Marc V. Simon

Natural scientists, social scientists, and the environment: A cross‐border analysis

Abstract This study uses interviews with 64 Canadian and 65 United States scientists to compare and contrast their perspectives with respect to environmental policy making across borders, both geographic (Canada versus United States) and disciplinary (natural versus social science). The findings indicate that important imbalances remain between Canadian and United States scientists’ perceptions about cross‐border pollution. There appears to be a great divergence between the responses of natural and social scientists in the United States and a robust similarity between the responses of natural and social scientists in Canada. In the end, the results support the view that issues centered on the Canada‐United States environmental borderlands remain firmly linked to national differences and issues centered on the science‐ policy linkage remain substantially linked to disciplinary differences.

When sanctions can work: Economic sanctions and the theory of moves

The paradox of economic sanctions is that though they are used with increasing frequency in the post‐cold war world, policy makers and scholars still largely conclude that they do not work to produce political change in targeted countries. This paper uses Steven Brams’ revision of standard game theory, the “theory of moves,” to derive conditions for successful sanctions, failed sanctions, and stalemated sanctions disputes. Then, applying the theory of moves to the cases of U.S. sanctions against Vietnam and Haiti, it illustrates how Brams’ theory can explain the dynamics and outcome of sanctions disputes. The paper shows that even if the recipient state has a dominant strategy of noncompliance with the sanctioning state, sanctions can succeed—even when they are costly to the sanctioning state. Further, it demonstrates that the theory of moves provides a better conceptual account of the dynamics of sanctions disputes over time than traditional game theory.

Policy windows and two-level games: explaining the passage of acid-rain legislation in the Clean Air Act of 1990

Because of the transboundary nature of most environmental problems, environmental policy often lies at the intersection of domestic and international forces. Yet, because domestic and international issues are usually examined with different sets of theories and models, we tend to explain the policy process and outcome by emphasizing only one arena. Analysis of domestic policy is often dominated by process models, whereas scholars of international relations tend to apply rational models to explain state behavior. We apply Kingdons ‘policy windows’ model of agenda setting and Bramss dynamic game theory framework to the development of acid-rain legislation enacted by the USA in the Clean Air Act of 1990. We compare the explanations of these theories with the work of other analysts, as well as with perceptions of policymakers by using data from interviews of policymaking elites in Canadian and US government, industry, and interest groups. It is demonstrated that process models and models of strategic interaction can complement each other, providing improved explanations of policy outcomes.

Hawks, doves, and civil conflict dynamics: A “strategic” action‐reaction model

This paper develops a model of the escalation process of civil conflicts. The model is a system of differential equations, based on a population growth model structure. Unlike most models of this type, it treats the state as a rational but binary actor consisting of hawks and doves. The model reveals four underlying escalation dynamics which civil conflicts can take. Using these dynamics and the hawk‐dove dichotomy, the model is analyzed to show when it is beneficial for a state or intervener involved in a civil conflict to be hawkish or dovish in their strategy.

Two-Level Security Management and the Prospects for New Democracies: A Simulation Analysis

Most new democracies face serious internal, ethnic/separatist conflicts; in addition, some face international threats. The literature on the growth of democracy in the global system and its impact on world politics does not fully account for the dual threats all states must address in managing their security. Based on theoretical work by Starr (1994) which describes the “common logic” of conflict processes in war and revolution, we outline a model of how states respond to security threats from both external and internal sources. Using computer simulation, we analyze the model and evaluate the relative importance for state security of factors such as system size, numbers of democracies in the system, extraction/allocation strategy pursued by new democracies, and government legitimacy level. Our results show that new democracies thrive in systems that are predominantly democratic. Also, ally support can provide crucial resources for new democracies facing internal threats. Finally, “endangered” democracies can recover security by attempting to buy off domestic threats rather than deter them, and by improving legitimacy.

Environmental Scientists' Perceptions of the Science-Policy Linkage

n fall 1991, the National Acid I Preparation Assessment Program (NAPAP) released its final assessment report on acid rain; this document was a compilation of the best available scientific, technical, and economic information relevant to policymaking about acid rain. Many scientists were highly critical of this report and the NAPAP program in general. There were charges of political interference with the course of science and delays in the release of first-class science that did not support political agendas (Schindler, 1992). Individual scientists were accused of acting out of self-interest, using hype and selective data to support policy situations, and advocating policy without clearly distinguishing between policy and science (Perhac, 1991). These charges go right to the heart of the dilemma that has characterized environmental policymaking during the past several decades about how to resolve scientific questions through the political process while making scientific and political judgments compatible (Rosenbaum, 1998). Our study explores the science-policy linkage as it is played out today from the oftenneglected perspective of scientists; that is, how do scientists who were involved in the acid rain debate perceive their role in generating solutions to environmental problems, especially as this role pertains to concepts like objectivity, advocacy, and the separation of science from policy (and politics)? To complete our study, we interviewed 129 scientists from the United States and Canada. We conducted interviews from March 1997 to November 1997 and included both natural scientists (33 each from the U.S. and Canada) and social scientists (32 from the U.S. and 31 from Canada). Most of the scientists interviewed worked for universities (US. = 66%, Canada = 66%) or the government (U.S. = 31%, Canada = 33%). The natural scientists interviewed represented a range of disciplines, including chemistry (15), atmospheric science (13), biology (16), ecology (8), forestry (3), engineering (6), and geology (5). Social scientists interviewed represented a range of disciplines, including political science (28), economics (9), international studies (4), public administration and policy (lo), history (2), sociology (2), and environmental studies (8). We used the natural-social science and university-government dichotomies to explore the similarities and differences in perceptions between these groups, which result from differences in discipline, education, training, and expertise. We asked the scientists to answer four large, philosophical questions about the linkage of science to policy: (a) Do policy makers listen to scientists? (b) Should scientists advocate policy positions? (c) Is it possible to separate science from policymaking? and (d) Is it possible for scientists to be objective in completing their research? We then coded the interview results using cross tabulations and chisquare for significance testing. Our results identify a major division in scientific opinion that exists within a broad consensus that advocacy is acceptable and objectivity is possible. Regarding advocacy, objectivity, and the separation of science and policy, we see important differences between natural and social scientists and between government and university scientists. First, a consensus of scientists think that policymakers listen. If cynicism about this issue has grown because of the NAPAP experience, it showed up only as a minority view in our data and was not common in interviews. Because scientists think that policymakers listen, perhaps it makes sense to advocate. Second, a broad consensus exists across disciplines in favor of advocacy by scientists. How-