Manuel Salas-Velasco

Who Manages Spain's Water Resources? The Political and Administrative Division of Water Management

At the beginning of the 20th century, Spain introduced a pioneering system of water management by river basins, which was later endorsed by the EU Water Framework Directive. Recently, for a variety of political and administrative reasons, a number of fierce territorial disputes and debates have arisen that challenge the validity of this system. Changes have also taken place in the way water is managed, with a shift towards a more environmentally friendly approach. It is recommended that the river basin remain the basic territorial unit for any water management system, although this will require a National Water Agreement.

Assessment of Productive Efficiency in Irrigated Areas of Andalusia

Expansionist policies in irrigation in Andalusia have led to an intensive use of water, which has depleted rivers and aquifers and led to high added costs in terms of hidden subsidies for irrigation farming. Water scarcity has become an increasing social and economic worry for those responsible for regulating water policies and has created problems among users, especially when it is an important factor for production purposes. This empirical study analyses the differences that exist in terms of economic efficiency in the 156 irrigation areas of Andalusia. To achieve rational management of irrigation water it is essential to consider economic efficiency and carry out comparative studies to identify the causes that contribute to differences in terms of efficiency. This paper describes the conclusions of a study into economic rationality in the use of such a scarce resource as water.

Teaching Third-Degree Price Discrimination by a Monopolist with Linear Demands

This paper uses both a geometrical and mathematical analysis to explain monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, and it also shows how price discrimination affects society. A frequent policy question in the price discrimination literature is whether to allow third-degree price discrimination or to enforce uniform pricing. A key feature to understanding this issue in the context of imperfectly competitive markets is the impact of price discrimination on output. The article shows that a monopoly facing downward sloping linear demands, and constant marginal costs, will obtain higher profits under price discrimination than under a single-price strategy, but price discrimination lowers welfare if total output does not change. When price discrimination causes total output to increase, then this practice will have a beneficial effect on overall welfare.