Marcello Pagnini

Distance, bank heterogeneity and entry in local banking markets

We examine the determinants of entry into Italian local banking markets during the period 1991-2002 and build a simple model in which the probability of branching in a new market depends on the features of both the local market and the potential entrant. Econometric findings show that banks are more likely to expand into those markets that are closest to their pre-entry locations. Large banks are also more able to cope with distance-related entry costs than small banks. Finally, banks have become increasingly able to open branches in distant markets, due to the advent of information and communication technologies. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Switching Costs in Local Credit Markets

Switching costs are a key determinant of market performance. This paper tests their existence in the corporate loan market in which they are likely to play a central role because of the complexity of contracts and informational problems. Using very detailed data at bank-firm level on four Italian local credit markets we empirically show that firms tend to iterate their choice of the main bank over time. This inertia is not related to unobserved and time invariant preferences of firms across banks and can be attributed to the existence of switching costs. We also offer evidence that banks price discriminate between new and old borrowers by charging lower interest rates to the former in order to cover part of the switching costs. The discount is about 44 basis points, equal to 7 per cent of the average interest rate. These results prove robust to a number of other potential identification drawbacks.

Information Technology and Banking Organization

We investigate the impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on local loan officers’ autonomy in small business lending. We derive a simple agency model of the interaction between a local branch manager and the headquarters, which yields an estimable equation for the optimal delegation of authority. Using a unique and specifically tailored dataset including about 300 Italian banks, we show that banks equipped with more ICT capital and resorting to credit scoring delegate more decision-making power to their local branch managers. These results are robust to many additional controls, including instrumental variable estimation. The effects on decentralization are strengthened for those banks that jointly hold higher ICT capital endowments and adopt credit scoring.

The Organization of Lending and the Use of Credit Scoring Techniques in Italian Banks: Results of a Sample Survey

This paper examines the results of a survey carried out in 2007 by the Bank of Italy concerning different characteristics of the organization of lending activities. Between 2003 and 2006 the physical distance between the headquarters and the branches increased, the limits to the decision-making process of loan officers were eased, their mobility raised, and the use of economic incentives to reward their activity expanded. The huge heterogeneity in organizational structures persists even within relatively homogenous size classes. The diffusion of statistical models to assess credit risk (scoring) accelerated recently particularly among large banks, boosted by the new Basel Capital Accord. Scoring is either very important or determinant in decisions on credit extension while it is rarely influential in setting interest rates, the duration of the credit, and the amount and type of collateral required. The survey shows that banks have been progressively adapting their organizational structure in order to incorporate the credit scoring tools into their lending processes.

Lending Organization and Credit Supply During the 2008-09 Crisis

Using a dataset that combines bank organizational variables with information on firms’ credit demand and balance-sheet indicators, we investigate the impact of how bank lending was organized on credit dynamics during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Our main findings suggest that the organization of lending to non-financial firms had an impact on the ability of banks to expand credit. Those that made substantial use of credit scoring techniques actually moderated the pace of credit growth during the economic downturn. At the same time, banks that delegated more power to branch managers were likely to expand lending at a faster rate. Finally, contrary to the evidence from the pre-crisis period, we find that lengthy branch manager tenure in the same branch was detrimental to the rate of credit growth. These findings are robust to a broad set of robustness checks.