Marcelo Pinheiro

Three Cycles: Housing, Credit, and Real Activity

We examine the characteristics and comovement of cycles in house prices, credit, real activity and interest rates in advanced economies during the past 25 years, using a dynamic generalised factor model. House price cycles generally lead credit and business cycles over the long term, while in the short to medium run the relationship varies across countries. Interest rates tend to lag other cycles at all time horizons. While global factors are important, the U.S. business cycle, house price cycle and interest rate cycle tend to lead the respective cycles in other countries over all time horizons. However, the U.S. credit cycle leads mostly over the long term.

Delegated Portfolio Management, Benchmarking, and the Effects on Financial Markets

We analyze the implications of linking the compensation of fund managers to the return of their portfolio relative to that of a benchmark—a common solution to the agency problem in delegated portfolio management. In the presence of such relativeperformance- based objectives, investors have reduced expected utility but markets are typically more informative and deeper. Furthermore, in a multiple asset/market framework we show that (i) relative performance concerns lead to an increase in the correlation between markets (financial contagion); (ii) benchmark inclusion increases price volatility; (iii) home bias emerges as a rational outcome. When information is costly, information acquisition is hindered and this attenuates the effects on informativeness and depth of the market.

‘White Men Can’t Jump,’ But Would You Bet on It?

We identify an otherwise efficient market in which racial stereotypes affect market outcomes. In this market, there are well-defined prices, well-defined outcomes, a finite time horizon, and readily available information. The market appears to efficiently process the available information, with the exception of the race of the participants. We examine data on point spreads for NBA games over the 15 seasons from 1993-94 to 2007-08. We find evidence that the racial composition of the team is related to the size of the spread and their performance against the spread. Specifically, we find that a more black team tends to face a larger point spread and that these teams perform worse against the spread. It is possible that this effect is driven by the bookmakers setting a biased point spread or driven by excessive betting on the more black team. Using a different data set containing the movement of the spread, we do not find a relationship between the movement of the spread and the racial composition of the team. As a result, we favor the explanation that the bookmakers set a biased point spread.

Racial Biases and Market Outcomes: 'White Men Can't Jump,' But Would You Bet On It?

We identify an otherwise efficient market in which racial biases affect market outcomes. In particular, we examine data on point spreads for NBA games over the 15 seasons from 1993-94 to 2007-08. We find evidence that a more black team tends to face a larger point spread and that these teams perform worse against the spread. These biased outcomes are significantly large and persistent so that we are able to identify profit opportunities. We also find evidence that the biased spread is set by the bookmakers rather than being moved as a result of excessive betting on the more black team. These findings are consistent with information-based discrimination where mistaken beliefs persist even though they are financially disadvantageous, and, more importantly, easily recognizable and correctable.

Exposure to Real Estate Losses: Evidence from the Us Banks

We implement a three-step procedure to assess the extent of exposure to real estate in commercial banks. First, we demonstrate interest rates and income to be the major determinants of delinquency. Then, we adopt a stress testing approach to calculate the impact of any adverse changes in these determinants. This suggests that a 1.3 percentage point increase in mortgage interest rate leads to a 20 percent decrease in a typical banks distance to default. Finally, we look at the cross-sectional differences and indentify the banks with rapid loan growth along with high cost-income ratio as the most vulnerable.