Madanmohan Ghosh

On some properties of a trade closure widely used in numerical modelling

Abstract Armington trade models with price taking behaviour and CET and CES functions may have perverse offer curves and Nash equilibria in tariff games may not exist in the two-country case.

Developing-Country Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional/Bilateral Trade Arrangements

Using a general-equilibrium model of world trade, this paper evaluates the benefits of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to developing countries in multilateral relative to bilateral or regional trade agreements, from three sources. First, developing countries may be able to free-ride on bilateral tariff concessions exchanged between larger countries in MFN-based GATT/WTO rounds. Second, MFN benefits developing countries by restricting discriminatory retaliatory actions by other countries, evaluated here by a non- cooperative Nash tariff game. Finally, MFN changes threat points in bargaining and hence affects the bargaining solution of multilateral MFN-based trade negotiation compared to a bilateral/regional arrangement. The authors find that the benefits to developing countries are small in the first case as the tariff rates are already low, and the benefits are small in the second case as the optimal tariffs under unconstrained retaliation are not very asymmetric. Benefits from the third case are large as large countries can extract large side-payments if they bargain bilaterally. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.