Marcel-Cristian Voia

What Determines the Length of a Typical Canadian Parliamentary Government

In this paper we examine the length of political tenure in Canadian federally elected parliamentary governments since 1867. Using data on tenure length, we categorize the distribution of governing tenures in terms of a hazard function--the probability that an election will arise in each year, given that an election has not yet been called. We then ask whether that distribution responds in a systematic way to characteristics of the political and/or economic environment. Our particular focus is on whether there is evidence of electoral timing and whether governing parties have used economy policy in conjunction with federal elections. Finally we investigate whether partisan effects emerge. The results suggest that, independent of party affiliation, governing parties do engage in election timing. The data also suggest that election calls coincide with periods of monetary expansion and more with tax decreases than with expenditure increases, supporting the Persson and Tabellini (2003) hypothesis that under parliamentary systems, it is tax cuts (rather than expenditure increases) that will be most closely associated with elections. Unlike the case in other parliamentary systems, however, Canadian data also support the hypothesis that tough measures (expenditure cuts) are postponed until after elections.

Currency Crises, Exchange Rate Regimes and Capital Account Liberalization: A Duration Analysis Approach

This paper empirically analyzes the effect of exchange rate regimes and capital account liberalization policies on the occurrence of currency crises for 21 countries over the period of1970-1998. We examine changes of the likelihood of currency crises under de jure, and de facto exchange rate regimes. We also test whether the impact of the exchange rate regimes on currency stability would be different under free and restricted capital flows. Our findings show that the likelihood of currency crises changes significantly under de facto regimes. However, the results are sensitive to the choice of de facto exchange rate arrangements. Furthermore, in our sample, capital control policies appear to be helpful in preventing low duration currency crises. The results are robust to a wide variety of sample and models checks.

Does the expectation or realization of a federal election precipitate Canadian output growth

This paper asks whether Canadian data is consistent with the predicted effects of political opportunism, partisanship, and political competition on real output growth since Confederation. Using annual data from 1870 to 2005 we find new support for an opportunistic electoral cycle in Canadian data but only if the actual election date used in most studies is replaced by an estimate of the incumbent governing partys subjectively held likelihood of an election arising. In our case the estimate is generated from a Cox-proportional hazard model. The paper explores in detail the issues raised by using a generated regressor to approximate a subjectively held expectation versus an observable proxy and argues that these conditions are met in our case. Finally we also find evidence consistent with partisan cycles in the data but much less evidence consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the degree of political competition have affected real output growth.

Does the Expectation or Realization of a Federal Election Precipitate Canadian Output Growth? (Est-Ce Que Lanticipation Ou La Tenue Dune Lection Fdrale a Un Effet Dclencheur Sur La Croissance Du Produit Canadien?)

This paper asks whether Canadian data is consistent with the predicted effects of political opportunism, partisanship, and political competition on real output growth since Confederation. Using annual data from 1870 to 2005 we find new support for an opportunistic electoral cycle in Canadian data but only if the actual election date used in most studies is replaced by an estimate of the incumbent governing partys subjectively held likelihood of an election arising. In our case the estimate is generated from a Cox-proportional hazard model. The paper explores in detail the issues raised by using a generated regressor to approximate a subjectively held expectation versus an observable proxy and argues that these conditions are met in our case. Finally we also find evidence consistent with partisan cycles in the data but much less evidence consistent with the hypothesis that changes in the degree of political competition have affected real output growth.

Youth Training Programs and Their Impact on Career and Spell Duration of Professional Soccer Players

A unique data set of post-war English trained soccer players that signed professionally with their parent club when they turned 18 is used to study the impact of their stay with the home team and their total career duration. The home team (first) spell and career durations of these soccer players in a top European leagues is modeled using robust hazard models. The results of the analysis show that players that start their professional careers after acquiring training in competitive youth academy/programs have different outcomes on their career and first spell duration depending on the clubs they start their training. The first spell duration analysis is performed to estimate the bond or loyalty factor established by clubs with their youth trainees. The spell analysis outlines the nature of the competitive environment in which smaller clubs have a chance to keep up with the larger ones in terms of producing and holding on to home-grown talent. This would be a necessary condition for them to remain competitive in light of their lagging financial resources that limit their activity and ability to attract top talent in the soccer transfer market. The analysis of career duration in the top European leagues will show the success of a specifc academys training programs in producing players competitive in top soccer leagues. Finally, the results of both analyses were tested for endogeneity bias using a split sample test.

Is the Aggregate Size of Government in Canada Too Large

This paper asks whether consolidated government in Canada is too large in relation to its effect on economic performance. Rather than impose a parametric shape, nonparametric methods are used to motivate the nonlinear form that best describes this relationship. Using data from 1929 through 2014 and controlling for the different time-series characteristics of the variables, the bias in standard errors that can be expected from correlations arising across time, and the presence of Wagners-law-type endogeneity in the relationship running between government size and private performance, we find evidence consistent with government size peaking in its effect on private output at roughly 32 percent of GDP.

Estimation of Health Care Demand and its Implication on Income Effects of Individuals

Zero inflation and over-dispersion issues can significantly affect the predicted probabilities as well as lead to unreliable estimations in count data models. This paper investigates whether considering this issue for German Socioeconomic Panel (1984–1995), used by Riphahn et al. (2003), provides any evidence of misspecification in their estimated models for adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health demand market. The paper has the following contributions: first, it shows that estimated parameters for adverse selection and moral hazard effects are sensitive to the model choice; second, the random effects panel data as well as standard pooled data models do not provide reliable estimates for health care demand (doctor visits); third, it shows that by appropriately accounting for zero inflation and over-dispersion there is no evidence of adverse selection behaviour and that moral hazard plays a positive and significant role for visiting more doctors. These results are robust for both males and females’ subsamples as well as for the full data sample.

Worker Separations and Industry Instability

This paper looks at the impact industry instability has on worker separations. Workers leave firms one of two ways: (i) voluntarily by quitting; or (ii) involuntarily through firm layoffs. Using data drawn from the Longitudinal Worker File, a Canadian firm-worker matched employment database, we are able distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separations using information on reasons for separations and assess the impact industry shutdown rates have on worker separation rates, both voluntarily and involuntarily. Once controlling for various factors and potential selection bias, we find that industry shutdown rates have a positive and significant effect on the overall separation, layoff and quit rates of workers. Finally, industry instability has a much larger impact on layoff rates when comparing voluntary and involuntary separations.