Manuel Wäckerle

An Agent-Based Model of Institutional Life-Cycles

We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social structures. We show how endogenized trust and exogenously given leader authority influences institutional change, i.e. , diversity in institutional life-cycles. It turns out that these governed institutions (de)structure in cyclical patterns dependent on the overall evolution of trust in the artificial society, while at the same time, influencing this evolution by supporting social learning. Simulation results indicate three scenarios of institutional life-cycles. Institutions may, (1) build up very fast and freeze the artificial society in a stable but fearful pattern (ordered system); (2) exist only for a short time, leading to a very trusty society (highly fluctuating system); and (3) structure in cyclical patterns over time and support social learning due to cumulative causation of societal trust (complex system).

A computational agent-based simulation of an artificial monetary union for dynamic comparative institutional analysis

We present a highly stylized agent-based computational model (ABM) of an artificial economic and monetary union. Contrary to other current macroeconomic ABMs, it focuses on the relations/consequences of credit-financed, high-leveraged economies, conspicuous consumption within and across borders and a monetary and economic union of individual countries. The model includes a number of boundedly rational agents of the following types: a central bank, states & governments, banks, firms and households. In summary, it enables simulations of interacting political economies within a monetary union, entailing complex interactions and interdependencies between centralized governments/central banks and decentralized markets for goods (regular and status), labor, loans as well as bonds from the bottom up. Through its modular structure, we are able to apply dynamic comparative institutional analysis by investigating medium and long-run economic effects.

Ökonomie im Ereignis – Zeit der Verzweiflung? Zu Joseph Vogls kulturwissenschaftlicher Kritik der Oikodizee

Das Gespenst des Kapitals lasst sich als Antwort auf ein aus der Finanzwirtschaft her kommendes, aber weit uber deren Grenzen hinausgehendes Ereignis lesen – oder besser auf eine Serie von Ereignissen, die man gemeinhin Finanzkrisen nennt. Diese Ereignisserie beruht, wie Vogls Essay analysiert, paradoxerweise auf einer Verkennung der Ereignishaftigkeit des Marktgeschehens durch die orthodoxe, neoklassische Wirtschaftstheorie.

Transitions of Democracy: An Evolutionary Political Economy Perspective

This chapter offers a fundamental criticism on the alterations of democratic regimes as a result of conditions determined by political economy. The article emphasizes the fact that democracy is a non-static principle, rather, it is a dynamic, evolving and context-dependent principle influenced by conditions relating to historical processes. The article reminds us of the necessity to reinvent political philosophy, and in extension consider new forms of democratic governance, by developing a thorough understanding of the implications economic patterns have on the nature of democratic governance and transition.