; Rainer Böhme; Carlos Gañán; Maciej Korczynski; Michel van Eeten
Internet security and technology policy research regularly uses technical indicators of abuse to identify culprits and to tailor mitigation strategies. As a major obstacle, current inferences from abuse data that aim to characterize providers with poor security practices often use a naive normalization of abuse (abuse counts divided by network size) and do not take into account other inherent or structural properties of providers. Even the size estimates are subject to measurement errors relating to attribution, aggregation, and various sources of heterogeneity. More precise indicators are costly to measure at Internet scale. We address these issues for the case of hosting providers with a statistical model of the abuse data generation process, using phishing sites in hosting networks as a case study. We decompose error sources and then estimate key parameters of the model, controlling for heterogeneity in size and business model. We find that 84% of the variation in abuse counts across 45,358 hosting providers can be explained with structural factors alone. Informed by the fitted model, we systematically select and enrich a subset of 105 homogeneous “statistical twins” with additional explanatory variables, unreasonable to collect for all hosting providers. We find that abuse is positively associated with the popularity of websites hosted and with the prevalence of popular content management systems. Moreover, hosting providers who charge higher prices (after controlling for level differences between countries) witness less abuse. These structural factors together explain a further 77% of the remaining variation. This calls into question premature inferences from raw abuse indicators about the security efforts of actors, and suggests the adoption of similar analysis frameworks in all domains where network measurement aims at informing technology policy.
computer and communications security | 2017
Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob; Tom Van Goethem; Maciej Korczynski; Arman Noroozian; Rainer Böhme; Tyler Moore; Wouter Joosen; Michel van Eeten
Hosting providers play a key role in fighting web compromise, but their ability to prevent abuse is constrained by the security practices of their own customers. Shared hosting, offers a unique perspective since customers operate under restricted privileges and providers retain more control over configurations. We present the first empirical analysis of the distribution of web security features and software patching practices in shared hosting providers, the influence of providers on these security practices, and their impact on web compromise rates. We construct provider-level features on the global market for shared hosting -- containing 1,259 providers -- by gathering indicators from 442,684 domains. Exploratory factor analysis of 15 indicators identifies four main latent factors that capture security efforts: content security, webmaster security, web infrastructure security and web application security. We confirm, via a fixed-effect regression model, that providers exert significant influence over the latter two factors, which are both related to the software stack in their hosting environment. Finally, by means of GLM regression analysis of these factors on phishing and malware abuse, we show that the four security and software patching factors explain between 10% and 19% of the variance in abuse at providers, after controlling for size. For web-application security for instance, we found that when a provider moves from the bottom 10% to the best-performing 10%, it would experience 4 times fewer phishing incidents. We show that providers have influence over patch levels--even higher in the stack, where CMSes can run as client-side software--and that this influence is tied to a substantial reduction in abuse levels.
passive and active network measurement | 2017
Qasim Lone; Matthew J. Luckie; Maciej Korczynski; Michel van Eeten
Despite source IP address spoofing being a known vulnerability for at least 25 years, and despite many efforts to shed light on the problem, spoofing remains a popular attack method for redirection, amplification, and anonymity. To defeat these attacks requires operators to ensure their networks filter packets with spoofed source IP addresses, known as source address validation (SAV), best deployed at the edge of the network where traffic originates. In this paper, we present a new method using routing loops appearing in traceroute data to infer inadequate SAV at the transit provider edge, where a provider does not filter traffic that should not have come from the customer. Our method does not require a vantage point within the customer network. We present and validate an algorithm that identifies at Internet scale which loops imply a lack of ingress filtering by providers. We found 703 provider ASes that do not implement ingress filtering on at least one of their links for 1,780 customer ASes. Most of these observations are unique compared to the existing methods of the Spoofer and Open Resolver projects. By increasing the visibility of the networks that allow spoofing, we aim to strengthen the incentives for the adoption of SAV.
international conference on computer communications and networks | 2015
Maciej Korczynski; Ali Hamieh; Jun Ho Huh; Henrik Holm; S. Raj Rajagopalan; Nina H. Fefferman
In this paper, we describe a fully nonparametric, scalable, distributed detection algorithm for intrusion/anomaly detection in networks. We discuss how this approach addresses a growing trend in distributed attacks while also providing solutions to problems commonly associated with distributed detection systems. We explore the impacts to detection performance from network topology, from the defined range of distributed communication for each node, and from involving only a small percent of total nodes in the network in the distributed detection communication. We evaluate our algorithm using a software-based testing implementation, and demonstrate up to 20% improvement in detection capability over parallel, isolated anomaly detectors for both stealthy port scans and DDoS attacks.
passive and active network measurement | 2018
Oliver Gasser; Benjamin Hof; Max Helm; Maciej Korczynski; Ralph Holz; Georg Carle
In recent years, multiple security incidents involving Certificate Authority (CA) misconduct demonstrated the need for strengthened certificate issuance processes. Certificate Transparency (CT) logs make the issuance publicly traceable and auditable.
IEEE Communications Magazine | 2017
Wojciech Mazurczyk; Maciej Korczynski; Koji Nakao; Engin Kirda; Cristian Hesselman; Katsunari Yoshioka
The articles in this special section focus on telecommunication traffic measurements for protecting network security. Computers and open communication networks have become increasingly interwoven with our daily lives and have profoundly changed our societies. While this has significantly increased people’s well being, our growing dependence on an increasingly pervasive, complex, and ever evolving network infrastructure also poses a wide range of cyber security risks with potentially large socio-economic impacts. For example, the increasing number of ill-secured networked devices in combination with growing network capacities enables miscreants to launch disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Within this context, network traffic measurements and monitoring have become a crucial line of research. It enables us to enhance our understanding of cyber security threats and use this knowledge to develop new ways to detect and mitigate them. Example applications of network measurement research include the analysis of how malicious software proliferates and operates, and how it exploits users’ behavior, assessments of the effectiveness of cyber security countermeasures, of the “badness” of Internet service providers, and estimations of the revenues of cyber criminals.