Marco Di Cintio

A note On the Hotelling Principle of Minimum Differentiation: Imitation and Crowd

Abstract This paper investigates price competition in the Hotelling location model with linear transportation costs when consumer preferences are affected by the number of consumers shopping at the same store. A consumption externality permits us to consider the imitation and the congestion effects which are opposite forces at work. The coexistence of the two effects confers new validity to the principle of minimum differentiation as it was in the original Hotelling model. I show that firms do not need to set apart in order to earn higher profits. The results show firms endogenously choosing to locate in the center of the interval sharing the market with positive prices.

Uncertainty, Flexible Labour Relations and R&D

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty and flexible labour contracts on the Research and Development (R&D) intensity. Using a panel of Italian manufacturing firms, we find a hump-shaped relationship between workforce flexibility and R&D intensity. Moreover, as predicted by the real options theory, our results suggest that product market uncertainty reduces R&D efforts and that flexible labour contracts countervail the adverse effect of uncertainty on R&D.

Wage Incentive Profiles in Dual Labor Markets

We propose a modified version of the Shapiro-Stiglitz’s (1984) efficiency wage model by introducing temporary contracts in the standard setup. New theoretical insights emerge on the incentive problem faced by workers and firms. We argue that the existence of temporary contracts broaden the incentive menu available to employers and that the optimal incentive structure can be sustained as an equi- librium outcome only if permanent contracts do not disappear. We also provide an alternative explanation of the wage penalty suffered by temporary workers even if standard models of efficiency wages would predict higher compensations for workers facing a higher job loss risk.

The Returns to Temporary Migration: The Case of Italian Ph.D.s

This paper examines the implications of temporary migration episodes for two cohorts of Italian Ph.D.s. Special attention is given to the duration of experience abroad, its contribution to earned wages and the selectivity of returnees. After controlling for the endogeneity of both the migration decision and the length of stay abroad, we find positive returns to longer periods abroad and negative returns to shorter periods. Returnees are also found to be positively self-selected. The results are confirmed in several robustness and sensitivity checks.

Product Differentiation and MultiProduct Strategies

This paper analyzes the price-setting behavior of multiproduct firms in a differentiated product market. The structure considered is one where large companies offer either a set of close substitutes (market segmentation) or a set of distant substitutes (market interlacing). The modelling strategy of the paper is to allow for two different elasticities of substitution: the intra-company elasticity of substitution and the inter-company elasticity of substitution. The key feature of the model is the possibility for multiproduct companies to choose their optimal internal organizational structure, according to the relative size of these two parameters. In order to maximize profits, each company may either set prices centrally, or alternatively it may assign an independent product manager to run each division. In other words, product managers of the same company may behave either independently or cooperatively. While the model does not consider either the proliferation or the product-line selection decisions, it deals with multiproduct frms price decisions under oligopolistic competition making use of conjectural variations. Its main purpose has been to provide a micro-founded answer about the question of whether and when a system of independent product managers (decentralized decisions) is better than a mechanism with a centralized general direction. Coordination is always profitable under market segmentation; while under market interlacing, the strategy of relying on independent product managers is profitable when the standard monopolistic competition arises; it may also be profitable with oligopolistic (Bertrand) competition under some assumptions.