Madeleine O. Hosli

Brussels between Bern and Berlin: Comparative Federalism Meets the European Union

In the current debate on the future European order, the European Union (EU) is often described as an “emerging federation.” This article claims that federalism is not exclusively useful in deliberating about the future of the EU. Non-statecentric conceptions of federalism provide a better understanding of the current structure and functioning of the European system of multilevel governance than most theories of European integration and international relations do. We combine political and economic perspectives of federalism to analyze the “balancing act” between effective political representation and efficient policy-making in the EU. Drawing on the examples of Germany and Switzerland in particular, we argue that the increasing delegation of powers to the central EU level needs to be paralleled by strengthened patterns of fiscal federalism and an empowered representation of functional interests at the European level. Without such “rebalancing,” the current legitimacy problems of the EU are likely to intensify.

Measuring national delegate positions at the convention on the future of Europe using computerized word-scoring

The Convention on the Future of Europe that led to the eventual drafting of an EU Constitution involved numerous political actors from many countries. Their negotiations over the constitution generated a huge volume of texts containing substantive information about their preferences for EU institutional and political outcomes. In this paper, we attempt to measure these preferences at the national party level by analysing the Convention texts using the computerized ‘word-scoring’ method for text analysis (Laver et al., 2003). For each national party whose delegates’ texts were recorded at the Convention, we estimate their positions on four political dimensions. We then test the validity of these estimates by comparing them with measures of national party positions on EU policy dimensions obtained through an extensive expert survey undertaken in 27 countries (the EU 25 plus Turkey and Romania). Our results show strong evidence that the word-scoring method is broadly successful in reconstructing the map of national party preferences for and against a more centralized and more powerful Europe as expressed through the Convention texts.

Pre- and Post-Lisbon: European Union Voting in the United Nations General Assembly

This paper focuses on effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the coherence of EU behaviour at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). It theorises the EU’s presence at the UNGA in terms of a principal–agent model wherein the EU and its entire membership are considered to constitute a collective principal while the actors playing the role of the agent have varied in different phases. It then investigates, in the light of this framework, the voting cohesion of EU member states at the UNGA between 1993 and 2012, paying particular attention to differences before and after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The statistical analysis shows that EU voting cohesion has been increasing in general during the last decade, but the level of cohesion is not (yet) significantly different post-Lisbon as compared to pre-Lisbon.

Introduction: Decision-Making in the European Union before and after the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty (2007) entered into force on 1 December 2009. It foresaw a number of changes in institutional relations and decision-making between the European Union (EU) institutions on the one hand and between the EU and its member states on the other. This special issue of West European Politics (WEP) focuses on decisionmaking in the European Union before and after the Lisbon Treaty (DEUBAL). It mainly aims to assess what the changes were on particular subject areas that the Treaty of Lisbon envisaged and whether these ambitions have materialised since the Treaty entered into force. In other words, some of the DEUBAL papers offer both analyses of the past and of what the future may hold in light of these changes (and some of them may in fact only take effect in years to come). Others do not focus on the past but examine the extent to which the current decisionmaking process has been able to address the shortcomings and challenges of the past since the Lisbon rules entered into force and new practices have emerged. Included in this last category are also studies that examine the impact of aspects of the Lisbon Treaty that clarified pre-existing norms and structures, in some cases formalising them, rather than introducing new changes. The authors in this project all look at the interaction between formal rules and informal practices, seeking to point to the interaction between the two. They each adopt a loosely rationalist institutionalist approach, attributing rationality to actors (March and Olsen 1989). It is rationalist not so much in opposition to sociological institutionalism or to constructivism, but because authors attribute utility-maximising efforts to actors. In other words, actors seek to maximise their influence, and use the institutional structure for their own interests. If not, the assumption is that there is a good reason why they do not. The DEUBAL papers focus on different institutional aspects of changes to decision-making since Lisbon (basically comparing before and after). A

The United Nations Security Council: The Challenge of Reform

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the most important multilateral institutions having the ambition to shape global governance and the only organ of the global community that can adopt legally binding resolutions for the maintenance of international peace and security and, if necessary, authorize the use of force. Created in the aftermath of World War II by its victors, the UNSC’s constellation looks increasingly anachronistic, however, in light of the changing global distribution of power. Adapting the institutional structure and decision-making procedures of the UNSC has proven to be one of the most difficult challenges of the last decades, while it is the institution that has probably been faced with the most vociferous calls for reform. Although there have been changes to the informal ways in which outside actors are drawn into the UNSC’s work and activities, many of the major players in the current international system seem to be deprived from equal treatment in its core patterns of decision-making. Countries such as Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, alongside emerging African nations such as Nigeria and South Africa, are among the states eager to secure permanent representation on the Council. By comparison, selected BRICS countries, China and Russia - in contrast to their role in other multilateral institutions - are permanent members of the UNSC and with this, have been “insiders” for a long time. This renders the situation of the UNSC different from global institutions, in which traditionally, Western powers have dominated the agenda.

Avoiding Paralysis: The Eastern Enlargement and the Council of the European Union

Abstract Why does the Council of the European Union continue to function without apparent problems, despite the increase in the number and heterogeneity of its members brought about by the Eastern enlargement? We argue that the reason why the Council has not become paralysed lies in the increased delegation of its agenda load from the ministerial meetings downwards to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). We assess our argument on the basis of quantitative analysis of the amount of the so-called A-points (decided by Coreper) and B-points (decided by ministers) on the Council agenda in the years 2000 through 2007. Studying the delegation mechanism deeper, we argue that two design features of Coreper — its permanent nature and its broad scope of agenda coverage — enabled the delegation from ministerial meetings to take place and thus helped the Council cope with the larger and more heterogeneous membership.

Byrokratizace rozhodování v Evropské unii po východním rozšíření

This article seeks to describe some important changes that have oc- curred in EU decision-making procedures since its eastern enlargement and to explain how it is that the decision-making process continues to function relatively smoothly in the EU even after a sharp increase in the number of Member States and despite generally shared fears to the contrary. The analysis focuses on the main decision-making body in the EU, the Council of the Eu- ropean Union, where it was expected the biggest problems would occur after enlargement, including the prediction that the increase in EU membership could result in the obstruction of decision-making in the Council. The authors argue that the Council managed to avoid this problem by shifting a major part of the Councils agenda from the political level of ministerial proceedings to the Councils main administrative body, the Committee of Permanent Repre- sentatives. The authors test their hypothesis about the Councils adjustment using a large quantitative data sample encompassing more than 4000 acts that the Council of the EU took decisions on between 1999 and 2009.

What Fosters Enduring Peace? An Analysis of Factors Influencing Civil War Resolution

Abstract In literature on civil war resolution, several factors have been identified that may influence the peace process. In this paper, based on a combination of different datasets and additional information, we explore reasons for the initiation of negotiations and for the shortening of conflict duration based on 82 civil wars that took place between 1944 and 1997. Employing logistic regression, supplemented by graphical explorations, we demonstrate that the existence of a “mutual hurting stalemate” and partial instead of neutral intervention increase the probability that negotiations set in. In addition to this, somewhat counter-intuitively, our analysis shows that a larger number of warring parties – compared to conflicts based on two rival groups – enhance prospects that negotiations are conducted. This may partially be due to the fact that conflicting parties fear they may be excluded from negotiations on a potential settlement and with this, are more ready to engage in the bargaining process. The occurrence of a military stalemate in the course of a conflict, as our analysis based on proportional hazards survival regression demonstrates, shortens war duration. We put forward the idea that partial intervention to support the weaker party can create mutual hurting stalemates, and in this way, contribute to the ending of civil war. Our study partially confirms work in which the ripeness of a conflict or the existence of a mutual hurting stalemate was found to crucially affect prospects for conflict resolution, but also offers new insights into these themes.

The European Union in the United Nations: Coordination on Peacekeeping Missions

Due to various institutional adaptations over time, the European Union (EU) has gradually obtained stronger means to coordinate the – often – divergent preferences of its member states in foreign policy and to act with one voice. But how can we assess this cohesiveness, ‘effectiveness’ or performance of the EU as a global actor, in empirical terms? This chapter focuses on one area in which EU outcome and consequently, performance, can be highly relevant: coordination of EU activities in the framework of UN peacekeeping activities and operations. More specifically, this chapter aims to offer a ‘snapshot’ of EU member state homogeneity and coordination in a number of peacekeeping resolutions as agreed upon at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC). By exploring UNGA roll call votes of EU member states on peacekeeping missions and a study of the preference alignment of selected cases of peacekeeping resolutions voted on in the UNSC, this chapter shows that coordination between the different EU member states has strongly increased over time, partially in parallel with increased intra-EU coordination in foreign policy.

Why is change so slow? Assessing prospects for United Nations Security Council reform

The article explores how changed patterns of UN membership affected the prospects for UN Security Council institutional reform. First, we outline a theoretical framework based on path dependency, veto player analysis and social choice theory. Second, we offer calculations of decision probability and show that a higher voting threshold lowers chances of winning coalitions in a non-linear fashion. Third, we explore the specific decision-making procedures for UNSC reform and which actors can block reform. We conclude that not only diverging preferences, but that hurdles established early on combined with membership growth have ‘locked in’ the current institutional arrangement.