Marc Pauly

Logical constraints on judgement aggregation

Logical puzzles like the doctrinal paradox raise the problem of how to aggregate individual judgements into a collective judgement, or alternatively, how to merge collectively inconsistent knowledge bases. In this paper, we view judgement aggregation as a function on propositional logic valuations, and we investigate how logic constrains judgement aggregation. In particular, we show that there is no non-dictatorial decision method for aggregating sets of judgements in a logically consistent way if the decision method is local, i.e., only depends on the individual judgements on the proposition under consideration.

Axiomatizing collective judgment sets in a minimal logical language

AbstractWe investigate under what conditions a given set of collective judgments can arise from a specific voting procedure. In order to answer this question, we introduce a language similar to modal logic for reasoning about judgment aggregation procedures. In this language, the formula

Decision framing in judgment aggregation

\square \varphi

What is social software

expresses that

A Framework for Ontological Policy Reconstruction: Academic Knowledge Transfer in the Netherlands as a Case Study

\varphi

Winning Isn’t Everything: How Sports Competition Rules Can Make You Want to Lose

is collectively accepted, or that