Mads Bøge Kristiansen

Performance contracting: Understanding variation across agencies in Danish Central Government

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how variation in the content of the performance contracts (number and types of targets) across agencies can be understood. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is conducted as a cross-sectional quantitative study carried out through an analysis of performance contracts between parent ministries and their agencies in Danish Central Government. Findings The study finds that the size of agencies, measurability of tasks and ministerial affiliation are significantly related to the number of targets in the contracts, whereas ministerial affiliation and the internal organization of agencies are significantly related to certain types of targets in contracts. Practical implications The findings indicate, on the one hand, that it may be difficult to obtain the same kind of performance contracting across agencies characterized by different features. Thus, it may be difficult to put up universal standards for performance contracting for a broad range of agencies, and expect that they will all be able to meet them. On the other hand, the findings also indicate that the effort and knowledge actors put into the implementation of performance contracting matters. Therefore, some agencies may be able to get closer towards the recommendations for management by objectives and results. Originality/value The paper contributes to the existing literature, as it tests and shows the importance of other and further contextual factors affecting the formulation of targets in performance contracts than previous studies.

Management by Objectives and Results in the Nordic Countries: Continuity and Change, Differences and Similarities

ABSTRACT In order to identify continuity or change, this paper analyzes the development processes of the management by objectives and results (MBOR) discourse over time in the central governments of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. It shows that MBOR has been marked by continuity since its introduction in the 1980s, and has become a central element in the steering and management of agencies in central government in all three countries. Nevertheless, gradual changes that have altered the direction of the MBOR discourse over time can also be identified. The direction changes from autonomy and a simple MBOR system in the early years toward more control and a more comprehensive system in the 1990s, and back again toward more autonomy and a less comprehensive MBOR system in recent years. The development processes in the three countries are characterized by some differences, but seem also to share numerous similarities. Explanations of these differences and similarities are discussed in the final section of the paper.

On the Dynamic Nature of Performance Management Regimes

The ambition of this article is to gain a better understanding of the endogenous dynamics of performance management regimes. Based on a review of the literature, we develop a framework that enables us to grasp dimensions and mechanisms of escalation. Hereafter, we demonstrate the use of our framework through two cases. We argue that a range of dimensions of a performance regime may evolve over time, that the dynamics might be repressed by contextual factors and politics, that the dynamics may be reversed leading to de-escalation, and that different dimensions related to the regime do not all necessarily escalate simultaneously.

Budget Reforms in Times of Austerity: A Centralization Cascade in Danish Central Government?: Budget Reforms in Times of Austerity

Based on a study of changes of the Danish budget institutions, the paper explores how a centralization cascade may look like, and discusses the consequences thereof. The paper identifies a centralization cascade, as the Ministry of Finance acquires increased power and greater control over the line ministries. Consequently, line ministries enhance their control over their agencies, which is followed by enhanced internal management and control within agencies. The changes imply both functional and dysfunctional consequences as well as the appearance of a range of trade‐offs between the different functions of a budget.