Magnus Henrekson

The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System

To get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism should be taken into account. In particular, absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. We examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using long time series data (1955–99) for Sweden with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permanent increases in sick leave, and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983–91 period.

Tax Effects on Work Activity, Industry Mix and Shadow Economy Size: Evidence from Rich-Country Comparisons

Guided by a simple theory of task assignment and time allocation, we investigate the long run response to national differences in tax rates on labor income, payrolls and consumption. The theory implies that higher tax rates reduce work time in the market sector, increase the size of the shadow economy, alter the industry mix of market activity, and twist labor demand in a way that amplifies negative effects on market work and concentrates effects on the less skilled. We also describe conditions whereby cross-country OLS regressions yield unbiased estimates of the total effect of taxes, inclusive of indirect effects that work through government spending responses to tax revenues. Regressions on rich-country samples in the mid 1990s indicate that a unit standard deviation tax rate difference of 12.8 percentage points leads to 122 fewer market work hours per adult per year, a drop of 4.9 percentage points in the employment-population ratio, and a rise in the shadow economy equal to 3.8 percent of GDP. It also leads to 10 to 30 percent lower employment and value added shares in (a) retail trade and repairs, (b) eating, drinking and lodging, and (c) a broader industry group that includes wholesale and motor trade.

Explaining National Differences in the Size and Industry Distribution of Employment

What forces determine national differences in the size and industry distribution of employment? We stress the role of the economic policy environment as determined by business taxes, employment security laws, credit market regulations, the national pension system, wage-setting institutions and the size of the public sector. We characterize these aspects of the economic environment in Sweden prior to 1990–91 and compare them to the situation in other European countries and the United States. Our characterization and international comparisons show that Swedish policies and institutions strongly disfavored less capital-intensive firms, smaller firms, entry by new firms, and individual and family ownership of business.We also compile evidence that these forces affect outcomes. Taking the U.S. industry distribution as a benchmark that reflects a comparatively neutral set of policies and institutions, Swedens employment distribution in the mid-1980s is sharply tilted away from low-wage industries and industries with greater employment shares for smaller firms and establishments. Compared to other European countries, Sweden has an unusually high share of employment in large firms. Furthermore, the Swedish rate of self- employment in the 1970s and 1980s is the lowest among all OECD countries.The institutional and policy factors emphasized by our study differ greatly across countries. This fact suggests that our approach can be fruitfully applied to other studies of national differences in industry and size structures and their evolution over time. As an example, the tax reform wave of the 1980s – which largely evened out cross-country differences in corporate taxation among OECD countries – offers some basis for projecting a movement towards greater similarity among wealthy countries in the size and industry distribution of employment.

Institutional Effects on the Evolution of the Size Distribution of Firms

In this paper it is argued that the size distribution of firms may largely be determined by institutional factors. This hypothesis is tested in an exploratory fashion by studying the evolution of the size distribution of firms over time in Sweden for a period spanning from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. The data used are divided into finer size classes compared to most previous studies. This gives more scope for investigating the impact of institutions. Moreover, we use a unique data set, starting in 1984, to take account of corporate groups and government ownership. The analysis shows a poor development for intermediate-sized (10–199 employees) firms. This is likely to reflect the existence of a threshold that many firms are either unwilling or unable to cross. The analysis of the institutions and rules of the game determining the entrepreneurial and business conditions in Sweden indicate that the conditions have been unfavorable for small firms, and hence that too few small firms have managed to grow out of the smallest size classes. The conclusion is supported by an international comparison of the number of firms in different size classes. Data indicate that Sweden has fewer small (10–99 employees), and more large (500+) firms per capita than other European countries.

Government Size and Growth: A Survey and Interpretation of the Evidence

The literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings. This conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied. An alternative approach—of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries, measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time—reveals a more consistent picture. The most recent studies find a significant negative correlation: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5 to 1 percent lower annual growth rate. We discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation, and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation. Against this background, we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth: (i) that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy, and (ii) that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market-friendly policies in other areas. Both explanations are supported by current research.

Entrepreneurship and Institutions

In this paper entrepreneurs are defined as agents who bring about economic change by combining their own effort with other factors of production in search of economic rents. The institutional setup is argued to determine both the supply and direction of entrepreneurial activity. Four key institutions are explored more closely: property rights protection, savings policies, taxation and the regulation of labor markets. Institutions have far-reaching effects on entrepreneurship, and they largely determine whether or not entrepreneurial activity will be socially productive. Due to the responsiveness of entrepreneurship to the institutional setup it is maintained that in-depth analyses of specific institutions are required in order to further our understanding of the determinants of entrepreneurial behavior and the economic effects of entrepreneurship. The paper also demonstrates that it is problematic to use self-employment as an empirical proxy for productive entrepreneurship.

Small business activity does not measure entrepreneurship

Significance Schumpeterian entrepreneurship refers to growing and innovative firms. However, in empirical research the rate of entrepreneurship is commonly estimated using the self-employment rate or other measures of small business activity. We argue that this empirical strategy gives rise to misleading inferences regarding Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. To unambiguously identify this type of entrepreneur we focus on self-made billionaires on Forbes Magazine’s list who became wealthy by founding new firms. We identify 996 such billionaire entrepreneurs in over 50 countries. The rate of billionaire entrepreneurs correlates negatively with self-employment, small business ownership, and startup rates. Countries with higher income, higher trust, lower taxes, more venture capital investment, and lower regulatory burdens have higher entrepreneurship rates but less self-employment. Entrepreneurship policy mainly aims to promote innovative Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. However, the rate of entrepreneurship is commonly proxied using quantity-based metrics, such as small business activity, the self-employment rate, or the number of startups. We argue that those metrics give rise to misleading inferences regarding high-impact Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. To unambiguously identify high-impact entrepreneurs we focus on self-made billionaires (in US dollars) who appear on Forbes Magazine’s list and who became wealthy by founding new firms. We identify 996 such billionaire entrepreneurs in 50 countries in 1996–2010, a systematic cross-country study of billionaire entrepreneurs. The rate of billionaire entrepreneurs correlates negatively with self-employment, small business ownership, and firm startup rates. Countries with higher income, higher trust, lower taxes, more venture capital investment, and lower regulatory burdens have higher billionaire entrepreneurship rates but less self-employment. Despite its limitations, the number of billionaire entrepreneurs appears to be a plausible cross-country measure of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship.

Competencies and Institutions Fostering High-Growth Firms

High-growth firms (HGFs) are critical for net job creation and economic growth. We analyze HGFs using the theory of competence blocs, linking firm growth to property rights and the interaction of complementary expertise. Specifically, we discuss how the institutional framework affects the prevalence and performance of HGFs. Firm growth is viewed as resulting from the perpetual discovery and use of productive knowledge. A key element in this process is the competence bloc, a nexus of economic actors with complementary competencies that are vital in order to generate and commercialize novel ideas. The institutional framework determines the incentives for these individuals to acquire and utilize knowledge. We identify a number of institutions that foster the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs. In particular, our analysis points to the pivotal roles played by tax structures, labor market regulation, and the contestability of currently closed service markets. Finally, we characterize institutions beneficial for sclerotic or dynamic capitalism, respectively, depending on whether they provide a favorable environment for the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs.

The Interaction of Entrepreneurship and Institutions

Previous research, notably Baumol (1990), has highlighted the role of insti- tutions in channeling entrepreneurial supply into productive, unproductive or destruc- tive activities. However, entrepreneurship is not only influenced by institutions— entrepreneurs often help shape institutions themselves. The bilateral causal relation between entrepreneurs and institutions is examined in this paper. Entrepreneurs affect institutions in at least three ways. Entrepreneurship abiding by existing institutions is occasionally disruptive enough to challenge the foundations of prevailing institutions. Entrepreneurs sometimes have the opportunity to evade institutions, which tends to undermine the effectiveness of the institutions, or cause institutions to change for the better. Lastly, entrepreneurs can directly alter institutions through innovative political entrepreneurship. Like business entrepreneurship, innovative political activity may be productive or unproductive, depending on the incentives facing entrepreneurs.

Entrepreneurship and Public Policy

Public policy is currently shifting from SME policy towards entrepreneurship policy, which supports entrepreneurship without directing attention to quantitative goals and specific firms or employment groups. The institutional framework set by public policy affects the prevalence and performance of both productive entrepreneurship and so-called high-impact entrepreneurship in turn. Although varying contexts and economic systems make prescribing a general panacea impossible, a number of relevant policy areas are identified and analyzed. Independent of environment, productive entrepreneurship should be rewarded and unproductive entrepreneurship should be discouraged. Successful ventures must also have the incentive to continue renewing themselves just as it must be easy to start and expand a business. In particular, we analyze regulatory entry and growth barriers, labor market regulation, liquidity constraints and tax policy at length.