Marc J. Hetherington

The Political Relevance of Political Trust

Scholars have debated the importance of declining political trust to the American political system. By primarily treating trust as a dependent variable, however, scholars have systematically underestimated its relevance. This study establishes the importance of trust by demonstrating that it is simultaneously related to measures of both specific and diffuse support. In fact, trusts effect on feelings about the incumbent president, a measure of specific support, is even stronger than the reverse. This provides a fundamentally different understanding of the importance of declining political trust in recent years. Rather than simply a reflection of dissatisfaction with political leaders, declining trust is a powerful cause of this dissatisfaction. Low trust helps create a political environment in which it is more difficult for leaders to succeed.

Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization

For the most part, scholars who study American political parties in the electorate continue to characterize them as weak and in decline. Parties on the elite level, however, have experienced a resurgence over the last two decades. Such a divergence between elite behavior and mass opinion is curious, given that most models of public opinion place the behavior of elites at their core. In fact, I find that parties in the electorate have experienced a noteworthy resurgence over the last two decades. Greater partisan polarization in Congress has clarified the parties’ ideological positions for ordinary Americans, which in turn has increased party importance and salience on the mass level. Although parties in the 1990s are not as central to Americans as they were in the 1950s, they are far more important today than in the 1970s and 1980s. The party decline thesis is in need of revision.

The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968–96

Scholars have consistently demonstrated that no link exists between declining political trust and declining turnout, but they have paid less attention to the effect of trust on vote choice. In an era characterized by declining trust, the incumbent party has lost, and third parties have strongly contested, four of the last eight presidential elections. Such outcomes are historically anomalous. This study demonstrates that declining political trust affects vote choice, but the electoral beneficiary differs according to electoral context. In two-candidate races, politically distrustful voters support candidates from the nonincumbent major party. In races with three viable candidates, third-party alternatives benefit from declining political trust at the expense of both major parties.

Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism

The “rally-round-the-flag effect” sparked by the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington and by President George W. Bushs prompt launching of the War on Terrorism cries out for the kind of timely analysis that political scientists sometimes can provide. A rally effect is the sudden and substantial increase in public approval of the president that occurs in response to certain kinds of dramatic international events involving the United States. The September 11 rally effect is distinctive for at least three reasons. First, of all the recorded rally effects, it is the largest. Bushs approval rating soared in the Gallup Poll from 51% on September 10 to 86% on September 15. The presidents approval rating is the percentage of survey respondents who answer “approve” to the question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the job [name] is doing as president?” This 35-point increase nearly doubles the previous record, the 18-point boost triggered by his fathers launch of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. Second, the further increase in Bushs approval rating to 90% on September 22 represents the highest rating ever recorded for a president ( Morin 2001 ). Third, the September 11 rally effect has lasted longer than any in the history of polling. As of November 10, 2002, Bushs approval rating was 68%—22 points below its peak but still much higher than his rating 13 months earlier.

Priming, Performance, and the Dynamics of Political Trust

Political trust has never returned to Great Society-era levels. Conventional wisdom suggests that chronically poor performance explains why. Over the last 25 years, however, performance has often been at least very good. We show that one key to understanding the persistence of lower levels of political trust is that Americans have become more apt to use less favorable criteria when asked to evaluate government. When more people identify international problems as most important, trust increases. Hence the steep decline in concern about international issues after the 1960s has set a lower baseline than before. In addition, we show that the effect of economic performance on political trust is asymmetric. Since fewer people think the economy is important during good times than bad, even the often strong economies of the past 30 years increased trust less than the poor economies diminished it. Taken together, our results imply that a return to 1960s-era trust levels is unlikely.

Putting Polarization in Perspective

Scholarly research has demonstrated rather conclusively that American political elites have undergone a marked partisan polarization over the past thirty years. There is less agreement, however, as to whether the American electorate is polarized. This review article evaluates the evidence, causes and consequences of polarization on both the elite and mass levels. A marked difference between the two is found. Elites are polarized by almost any definition, although this state of affairs is quite common historically. In contrast, mass attitudes are now better sorted by party, but generally not polarized. While it is unclear whether this potentially troubling disconnect between centrist mass attitudes and extreme elite preferences has negative policy consequences, it appears that the super-majoritarian nature of the US Senate serves as a bulwark against policy outcomes that are more ideologically extreme than the public would prefer. Moreover, a public more centrist than those who represent it has also at times exerted a moderating influence on recent policies.

The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and the Polarization of Congressional Parties

We argue that the leadership selection system, which now gives significant weight to fundraising, helps explain the continuing polarization of the congressional parties. Focusing first on elected party leadership posts, we demonstrate that members will select ideologically extreme leaders over “ideological middlemen” when extremists redistribute more money than their more centrist opponents. We then show that redistributing campaign money also helps ideologues win posts in the extended party leadership, though appointment to such posts by the top leaders (rather than by the caucus) makes the role of money and ideology more complex. Specifically, we demonstrate that top leaders, who are now ideologues themselves, reward the contributions of ideologically like-minded members more heavily than those of ideologically dissimilar members. This produces a more polarized leadership in Congress.

Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics: Threat and Authoritarianism: Polarization or Convergence

As the literature has evolved from treating authoritarianism as a static personality characteristic a la Adorno et al. (1950) to seeing it as a disposition that manifests itself in situation-specific circumstances (e.g., Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005), threat has come to play a starring role in understanding its effect. Scholars today tend to believe that the level of authoritarianism in a population generally stays the same over time (but see, e.g., Altemeyer 1996, who measures authoritarianism differently). Its effect , however, changes depending upon measurable circumstances. Specifically, most scholars argue that an authoritarian disposition lies dormant in the absence of threat, meaning that under this condition the preferences of the more and less authoritarian will not differ by much. Threat activates an authoritarian disposition, which, in turn, causes it to have measurable effects on opinions, behaviors, and preferences (see, e.g., Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005, for the most complete treatment). Although we wholeheartedly embrace the notion of situationism – that authoritarianisms effect will wax and wane depending on how threatened people feel – we will demonstrate that scholars have misunderstood the relationship between threat and authoritarianism. Worse, this flawed thinking encourages a fundamental misreading of the recent dynamics of American politics. In correcting this misunderstanding, we can better explain why support for gay rights, limitations on civil liberties, the use of force, and even approval of the president have tended to move in the directions they have over the last decade.

The Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns, by Lynn Vavreck

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Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics: Spanking or Time Out: A Clash of Worldviews?

In September 2004, National Public Radio’s late afternoon news show, All Things Considered, visited West Virginia to interview potential voters. The state had gone to George W. Bush in 2000, marking a departure from its typical voting pattern. Between 1932 and 1996, Republicans won West Virginia only three times (1956, 1972, and 1984), and each victory was part of an overwhelming Republican landslide. Even in 1980, when Democrat Jimmy Carter carried a mere six states, one of them was West Virginia. Democrats have dominated the state’s congressional delegation for decades. In 2000, both U.S. Senators, Robert Byrd and Jay Rockefeller were Democrats, and two of the state’s three congressional districts were represented by longtime Democratic incumbents. Bush’s victory, moreover, was substantively important. Had West Virginia voted Democratic as was typical, Al Gore would have been elected president with 271 electoral votes. One of reporter Brian Naylor’s interviews on NPR was with a truck driver named Mark Methany. With the September 11 terrorist attacks only three years in the past, the candidates’ relative ability to deal with foreign threats and terrorism was, not surprisingly, on Methany’s mind. The way he talked about the issue, however, was a bit surprising. In sizing up the contest between Bush and Democratic Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, Methany said, “I really think that [George Bush] is the man for the job to face down our enemy. He won’t just give [Osama bin Laden] a time out. He’ll smack him in the mouth.”1 Bush as tough and Kerry as wimp were familiar campaign personas in 2004. Such personas fit into larger themes of the parties and their respective “manliness.” MSNBC’s Chris Matthews, host of the popular political talk show, Hardball, has dubbed the Democratic Party the “Mommy Party” and the Republican Party the “Daddy Party.” Arnold Schwarzenegger, the