Manuel Pérez Otero

Possible Worlds: Structure and Stuff

Abstract Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that any philosophically satisfying conception of modality that encompasses possible worlds semantics (PWS) commits us to the Barcan Formula. His argument depends on the assumption that the domain of what there is (the domain of the actual world) has to be identified with the domain D(@), where @ is the index or possible world that in PWS represents, or stands for, the actual world. I work out an interpretation of the relation between PWS and possible worlds terminology that makes it plausible to reject that assumption.

The Humean problem of induction and Carroll's Paradox

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns.

Purposes of reasoning and (a new vindication of) Moore's proof of an external world

A common view about Moore’s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore’s Proof is—in that sense—dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore’s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my defence is to conceive the Proof as addressed to subjects with a different epistemic condition. To sustain this view I formulate some hypothesis about the common general purpose of arguing and I defend that it can be fulfilled even when the addressee of an argument is not someone who disbelieves or doubts its conclusion.

Davidson, correspondence truth and the frege-Gödel—church argument

This paper argues for a conditional claim concerning a famous argument—developed by Church in elucidation of some remarks by Frege to the effect that the bedeutung of a sentence is the sentence’s truth-value—the Frege–Godel–Church argument, or FGC for short. The point we make is this :if, and just to the extent that, Arthur Smullyan’s argument against Quines use of FGC is sound, then essentially the same rejoinder disposes also of Davidsons use of FGC against ‘correspondence’ theories of truth. We thus dispute a contention by Professor Davidson that it is coherent to accept that Smullyan’s rejoinder takes away the force of Quine’s version of FGC, while still consistently using FGC to establish that if true sentences (or utterances) correspond to anything, they all correspond to the same thing. We show that the differences between the cases discussed by Smullyan and Davidson’s version of FGC on which Davidson relies for his contention are irrelevant to the point under dispute

Pluralismo plural en la concepción de Wittgenstein sobre seguir una regla

Wittgenstein defiende una concepcion pluralista sobre el seguimiento de reglas: es imposible que hubiera una unica vez en que alguien siguiera una regla. Con frecuencia se le ha atribuido esa tesis porque es una consecuencia plausible de una concepcion comunitarista que tal vez tambien propugna: es imposible que hubiera un unico sujeto que siguiera alguna regla. En este articulo identifico una motivacion diferente que Wittgenstein puede tener para sostener la concepcion pluralista; es una motivacion relacionada con la vaguedad de los procesos conducentes a adquirir la condicion de seguidores de una regla.