Marco Portmann

Do Female Representatives Adhere More Closely to Voters’ Preferences than Male Representatives?

We analyze whether female or male members of parliament adhere more closely to citizens’ revealed preferences with quasi-experimental data. By matching individual representatives’ voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referenda outcomes on the same issues, we identify the effect of gender on representatives’ responsiveness to revealed preferences of the majority of voters. Overall, female members of parliament tend to adhere less to citizens’ preferences than male parliamentarians. However, when party affiliation is controlled for, the effect of gender vanishes. These results are consistent with other evidence showing that women are more socially minded and tend to affiliate themselves more with left parties.

No Place like Home: Opinion Formation with Homophily and Implications for Policy Decisions

ABSTRACT We set up an opinion diffusion model with a local opinion leader, and using simulations we show the possibility of driving a significant wedge between the opinions of two groups that exhibit homophily although individuals are highly conformist. There exists an opinion gap between the group to which the opinion leader belongs and the other group. This opinion gap increases according to the relative size of the residence community. We show empirical traits related to our simulation: Employing Swiss national referenda data from 2008 to 2012, we show that members of parliament match referenda outcomes in their residence communities closer than they do in neighboring communities and that this wedge interacts significantly with the relative size of the residence community.

How Lobbying Affects Representation: Results for Majority-Elected Politicians

Abstract: While most observers feel that interest groups influence parliamentary decisions, direct evidence on this topic is scarce. Matching parliamentary votes with referendum results helps to bridge this gap. Existing research for politicians of the Swiss Lower House of Parliament suggests that the number of sectional and cause interest groups affect the quality of political representation. We extend this analysis to majority-elected politicians of the Upper House and by more than 50 referendum decisions for the Lower House. Our results show that the pure number of sectional or cause groups does not affect defection of politicians from their constituents which suggests that the generalizability of the results may be limited.