Marc Lanteigne

China and international institutions : alternate paths to global power

1. Introduction 2. Red Light, Green Light: China and the World Trade Organisation 3. Flying Geese and Rising Phoenix: China, APEC, and Exclusive Trade Regimes 4. Chimeras or Peacebuilders? Chinas New Approach to Strategic Regimes 5. Labyrinths Edge: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 6. Seeking Modernity: Chinas Institutional Openings and Shifts in International Power

Introduction: China and UN Peacekeeping

After many decades of eschewing participation in UN peacekeeping missions, the Peoples Republic of China has since the 1990s rapidly reversed its critical stance and become an enthusiastic supporter of and contributor to several different types of UN missions including, some that have involved non-traditional peacekeeping. Evolving Chinese peacekeeping policy has suggested that despite the countrys widely acknowledged rise to great-power status, within UN peacekeeping it still takes on the role of a middle power in its preferences for multilateralism and ‘norm-taking’. Although China has stated that it wishes to continue its deep engagement in UN peacekeeping within its established norms for the near future, its presence as a rising power has prompted much new debate on how the country will tacitly and directly shape peacekeeping policy.

Fire over water: China's strategic engagement of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden crisis

Abstract Since China agreed to join the international counter-piracy coalition in late 2008, a watershed development in Chinese strategic policy, Beijings engagement in Somalia is now following two separate streams. First, China is seeking to engage Somalia as part of its expanding number of African diplomatic partners via its participation in the coalition. Second, China is attempting to demonstrate, on the international level, its growing commitment to developing its naval capabilities, and protecting its maritime trade interests, by engaging in multilateral and coalition-based operations, namely to combat piracy off the Somali coast, in order to deflect criticism from the United States and its allies of Chinas overall military expansion and modernization.

‘Have you entered the storehouses of the snow?’ China as a norm entrepreneur in the Arctic

The admission of China as an observer in the Arctic Council in 2013 was a significant step in the ongoing evolution of the countrys Arctic policy, but Beijing is still concerned about being accepted as a regional player given its geography and arguably lack of an Arctic history. As the Arctic becomes more open to scientific and economic engagement, China wishes to develop the idea of the Arctic as more of an international space as opposed to strictly a regional one, and to allow non-Arctic states, such as China itself, to become accepted as Arctic actors. However, in order to avoid a backlash from the Arctic states and potential exclusion from the regions development, Beijing cannot effectively be a unilateral ‘norm-maker’ in the Arctic. Instead, China has sought to develop the identity of a regional ‘norm entrepreneur’, engaging the Arctic on many levels to promote the norm of partnerships between Arctic and non-Arctic actors to promote positive sum outcomes. Through engagement via several areas and governmental levels, Beijing hopes to succeed in being widely viewed as a ‘near-Arctic state’ which can contribute to new norms, and possibly new regimes, in an Arctic which shows many signs of becoming further internationalised.

Choppy waters: the ‘return’ of Fiji to pacific affairs after the 2014 vote

Abstract Although Fiji held a successful election in September 2014, the country still faces problems related to the completion of its democratic transition following its emergence from a difficult period of regional and international isolation. Fiji continues to find itself pushing against the political order in the South Pacific, while maintaining a balance between established powers like Australia and New Zealand, and new partners including China. The case of Fiji as a small state which, by virtue of its perceived ‘centrality’ in the region, can shape diplomacy and regime development on a larger scale, is examined.

The South China Sea in China’s Developing Maritime Strategy

The South China Sea (SCS) maritime sovereignty dispute between China and its neighbours in Southeast Asia had greatly increased in intensity since 2010, and has developed into one of the most complex security questions in East Asia. China has been seeking a ‘small step’ approach to legitimising and clarifying its claims in the SCS, using non-military and incremental policies to avoid an overt balance of power scenario which might provoke a stronger reaction from the United States and its regional allies. This process of restricting SCS policies to incrimental approaches and maintaining a degree of strategic ambiguity in the region has benefitted Chinese policy in the region, but the sovereignty question in the SCS remains open as Beijings maritime power continues to grow and Washington contemplates its future security role in East Asia on several fronts.

Russia, China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Diverging Security Interests and the ‘Crimea Effect’

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an emerging security community created in 2001 to address looming threats, including terrorism and separatism, in the Central Asian region. China and Russia remain the major shapers of the SCO; but in recent years, differences over how the organization should evolve have begun to drive a subtle yet growing wedge between the two powers. Impending challenges related to expansion (India and Pakistan became full members in 2017), deepening Sino-Russian rifts (with China pushing for a stronger economic role for the organization, and Russia being more interested in hard security) and the ‘shadow of Crimea’ are likely to impede any Sino-Russian alliance in the foreseeable future.

‘The rock that can't be moved’: China's revised geostrategies in Myanmar

ABSTRACT Since 2011, Myanmar has undertaken a series of domestic and foreign policy reforms, including democratisation and peacebuilding, before and after the watershed November 2015 elections in the country. These reform processes have called into question whether China, which has been Myanmars dominant great power neighbour throughout the previous era of military government in the country formerly known as Burma, would find its strategic position eroding as Myanmar further opens to the international community. However, the concept of China ‘losing’ diplomatic ground to other actors, including the West, in Myanmar implies a zero-sum game that does not adequately address Beijings still-formidable geostrategic presence vis-à-vis its southern neighbour. China has now started to implement a more multi-faceted, ‘resilience network’-building approach to maintaining its special status in Myanmars foreign policy, a situation which will persist as Myanmar continues its uncertain path towards further reform.

New Actors and Innovative Approaches to Peacebuilding: The Case of Myanmar

This chapter examines the peacebuilding role of selected external actors, especially Indonesia and China, through a study of Myanmar. These two rising powers have played differing but prominent roles in peacebuilding. Indonesia represents an emerging actor in Myanmar diplomacy, both as a single player as well as a prominent member of ASEAN. The chapter shows how Indonesia has explicitly sought mainly to “share” its own experience of transition from semi-authoritarian rule and its handling of various internal armed conflicts. Its cooperation in peace processes and security training has been in response to the demand and pace of the partner government. China maintained ties with Myanmar during its period of diplomatic isolation between the late 1980s and 2010. Beijing adopted a soft power approach towards its southern neighbour, attempting to play a mediating role in peace talks in Myanmar and offering general support for negotiations, including hosting them. The Chinese Embassy in Yangon also sought a more active role in regional aid and assistance. Those initiatives reflect a more active global profile on peace issues as well as Beijing’s geopolitical interests. The chapter also briefly analyzes other external peacebuilding actors in Myanmar, namely Norway, India, Japan and Switzerland, to further elucidate similarities and differences among traditional and new peacebuilding actors.

The Russian Far East and the Northern Sea Route in Evolving Sino-Russian Strategic Relations

Since the coming to power of President Xi Jinping in China in 2013 , Sino-Russian economic relations have greatly improved, with Moscow concentrating on building trade links which are less dependent on the West, especially in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and strained Russia–Western relations. During 2014, the ‘pivot’ or ‘reorientation to Asia’ policies under Russian President Vladimir Putin were accelerated, while China proposed the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ in Eurasia and the ‘Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road’ in the Indian Ocean. Both routes may serve to further bring together Chinese and Russian economic and strategic interests. Yet there is another potential trade corridor, namely the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Arctic, which will factor significantly into the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Moscow as this maritime link between Asia and Europe comes into more common usage. The NSR should therefore be studied as the ‘third road’, which may link Chinese trade with Europe but also further augment Sino-Russian economic relations in Siberia and the Russian Far East.