Manthos D. Delis

Regulations, Competition and Bank Risk-Taking in Transition Countries

This study investigates whether regulations have an independent effect on bank risk-taking or whether their effect is channeled through the market power possessed by banks. Given a well-established set of theoretical priors, the regulations considered are capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities and official supervisory power. We use data from the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998-2005. The empirical results suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. Capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with market power this effect significantly weakens. Higher activity restrictions in combination with more market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of default, while official supervisory power has only a direct impact on bank risk.

Bank-Level Estimates of Market Power

The aim of this study is to provide an empirical methodology for the estimation of market power of individual banks. The new method employs the well-known model of Panzar and Rosse (1987) and proposes its estimation using the local regression technique. Thus, a number of restrictive assumptions regarding the properties of the production function of banks are relaxed, while the method proves successful in providing reasonable estimates of bank-level market power when applied to a large panel of banks of transition countries. The empirical results suggest that many banks in the sample deviate significantly from competitive practices and that market power varies substantially across banks in each country. Country averages of the bank-level results exhibit a very close relationship with standard, industry-level Panzar-Rosse estimates.

A New Data Set on Competition in National Banking Markets

We estimate the degree of competition in the banking sectors of 148 countries over the period 1997-2010 using three methods: the Lerner index, the adjusted Lerner index, and the profit elasticity. Marginal cost estimates required for all methods are obtained using a flexible semi-parametric methodology. All three indices show that competitive conditions in banking deteriorated during the period 1997-2006, improved until 2008, and deteriorated again thereafter. Levels of competition differ across regions and income groups, but there is gradual convergence over time. Banking systems in less competitive sub-Saharan Africa and low income countries and more competitive in Europe and Central and South Asia and OECD countries.

Evaluating cost and profit efficiency: a comparison of parametric and nonparametric methodologies

The objective of this article is 2-fold. First, it provides an empirical assessment of the cost and profit stochastic frontiers based on a panel dataset of Greek commercial banks over the period 1993 to 2005. Second, on the basis of the same sample, it also compares the most widely used parametric and nonparametric techniques to cost efficiency measurement, namely, the Stochastic Frontier Approach and Data Envelopment Analysis. The results suggest greater similarities between the predictions of cost and profit efficiency methods than between parametric and nonparametric techniques. Such evidence is new in the literature and calls for a more technically level playing field for estimating bank efficiency.

Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: Empirical Evidence

This article provides cross-country evidence that variations in bank regulatory policies result in differences in income distribution. In particular, the overall liberalization of banking systems decreases income inequality significantly. However, this effect becomes insignificant for countries with low levels of economic and institutional development and for market-based economies. Among liberalization policies, credit and interest rate controls have the most significant negative effect on inequality. Privatizations and liberalization of international capital flows also decrease income inequality; the latter also increases the income share of the relatively poor. In contrast, liberalization of securities markets increases income inequality substantially.

The Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in the USA: Evidence from Micro-Level Data

There is a growing consensus that a prolonged period of low interest rates can exert a negative impact on financial stability through the risk-taking incentives of banks. Using micro-level datasets from the US banking sector, this paper finds evidence of a highly significant negative relationship between monetary policy rates and bank-risk taking. This finding remains robust across various specifications, sub-periods and subsamples, thereby confirming the presence of an active risk-taking channel of monetary policy since the 1990s. The results, therefore, support the new responsibilities of the Fed on macro-prudential supervision to monitor systemic risks.

On the Estimation of Marginal Cost.

This article proposes the estimation of the marginal cost of individual firms using semiparametric and nonparametric methods. These methods have a number of appealing features when applied to cost functions. The empirical analysis uses data from a unique sample of the California electricity industry for which we observe the actual marginal cost and estimate the marginal cost from these data. We compare the actual values of marginal cost with the estimates from semiparametric and nonparametric methods, as well as with the estimates obtained through conventional parametric methods. We show that the semiparametric and nonparametric methods produce marginal cost estimates that very closely approximate the actual. In contrast, the results from conventional parametric methods are significantly biased and provide invalid inference.

Anxious periods and bank lending.

We examine the lending behavior of banks during anxious periods. The main characteristic of anxious periods is that the perceptions and expectations about economic conditions worsen for economic agents even though the economy is not in a recession. We identify distinct periods of anxiety for consumers, CEOs (firms) and analysts. Subsequently, we study the lending behavior of US banks during the anxious quarters from 1985 to 2010, using bank-level data. The results show that banks’ lending falls when consumers and analysts are anxious, and this effect is more pronounced when banks hold a higher level of credit risk. These effects are more pronounced in anxious periods that were followed by recessions, and in these periods loan growth also responds negatively to the anxiety of CEOs. Yet, these effects are quite less prevalent in the period after 2001.

Firms’ Risk Endogenous to Strategic Management Choices

Use of variability of profits and other accounting-based ratios in order to estimate a firms risk of insolvency is a well-established concept in management and economics. This paper argues that these measures fail to approximate the true level of risk accurately because managers consider other strategic choices and goals when making risky decisions. Instead, we propose an econometric model that incorporates current and past strategic choices to estimate risk from the profit function. Specifically, we extend the well-established multiplicative error model to allow for the endogeneity of the uncertainty component. We demonstrate the power of the model using a large sample of U.S. banks, and show that our estimates predict the accelerated bank risk that led to the subprime crisis in 2007. Our measure of risk also predicts the probability of bank default both in the period of the default, but also well in advance of this default and before conventional measures of bank risk.

Bank Market Power and Monetary Policy Transmission

This paper examines empirically the role of bank market power as an internal factor influencing banks’ reaction in terms of lending and risk taking to monetary policy impulses. The analysis is carried out for the U.S. and euro-area banking sectors over the period 1997–2010. Market power is estimated at the bank-year level, using a method that allows the efficient estimation of marginal cost of banks also at the bank-year level. The findings show that banks with even moderate levels of market power are able to buffer the negative impact of a monetary policy change on bank loans and credit risk. This effect is somewhat more pronounced in the euro area compared with the United States. However, following the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007, the level of market power needed to shield bank loans and credit risk from the impact of a change in monetary policy increased substantially. This is clear evidence that the financial crisis reinforced the mechanisms of the bank lending and the risk-taking channels.